Making Progress with an Atheist Philosopher | Podcast Highlights (2021-11-26) #

0:00:00 i don't think we i don't think we
0:00:02 necessarily and no pun intended started
0:00:04 there we i don't think we started there
0:00:06 so i think
0:00:08 we've made progress in in the
0:00:10 conversation that's just that's now i
0:00:12 look at it
0:00:20 right so then in that case
0:00:23 um there's a possible world in which
0:00:25 only abstract necessary things exist
0:00:29 and no concrete
0:00:31 um nothing concrete exists
0:00:34 uh yeah okay sure
0:00:37 i mean
0:00:37 i
0:00:39 i'm playing the game a bit an artist i'm
0:00:41 just wondering
0:00:48 where there's no beginning to time
0:00:51 every possible world overlaps with the
0:00:53 actual world
0:00:54 so
0:00:55 i mean unless the actual world at no
0:00:58 point contains any concrete things
0:01:00 then
0:01:01 um there isn't a possible world where
0:01:04 at no point is there a concrete thing
0:01:06 like if there's some concrete thing at
0:01:07 some point in the actual world then it's
0:01:09 not possible this is an entirely empty
0:01:12 world no concrete things in it but ah so
0:01:15 so that's so that yeah so then that's my
0:01:18 point is then that means that something
0:01:21 concrete is necessary
0:01:25 um
0:01:26 huh
0:01:28 i mean it follows that if there's
0:01:30 something concrete then it's necessary
0:01:32 that there's something hungry that's
0:01:33 true it doesn't follow it doesn't
0:01:36 i don't have to hold that there is but
0:01:37 um yeah i think that's right on the
0:01:39 aristotelian view that's right that
0:01:41 there's there couldn't be an empty world
0:01:42 unless the actual world is an empty
0:01:44 world
0:01:45 uh
0:01:46 right but then if that's the case then
0:01:48 now you have something necessary that's
0:01:50 concrete and now we go all the way back
0:01:53 to step one in which your your theory is
0:01:56 now radically different no no no no no
0:01:57 no no no
0:01:59 i don't have that there's a necessary
0:02:01 concrete thing but i think it's
0:02:02 necessary that there's something
0:02:04 concrete but each of those things could
0:02:05 be contingent it's just that there
0:02:07 couldn't be no
0:02:10 concrete things
0:02:11 right but it doesn't mean there is one
0:02:12 concrete thing that's necessary it's
0:02:14 just not
0:02:15 not individual but the
0:02:17 thing exists yeah but the genus i'm
0:02:19 saying
0:02:21 so when we're talking
0:02:22 or something what do you mean by the
0:02:23 genus
0:02:25 you mean the type
0:02:26 yeah the category of concrete
0:02:30 some of the category of something being
0:02:32 concrete
0:02:33 that's necessary
0:02:35 yeah so i'm not saying that therefore
0:02:36 you're forced into
0:02:38 oh a particular molecule or a pen yeah
0:02:41 yeah
0:02:42 i'm not saying that i'm not saying that
0:02:44 but
0:02:45 there
0:02:46 the
0:02:47 the category of concrete existence would
0:02:50 then be necessary
0:02:53 yeah okay well that's compatible with me
0:02:54 saying every concrete thing contingently
0:02:56 exists
0:02:58 yeah
0:02:59 right but now
0:03:01 to me it seems like you're getting a bit
0:03:04 closer to
0:03:05 the view that we're trying to represent
0:03:11 maybe a little bit but i'm not sure that
0:03:13 is significantly closer because
0:03:16 um
0:03:19 let's so let me see if i can retrace the
0:03:21 steps where we just got got to
0:03:23 make sure because maybe i'm missing this
0:03:25 but
0:03:25 um
0:03:28 what i i was advancing that view that
0:03:31 there's a beginning sequence of
0:03:32 contingent propositions let's say
0:03:34 contingent concretely existing things or
0:03:36 something
0:03:37 um
0:03:39 and you said well
0:03:42 that view suffers from this problem that
0:03:44 it can't explain why there's something
0:03:45 other than nothing
0:03:47 um
0:03:50 and then
0:03:51 you said well on our view there's
0:03:54 a necessary
0:03:55 concrete thing
0:03:57 um
0:03:58 then i said well problem with that is it
0:04:00 doesn't explain anything if it's a
0:04:01 necessarily existing concrete thing
0:04:05 and now you're saying well on the
0:04:06 aristotelian view it's necessary that
0:04:09 some concrete thing
0:04:10 exists
0:04:12 brackets if it's actually true that some
0:04:14 concrete thing exists whatever
0:04:17 um
0:04:17 what's the significance of that
0:04:19 concession
0:04:21 how does that
0:04:23 i'm not sure how it deals with them
0:04:24 because my rebuttal to your point was
0:04:27 you're not explaining anything if you've
0:04:30 got a necessarily existent
0:04:32 concrete thing because necessarily
0:04:35 necessary truths don't have explanations
0:04:39 yeah and i'm not sure that you're
0:04:41 disagreeing with me about that or not
0:04:45 yeah cause i originally i originally was
0:04:48 well i shouldn't say originally but the
0:04:50 step in the discussion i wanted to go
0:04:52 back to is when i was talking about
0:04:55 uh a possible world in which abstract
0:04:57 objects it exists but no concrete object
0:05:00 exists
0:05:01 originally you said yes but then you
0:05:03 thought given your aristotelian view of
0:05:05 what you were yeah i'm going to be
0:05:07 representing yeah if you're representing
0:05:10 if you're sticking to that then you're
0:05:12 saying no no that's not really going to
0:05:13 work so then
0:05:15 if the change but before we get to that
0:05:18 bit just whilst we were still on the
0:05:19 point that when i because you said on
0:05:22 our view necessarily existing concrete
0:05:23 thing exists and i said i don't
0:05:25 understand how that provides any
0:05:26 explanation i'm i before we start
0:05:28 talking about whether i think
0:05:31 there could be no concrete things i'm
0:05:33 just not clear whether whether you
0:05:34 agreed with that reply or whether you
0:05:36 disagreed with it
0:05:38 uh agreed with what that necessary
0:05:41 necessary troops don't have explanations
0:05:43 do you agree with that
0:05:46 um
0:05:46Music 0:05:48 in a sense that i don't really like the
0:05:51 explanation idea
0:05:53 so
0:05:54 if there's an entity x
0:05:57 that's concrete
0:05:58 and exists
0:06:00 and that's a necessary truth
0:06:03 nothing explains that exists
0:06:06 because necessary truth
0:06:08 right
0:06:10 no there's nothing we just
0:06:12 yeah there's nothing there's nothing
0:06:13 outside of the thing itself no that's
0:06:15 explaining okay no
0:06:17 so originally the criticism was i can't
0:06:20 explain why something rather than
0:06:22 nothing exists
0:06:24 and you're and i said well what happens
0:06:26 on your theory and you said well on our
0:06:28 theory god exists necessarily but now i
0:06:32 think i just can see that nothing
0:06:33 explains that so how
0:06:36 can we because now i'm showing that
0:06:37 you're winding up in the same place
0:06:40 but before we talk about that how it
0:06:42 still feels like you haven't
0:06:44 are you agreeing then that your theory
0:06:45 doesn't have an explanatory advantage
0:06:47 because it doesn't explain away why it
0:06:50 doesn't have anything to say about why
0:06:52 there's something rather than nothing
0:06:54 positing a being that exists necessarily
0:06:56 with no explanation
0:06:58 can't explain why something exists
0:06:59 rather than nothing can it
0:07:02 um
0:07:04 well
0:07:06 when you say why is there something
0:07:08 rather than nothing right and we're
0:07:10 including
0:07:11 uh concrete existence in that
0:07:14 i'm saying that if god is the necessary
0:07:16 being
0:07:17 and he exists in all possible worlds
0:07:20 yeah that x in the sense explains the
0:07:23 question of why there couldn't be
0:07:25 non-existence
0:07:27 but nothing explains why he exists so
0:07:30 it's only to take one step back
0:07:32 kind of explanation and then you find
0:07:34 that you're because if i say look it's
0:07:36 just a brute contingency that something
0:07:38 exists then you might rightly complain
0:07:40 that well take one further step back why
0:07:43 does that brute contingency exist i said
0:07:44 well no reason at all and you say ah
0:07:46 there's no reason then it's no good to
0:07:48 just give me one step of explanation
0:07:51 away from the kind of precipice of there
0:07:53 being no explanation beyond that but it
0:07:55 seems to me exactly what you've done by
0:07:57 just giving me you know just some object
0:07:59 exists necessarily but nothing explains
0:08:02 that
0:08:03 i mean if anything is is unsatisfying
0:08:05 explanation it must be that
0:08:08 mind if i jump in here because this is
0:08:09 this is great i mean i've been listening
0:08:10 this is this is awesome but so i think
0:08:13 at this point so i i think the the most
0:08:15 important
0:08:16 point here is that well
0:08:18 it seems like this is going to boil down
0:08:21 to the fact that on both views i'm not
0:08:23 saying you're necessarily committed to
0:08:24 this alex i'm just saying as far as the
0:08:26 discussion is concerned both these are
0:08:27 going to commit to something necessary
0:08:30 but right now there's the there's so
0:08:32 there's the question of the overall
0:08:33 theory
0:08:34 and wait how is there a difference
0:08:36 you're saying that there's something
0:08:37 necessary
0:08:38 has no explanation i'm saying there's
0:08:40 something necessary it has no
0:08:41 explanation
0:08:43 but
0:08:44 i'm not really sure that's the case so
0:08:45 first of all there's there is the
0:08:47 question of whether self-explanation
0:08:49 makes any sense and that's that's
0:08:50 controversial so we can either accept
0:08:52 that there is self-explanation or say
0:08:54 that something doesn't need an
0:08:56 explanation
0:08:57 now if we go for the latter something
0:09:00 doesn't need an explanation
0:09:02 we can either say it doesn't need an
0:09:04 explanation
0:09:06 by
0:09:06 a virtue of it
0:09:09 being necessary period and that can like
0:09:12 literally be the tree right outside my
0:09:14 door it just doesn't need an explanation
0:09:16 just that's just it or we can say that
0:09:19 there is something about the nature of
0:09:23 this thing
0:09:24 that doesn't call for an explanation in
0:09:28 a similar way although the analogy isn't
0:09:30 perfect so like an analytic truth like a
0:09:32 equals a
0:09:33 you're not going to ask for an
0:09:34 explanation for that now it's obviously
0:09:37 difficult to think of something like
0:09:38 that in in in the concrete world right
0:09:41 because it's not an analytic truth but
0:09:43 then
0:09:44 at least what we're saying is
0:09:46 that
0:09:47 these are two views and we're thinking
0:09:49 of the explanatory power
0:09:52 on one view
0:09:54 so
0:09:55 so on one view there's there's just
0:09:58 a rock that's self-explanatory on the
0:10:00 other view we're saying no no it's
0:10:03 it's something that self-explanatory or
0:10:04 something that doesn't require
0:10:05 explanation but in order for it to be
0:10:07 that
0:10:08 it's not that nature it's not it's not a
0:10:10 rock it's something that is in a
0:10:12 different category than these things
0:10:15 around us that you know the natural
0:10:17 world that does call for an explanation
0:10:19 so i it might be a bit tricky like in
0:10:21 the sense that when we look at a theory
0:10:22 from the outside okay well it explains
0:10:25 it that one explains it fine we're good
0:10:27 we're it's a stalemate but then i mean
0:10:30 in a sense you could say that about like
0:10:31 a solipsist versus an external world
0:10:33 realist well i mean he explains
0:10:35 everything i mean
0:10:36 yeah but look
0:10:39 here's
0:10:40 i mean if if what you're saying is
0:10:43 on our theistic theory the difference is
0:10:47 we've got
0:10:48 a thing
0:10:50 god whose nature
0:10:52 gives it the
0:10:53 i mean
0:10:55 just to be quick about it to get out of
0:10:57 jail free card i don't mean anything
0:10:58 offensive balance it's not any
0:11:00 accusation of deception or anything like
0:11:01 that but like the reason why this is
0:11:03 different from the other things is its
0:11:05 nature if i press further on that isn't
0:11:07 it really just that its nature is that
0:11:09 it exists necessarily i mean and and
0:11:12 then now what we're talking about is
0:11:13 just actually it's just not a contingent
0:11:16 proposition i mean i'm okay with
0:11:18 necessary propositions not having
0:11:20 explanations so like
0:11:22 that's fine it's just that if if all you
0:11:24 mean by its nature
0:11:26 being special is that it's a necessarily
0:11:28 existing thing then i just don't see how
0:11:30 that progresses dialectic anywhere
0:11:32 because
0:11:33 if what we're saying is the reason why
0:11:34 there's something rather than nothing is
0:11:36 because something exists necessarily
0:11:38 then you can't be an advantage in terms
0:11:40 of explanation because aren't we just
0:11:42 agreeing that necessary things don't
0:11:44 have explanation so positing another
0:11:46 necessary thing can't help you in terms
0:11:48 of explanation because it's just yeah
0:11:49 well i don't know
0:11:51 i guess we are agreeing one second hold
0:11:53 on a second i'm direct man i think if
0:11:56 we're agreeing on that we've made
0:11:58 progress
0:12:00 as far as i'm concerned in the
0:12:02 conversation because i don't think we i
0:12:04 don't think we necessarily and no pun
0:12:07 intended started there we i don't think
0:12:09 we started there so i think
0:12:11 we've made progress in in the
0:12:13 conversation that's just i look at it