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SPECIAL: A Case for God with Alex Malpass Muslims discussing with an Atheist Philosopher (2021-11-17) ​

Description ​

In this special brothers Abdul & Jake will be talking to Malpass, a well-known Atheist Philosopher, about arguments for God's existence and about Theism and Atheism more generally. Join us for what we hope to be a great conversation with the respected philosopher, insha'Allah.

Timestamps for Chapters: 0:00 - Intro 0:27 - Abdul,Alex and Jake join 0:41 - Information about the Guest 1:00 - Topics to be discussed 1:32 - What got Alex into Philosophy ? 5:20 - Is it rationally justified to be a Theist ? 8:48 - Relationship between Rationality and Coherence 10:51 - Theists and Atheists not being Ultra Rationalists 15:45 - Theists requiring more proof of being deductively sound than Atheists 17:28 - Theists and Atheists trying to convert each other 21:35 - The Kalam Cosmological Argument and its contentions 31:42 - Abdul's counter argument 32:43 - Alex's response 34:22 - Abdul's disagreement with Craig's Paper about Kalam 34:59 - Alex's response 37:26 - Jake's question about "Always counting but never beginning" ? 39:51 - Alex's answer 41:01 - Jake's counter argument 41:51 - Alex's response 43:34 - Non Metric system and different time frames of the thought experiment 54:07 - Alex's views on Causal Finitism 59:33 - Patchwork's Principle: definition, acceptance, rejection and restriction 1:07:40 - Grim Reaper existing in Aristotelian view of metaphysical modality 1:13:34 - Concievability, Finitists' solution and commitment 1:19:46 - Why an agent can't be placed at every moment of time in the past ? 1:25:14 - Königsberg Bridge Problem 1:30:11 - Causal Finitism vs Unsatisfiable Pair 1:33:42 - Contingency Argument 1:39:23 - Quranic position on Dawah and presenting arguments 1:44:15 - PSR (Principle of Sufficient Reason) & Argument of Contingency 1:46:28 - Alex's contention against the Contingency Argument 1:51:24 - Abdul's response and back & forth 1:57:10 - Hatem's question about Partial explanation of the 'cookie thought experiment' 2:01:43 - Abdul's argument on Modal Collapse of Partial Explanation 2:05:36 - Alex's response 2:07:11 - Abdul's counter Argument 2:08:51 - Alex's response and back & forth 2:14:11 - Abdul's argument about Metaphysics of Causation 2:15:40 - Alex's response and back & forth 2:19:25 - Determinism on Marco Level vs Quantum Level 2:22:07 - A rejection of a PSR leads to ultra skepticism 2:24:15 - Everything that is concrete is contingent 2:39:34 - Jake's counter argument and back & forth 2:57:43 - Alex concedes to a Necessary Existence 3:00:38 - Necessary truths don't have an explanation 3:03:09 - Abdul explains the similarity & difference between their and Alex's position on the explanatory power 3:05:38 - Alex's counter argument 3:07:32 - Abdul's Response 3:11:35 - What qualifies something to have necessary Existence & not require an explanation ? 3:13:26 - Abdul's argument 3:15:58 - Alex's response 3:18:13 - Abdul and Alex discuss "what accounts for the existence of contingent things ?" 3:25:45 - Closing Statements

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The Hosts: ----------------------| Jake Brancatella, The Muslim Metaphysician

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Yusuf Ponders, The Pondering Soul

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Sharif

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Abdulrahman

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Admin

Riyad Gmail: hello.tapodcast@gmail.com

#friendlydiscussion #philosophy #atheism

Summary of SPECIAL: A Case for God with Alex Malpass Muslims discussing with an Atheist Philosopher ​

This summary is AI generated - there may be inaccuracies. *

00:00:00 - 01:00:00 ​

an atheist philosopher and a Muslim discuss the idea of cause affinity. Alex Malpass Muslims argues that every causal sequence has a first cause, and that this is best explained by the idea that cause and effect are connected through a universal. The atheist philosopher counters that this is arbitrary and that there is no objective meaning to saying that 10 is truly a 10.

**00:00:00 ** Alex Malpass is a philosopher interested in theology, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion. He has had a lot of experience online and in dialogue with Muslims. Abdulrahman asked him about his interest in philosophy of religion, and Alex explained that it was Socrates' character that got him interested in the subject.

  • **00:05:00 ** The philosopher explains that there are two ways a theist can be rational - one way is to say that they are good plausible looking things that a non-insane person can believe, and the other way is that they are reasonable considering there is persistent disagreement about the topic. He argues that a theist should take another position and say that no, despite disagreement, a rational person can be rational.
  • **00:10:00
  • Discusses disagreement among philosophers about how to deal with problems in metaphysics and philosophy of religion. Alex Malpass Muslims says that although there is disagreement, most philosophers believe in some form of p, which allows for some degree of belief. Abdul says that he believes that intuition is not the right word for what he means, and that someone like Graham Opie does not have a problem with the infinite regress.
  • **00:15:00 ** The atheist philosopher discusses with Muslims about how it feels to be a skeptic and an atheist, and how the theist needs to do more than just offer a more parsimonious theory to win the atheist over. The philosopher argues that there is a significant weight to the claims of the atheist, and that the goal of conversion should not be the focus of religious arguments.
  • **00:20:00
  • Discusses the "burden of proof" and how it is not fixed for either side in a conversation. The atheist philosopher Alex Malpass discusses this with the theist philosopher William Lane Craig. Craig points out that the argument from evil, which is a philosophical argument, does not actually disprove the existence of God.
  • **00:25:00 ** an atheist philosopher discusses with a Muslim about a counter-argument to the argument from successiveness. The atheist philosopher argues that a sequence that does not have a beginning but ends today cannot be actually infinite, because it has an end at the end.
  • **00:30:00
  • Discusses a case for God with Alex Malpass, a Muslim, and an atheist philosopher. Malpass argues that, due to presentism, it is impossible for a moment to succeed another moment in a sequence that never ends. The atheist philosopher points out that Malpass's argument is flawed because it does not take into account the temporal factor.
  • **00:35:00
  • Discusses the idea that it is impossible to count to infinity, ascounting would require starting from some point and going infinitely far in either direction. The Atheist Philosopher, Alex Malpass, discusses this with a Muslim, who agrees that it is impossible to count to infinity, but argues that it does not matter, as the claim that you can count to infinity does not hold up to scrutiny. The Atheist Philosopher agrees, and says that the point he is making is that there is an infinite number of events that will happen in the future, even if all of them have not yet been counted.
  • **00:40:00 ** an atheist philosopher and a Muslim discuss the difficulties of explaining why one person finishes a task earlier than another. The atheist philosopher suggests that the difference in completion time is arbitrary and based on nothing more than the starting point and counting sequence.
  • **00:45:00
  • Discusses the disagreement between an atheist philosopher and Muslims about whether or not there is a number n such that the number 10 is truly a 10. The Muslim argues that because there is no beginning or end to the infinite series of numbers, it is possible for anyone to say any number at any point in the past. The atheist philosopher counters that this is arbitrary and that there is no objective meaning to saying that 10 is truly a 10.
  • **00:50:00
  • Discusses the concept of cause affinity, which is the position that every causal sequence has a first cause. Alex Malpass Muslims argues that this thesis is more specific than cause finitism, which is the position that every causal sequence has a first cause. He also argues that causal finitism is probably not true, but he is unsure whether it is true or not.
  • **00:55:00 ** argues that causation is finite and that, as a result, the past cannot have a beginning. He also argues that this finite causation is best explained by the idea that cause and effect are connected through a universal.

01:00:00 - 02:00:00 ​

Alex Malpass discusses the patchwork principle with an atheist philosopher and argues that it is a simple and intuitive idea that should be accepted by everyone. He also discusses the contingency argument and how it is not a good argument. He suggests that Laypeople can be convinced of the existence of God by discussing the principles of Philosophy of Argumentation with them.

**01:00:00 ** The philosopher Alex Malpass discusses the patchwork principle with an atheist philosopher and argues that it is a simple and intuitive idea that should be accepted by everyone. The principle states that anything can exist with anything else, and is often associated with David Hume and David Lewis because they argue that anything can exist in a possible world. Patrick principle, which is a theory advanced by Rob Coons, is a similar idea that claims that possibility is grounded in the powers of things that exist.

  • **01:05:00 ** The Australian view of modality is that every possible world overlaps with the actual world at some point in time. This is a welcome consequence in the view of the philosopher, Alex Malpass.
  • **01:10:00 ** Muslims and an atheist philosopher discuss the claim that if the past were beginningless, the grim reaper scenario would be possible. The atheist philosopher points out that this scenario is impossible because time has a beginning, and the Muslims respond by arguing that this solution heavily relies on the atheist philosopher's rejection of conceivability.
  • **01:15:00 ** an atheist philosopher discusses with a Muslim how the bernadetti paradox - a contradiction in terms - can be expressed in a formal way. Nicholas Shackle, who coined the term, argues that it is a contradiction that does not need to be interpreted as anything specific.
  • **01:20:00 ** an atheist philosopher and a Muslim discuss the problem of contradictions in regards to God. The atheist philosopher argues that contradictions arise when one applies the patchwork principle—an ad hoc restriction on the patchwork principle to say that you can't combine two things together or say infinitely many things together. The Muslim argues that contradictions arise when one imagines an endless or beginning a sequence of events with no first cause. The atheist philosopher argues that this creates a contradiction, but the Muslim argues that it simply comes from the idea of the mystery of causality.
  • **01:25:00
  • Discusses the mathematical problem of bridging seven bridges across a river without doubling back. The solution is not possible, as is demonstrated by examples of Bridget crossing bridges and the Grim Reaper crossing bridges.
  • **01:30:00 ** The philosopher, Alex Malpass, discusses with an atheist philosopher the paradoxes of causality and how one could remain an atheist and accept causality as a valid explanation for events. Malpass points out that if one already accepts causality, then the paradoxes of causality are not a big deal. He then moves on to discuss the psi paradox, in which he argues that it is simpler to posit one rather than many causal chains.
  • **01:35:00
  • Discusses the argument from contingency, which is the idea that some theories of modality – like the theory of infinity – can be true even though they're contradicted by other theories. The atheist philosopher Alex Malpass Muslims argues that this assumption is controversial and undermines the argument.
  • **01:40:00 ** This philosopher argues that because every contingent truth requires an explanation, the argument for God's existence is legitimate. He also suggests that Laypeople can be convinced of the existence of God by discussing the principles of Philosophy of Argumentation with them.
  • **01:45:00
  • Discusses the contingency argument, which states that a thing must be explained by a necessary cause. The philosopher Alex Malpass discusses this argument with an atheist philosopher, discussing how it is not a good argument. He goes on to say that there are other ways of explaining things, such as the relation.
  • **01:50:00 ** Alex Malpass discusses with an atheist philosopher, Coons, the concept of partial explanation. Malpass argues that there are two sides to the concept of explanation: what satisfies an individual as an explanation versus what is the actual explanation. He argues that, in the case of smoking and cancer, the explanation satisfies an individual as an explanation, but there are other factors that are still unexplained. He goes on to say that, on a libertarian view, there is no information missing that hasn't been described, but it still feels like there is a contingent fact that this doesn't have an explanation. He concludes by saying that, for him, the concept of libertarian free will is still meaningful even though it doesn't have an explanation for certain actions.
  • **01:55:00 ** Alex Malpass Muslims and an Atheist Philosopher discuss the concept of libertarian free will. Malpass argues that libertarian free will requires contrastive explanation, and that partial explanations do not satisfy this requirement.

02:00:00 - 03:00:00 ​

, an atheist philosopher and a Muslim discuss the strong principle of PSR, with the atheist philosopher arguing that it is impossible for everything to be necessary. The Muslim replies that, on his view, there is a special explanation for contingent things--God.

**02:00:00

  • Discusses the idea of partial explanation, which is the ability to explain something in a way that does not require the thing explained to exist in its entirety. He argues that libertarian free will is a plausible candidate for a thing that is explained in this way, as the fact that someone chooses a over b does not necessitate the choice being caused by anything else.
  • **02:05:00 ** The philosopher Alex Malpass discusses the concept of libertarian choice with an atheist philosopher. Malpass argues that libertarian choices are fully determined by prior choice and prior conditions, and that there is no libertarian freedom.
  • **02:10:00 ** The philosopher, Alex Malpass, discusses with a Muslim how it seems that humans are only able to make choices due to random chance. Malpass goes on to say that this "libertarian choice" is actually a mystery, and that the everyday experience is only a "rough approximation" of the metaphysical picture.
  • **02:15:00
  • Discusses how an atheist philosopher, Alex Malpass, disagrees with Muslims who argue that there is something internal to humans that makes them feel connected to libertarian free will. Malpass argues that while there is something internal to humans, it does not fit into either a deterministic or indeterministic framework. He also argues that the denial of libertarian free will has consequences for our intuitive picture of the world.
  • **02:20:00 ** , an atheist philosopher and a Muslim discuss the idea of a case for God with Alex Malpass, a philosopher who has written about the concept of a psr. The atheist philosopher argues that if we don't have a priori methods to discern what is necessary and what is contingent, then we can fall into a radical kind of skepticism. The Muslim argues that if there is a God, then God is necessary and concrete, and that everything that is contingent is necessary.
  • **02:25:00 ** The philosopher and Muslim discuss the implications of the contingency argument, with the atheist concluding that there is still a contingent reality that has no explanation.
  • **02:30:00 ** , an atheist philosopher and a Muslim discuss the idea of a "special explanation" for contingent things. The atheist philosopher says that, on the libertarian view, everything that is explained is contingent, and that there is no a priori principle that can rule out the possibility that our experience is contingent. The Muslim replies that, on his view, there is a special explanation for contingent things--God.
  • **02:35:00 ** A YouTube video discusses the strong principle of PSR, or that everything is necessary. The atheist philosopher discusses this with a Muslim, who argues that everything is contingent, and that the strong principle does not hold.
  • **02:40:00 ** The philosopher discusses with a Muslim about the validity of the psr, a strong version of which entails that the entirety of contingent reality has a necessitating explanation. However, the philosopher contends that this is impossible because every contingent thing is contained within the circle he is drawing and self-explanation seems incoherent. He concludes that the strongest version of the psr is rejected because it would require an infinite series of necessitating explanations from contingent things.
  • **02:45:00
  • Discusses the argument that if there is no contingent reality, then everything is necessary, and that the only way to escape from this is to assume that there is some contingent thing that is not explained by the PSR. The philosopher, Alex Malpass, discusses his view, which is a beginningless chain of explanations, in which every individual thing is explained. He then compares it to another view, that of the philosopher, Sam Harris, who believes that there is something that is fundamentally contingent and not explained. He argues that on both views, the considerations are equal and do not help us to explain why things exist.
  • **02:50:00 ** , an atheist philosopher, Alex Malpass, discusses with a Muslim philosopher, James Anderson, the differences between the theories of God - solipsism vs. the theism. According to Malpass, theism - the belief in the existence of a God who is necessary and exists in all possible worlds - has a better explanation than solipsism, which posits that there is nothing, or no one, behind the contingent reality we experience.
  • **02:55:00 ** , an Atheist philosopher discusses with a Muslim about the existence of abstract things apart from the actual world or any other concrete existence. The philosopher points out that if there is something concrete, then it is necessary that there is something hungry. He then goes on to say that on his view, the category of concrete existence would then be necessary. However, the Muslim rebuttals this by saying that necessarily necessary truths don't have explanations. The Atheist philosopher responds by saying that his original point was that in a possible world in which abstract objects exist, but no concrete object exists, there must be a beginning sequence of contingent propositions. The Muslim then asks the philosopher if his view suffers from the problem that he can't explain why there is something other than nothing. The philosopher says that on his view, there is a necessary concrete thing that exists. However, the Muslim still questions whether this explanation is sufficient. The philosopher then says that on the Aristotelian view, it is necessary that some concrete thing exists. The Muslim then asks the philosopher what the significance of this concession is. The philosopher says that it shows that his view is closer to the Aristotelian view than the Muslim's view.

03:00:00 - 03:30:00 ​

Muslims and an atheist philosopher discuss the existence of concrete things. The atheist philosopher argues that, on his view, necessary truths do not have explanations, and that, therefore, there is nothing outside of the thing itself to explain why x exists. The Muslims reply that, on their view, god exists necessarily and has no explanation.

**03:00:00 ** Muslims and an atheist philosopher discuss the existence of concrete things. The atheist philosopher argues that, on his view, necessary truths do not have explanations, and that, therefore, there is nothing outside of the thing itself to explain why x exists. The Muslims reply that, on their view, god exists necessarily and has no explanation.

  • **03:05:00 ** Atheist philosopher Alex Malpass interviews a Muslim man about his religious beliefs, and they discuss the difference between necessary and contingent things. Atheist Malpass points out that, even if what the Muslim is saying is true, it doesn't help in terms of explaining anything because necessary things don't have explanations.
  • **03:10:00 ** Muslims discuss with an Atheist Philosopher, Alex Malpass, about the concept of God. Malpass argues that there is some plausibility to the idea that there is some sort of "advanced simplicity conception" of God, but that this does not mean that God is a necessary existent. He also discusses the implications of God's existence for our understanding of reality, and argues that a dispute about God's existence should involve understanding what it means for something to be necessary.
  • **03:15:00 ** The atheist philosopher Alex Malpass discusses with a Muslim how the existence of contingent things--such as coffee--can be necessitated by God, but ultimately fails to provide a convincing argument for the existence of God.
  • **03:20:00 ** Alex Malpass Muslims and an Atheist Philosopher discuss the intuition that there is something beyond positing things like limitlessness or unboundedness, and that this intuition is found in science as well. Malpass argues that the ontological cost of satisfying this intuition is too high, and that the intuition is flaky. He argues that causation operates the way it does in the external world because we have empirical knowledge of it, and that solipsism is untenable.
  • **03:25:00
  • Discusses the idea that something must have an explanation for its existence, and the difficulty in justifying this idea with regards to contingent things. The philosopher, Alex Malpass, discusses this difficulty with an Islamic scholar, Abdul. Abdul does not seem to see the benefit of positing an unnecessary being, and the conversation ends with both parties agreeing to talk again.
  • **03:30:00 ** features a discussion between an atheist philosopher and a Muslim about the existence of God. The discussion results in some progress being made, but the philosopher suggests that there might be a need for a second discussion to further explore these topics.

Full transcript with timestamps: CLICK TO EXPAND

0:00:05 i am0:00:27 assalamualaikum everyone welcome back0:00:30 we're here with the thought adventure0:00:32 podcast we got a special episode for you0:00:35 guys today0:00:37 i'm here with my co-host uh abdulrahman0:00:40 and our guest0:00:42 uh dr alex malpass um he is a0:00:45 philosopher interested in metaphysics0:00:48 philosophy of religion0:00:50 most of you guys who watch this are0:00:52 probably relatively uh familiar with his0:00:55 work and you know his material and0:00:57 interviews online0:00:59 so today we have him here to discuss a0:01:03 couple different topics you know0:01:05 arguments for god um theism atheism etc0:01:09 so but before we get started i just want0:01:11 to say uh salaam to abdul rahman and0:01:14 hello to alex how are you guys doing0:01:17 good thank you we're doing well0:01:19 good good good0:01:20 so um0:01:22 with that being said i think we'll just0:01:24 kind of jump right into it um actually i0:01:26 do have one question for alex if you0:01:29 wouldn't mind answering uh how what sort0:01:32 of got you initially interested0:01:35 in philosophy and these types of0:01:38 discussions um0:01:41 well0:01:42 i think i've0:01:43 what got me into philosophy um0:01:46 so i think i'm like one of those types0:01:48 of people that likes to think about0:01:50 um0:01:52 abstract things you know i think i've0:01:53 always been one of those kids at school0:01:56 who asks the difficult question to the0:01:58 teacher and0:01:59 you know like um that type of that type0:02:01 of person probably both you guys are0:02:03 similar i think um0:02:05 and then0:02:06 my parents had a book0:02:08 um on the shelf called the great0:02:10 philosophers right it's just kind of0:02:12 standard uh book that had a chapter on a0:02:15 bunch of different philosophies and then0:02:16 i remember reading early on i think this0:02:18 is probably my first philosophy book0:02:19 that i read and chapter one was about0:02:21 socrates and um i just really liked0:02:24 socrates as a character he was just like0:02:26 such a cool guy you know he was like0:02:28 he he just didn't really care about like0:02:32 i don't know just some simple like0:02:34 social stuff like looking cool or like0:02:36 people thinking he was cool or something0:02:37 he was just just fully interested in0:02:39 like0:02:40 talking about ideas0:02:42 and0:02:43 i don't know that type of character just0:02:45 had this one authenticity or something0:02:47 about him it was just like a0:02:49 like a philosopher character kind of0:02:51 just jumped out of the pages at me and i0:02:53 kind of i just identified with that i0:02:55 think0:02:56 um0:02:57 you know like um0:02:58 i mean i only read this years later but0:03:00 um in the symposium um0:03:03 it ends with uh it's like in a in a0:03:07 ancient greek equivalent of a bar and0:03:09 there's like people drinking and stuff0:03:10 and0:03:11 and um they're talking about the nature0:03:13 of love and ends with everybody0:03:15 basically being asleep and socrates is0:03:17 still awake and he just gets up and0:03:20 dusts himself down and goes outside into0:03:21 the marketplace and just continues0:03:23 asking people questions which is still0:03:24 after everyone's passed out i just0:03:26 really like that character um0:03:29 so i think that's what got me got me0:03:31 into it in the first place but i think0:03:32 at the time i never really thought about0:03:34 philosophy of religion until0:03:37 after i did my phd and after i left0:03:39 academia um because i was doing0:03:42 technical work in like logic and0:03:43 metaphysics when i was doing my academic0:03:47 studies and0:03:49 doing writing my thesis and stuff um0:03:52 and it was only after that where i sort0:03:53 of came back0:03:54 really through things like youtube and0:03:56 stuff where i was like huh there's this0:03:58 whole0:03:59 set second like wind in me or something0:04:02 now where nakeen0:04:05 involved this new area that were new to0:04:07 me0:04:09 it was kind of fun it wasn't quite so0:04:12 um it wasn't quite so technical and dry0:04:16 as just actual logic can be and some0:04:19 philosophy of science that type of thing0:04:20 can it can be really interesting but it0:04:22 can also be quite sort of0:04:24 stifling in a way and there's something0:04:25 quite cool about philosophy of religion0:04:27 it's really broad0:04:28 and you have to know stuff about like0:04:30 epistemology philosophy of0:04:32 language philosophy of mind metaphysics0:04:34 like you have to have like a broad0:04:36 knowledge of every area of philosophy0:04:38 really to do it and i think that that0:04:40 appeals to me um0:04:43 yeah it's just fun it's more fun than0:04:44 the other type of philosophy i was doing0:04:46 i think0:04:47 that's interesting0:04:49 so obviously based on0:04:51 your past and0:04:53 what your engagements are like online0:04:55 and the second win that you talk about0:04:57 you've had a lot of experience0:05:00 researching reading0:05:02 discussing debating0:05:04 different things whether it be theism0:05:06 versus atheism different arguments for0:05:09 god's existence0:05:10 with that sort of all of that in mind0:05:14 and0:05:15 you know your0:05:17 experience in that0:05:19 do you think that a theist can be0:05:23 rationally justified in their position0:05:26 um0:05:28 i guess so i mean i think0:05:30 there's two ways0:05:32 the number of ways you could0:05:33 so hear that question0:05:35 i mean0:05:37 one so one way might be0:05:39 do i think it's rational to believe it0:05:41 or something do i0:05:43 consider myself to be um0:05:45 like my own beliefs and the things i0:05:47 take myself to know whatever do they0:05:48 point towards that conclusion should i0:05:50 believe it based on what i0:05:51 currently am taking myself to know i0:05:54 don't answer that no right but0:05:57 i also think that0:05:59 um0:06:00 what's rational0:06:01 is kind of like a relation0:06:03 or it's relate is related to the things0:06:05 that you take yourself to believe and no0:06:07 and0:06:08 it's just it's just0:06:10 if you know x y and z uh then0:06:13 some other thing might be rational to0:06:14 conclude from that even if x y and z0:06:17 some of those are false something it's0:06:18 all about like the inferences that0:06:20 you're making from the set of beliefs to0:06:22 the conclusion so almost anything can be0:06:24 rationally believed on on that very0:06:26 loose definition a complete crazy person0:06:29 could believe hamburgers eat people and0:06:32 you know up is down and stuff like that0:06:33 and if they do that then they'll be0:06:35 rational in concluding some also crazy0:06:37 things right so0:06:39 um0:06:41 somewhere between those two there's0:06:42 there's something that's a little bit0:06:43 more reasonable which is like are they0:06:46 good plausible looking0:06:48 uh things that you know not an insane0:06:50 person could believe that would lead0:06:52 them to that conclusion i think probably0:06:55 yeah you have to be humble enough to say0:06:57 that0:06:57 i disagree with0:07:00 other0:07:01 thinkers or whatever who are theists but0:07:03 you have to be quite um0:07:06 unreasonably bold it seems to me to0:07:08 suppose that all of those people are0:07:10 like suffering from some kind of0:07:11 cognitive defect like you know newton0:07:14 was a theist right0:07:17 obviously not an idiot liveness was a0:07:19 theist obviously not an idiot right um0:07:23 leibniz must be more rational than me0:07:26 uh clearly i'll be super arrogant to0:07:29 suppose that he was in some way less0:07:31 rational than i was um0:07:33 so so yeah i think there are just people0:07:35 who are perfectly rational who are who0:07:37 are theists absolutely yeah and there's0:07:39 lots of strong0:07:41 theistic philosophers of religion um0:07:44 you know people so for instance i'm0:07:47 friends with um josh rasmussen0:07:49 obviously a very intelligent bloke very0:07:51 very0:07:53 rational person right um0:07:56 but he's a theist so i i think that0:07:58 that's that's why i mean this i i'm not0:08:00 gonna name any names but there are some0:08:01 other uh0:08:03 theist philosophers of religion who0:08:06 are kind of0:08:09 crazy republican supporting um0:08:12 a vaccine-denying kind of people that0:08:14 does stretch my credulity to suppose0:08:16 that they are 100 rational but there's0:08:19 something going on there that it seems0:08:21 wrong to me but um it's not there's not0:08:23 dwell on that thought this0:08:25 if i if i can jump in here i mean we0:08:27 were going to move on from this but what0:08:28 you're saying is very interesting right0:08:30 now because0:08:31 so so i suppose0:08:33 it's like i so so obviously you're a0:08:35 coherentist i think about like um you0:08:38 describe yourself more as a coherentist0:08:39 than a foundational stress so so that's0:08:41 right yeah kind of yeah0:08:43 yeah0:08:44 and and uh0:08:46 so in that sense you'd say that well you0:08:48 can0:08:49 be rational and and and uh0:08:51 disagree i i guess the question is where0:08:54 where um0:08:55 where you draw the line because0:08:57 um0:08:59 you know there's there's that whole0:09:00 discussion on on the uh the epistemology0:09:03 of disagreement right and and uh0:09:05 disagreement skepticism right so0:09:08 you know and disagreements between peers0:09:10 i mean someone might want to say that0:09:11 well there's so much disagreement on0:09:13 this topic and it doesn't look like it's0:09:15 going to end anytime soon0:09:17 then would the rational position0:09:20 be to withhold judgment0:09:22 or or um or would you take another0:09:25 position and say that no i mean you can0:09:27 be rational0:09:28 despite disagreement uh that this kind0:09:31 of disagreement that's that's like you0:09:32 know persistent disagreement0:09:35 yeah so i mean again it's gonna come0:09:37 back to the way exactly you mean by0:09:39 rationality here and it's not like0:09:41 that's completely a non-controversial0:09:44 thing to to wonder about so0:09:47 um0:09:48 i think it's just kind of obvious that0:09:50 there's some some readings of the word0:09:52 rational wear like a kind of0:09:54 something like a kind of cartesian0:09:56 that's really strong kind of cartesian0:09:58 view where0:10:00 everything has to be0:10:02 like0:10:03 deductively based on0:10:05 a priori foundations or something right0:10:07 and then0:10:08 i take0:10:09 take it that although there's0:10:11 disagreement about that i guess but i0:10:12 take it to like most philosophers do you0:10:14 think that program is not really0:10:16 sustainable anymore and it's whatever0:10:18 we're doing it's not0:10:20 going to be that every uh question is0:10:23 completely resolvable in that in that0:10:25 kind of ultra-rational sense and but the0:10:27 question is what what next what happens0:10:29 in the in the wake of that program uh0:10:31 not being viable anymore what do we do0:10:33 there's loads of different answers about0:10:35 that so there's a lot of different0:10:36 conceptions what what it means to be0:10:37 rationalized as you highlight this kind0:10:39 of disagreement about the epistemology0:10:41 of0:10:42 of disagreement0:10:43 um0:10:44 so0:10:46 um0:10:47 and alex would you say that pretty much0:10:50 because i agree with you that on both0:10:52 sides the theists and0:10:54 uh non-theist atheists pretty much have0:10:57 abandoned that sort of project that you0:10:59 just mentioned earlier0:11:01 right0:11:02 yeah like a kind of like really um0:11:05 ultra rational uh rationalist kind of0:11:08 program or something yeah i think that's0:11:09 more or less0:11:11 uh not practiced these days i mean0:11:13 philosophy comes in kind of waves and0:11:15 there's kind of fashions and stuff like0:11:16 that um everyone was a victinian in the0:11:19 like 50s and then now everybody's an0:11:21 analytic philosopher and you know these0:11:23 these things kind of come and go to some0:11:24 extent but0:11:25 the0:11:27 the way things stand right now is um0:11:31 yeah in in epistemology is also a bit of0:11:33 a mess i mean there's there's all this0:11:35 stuff about like you know uh in the wake0:11:38 of um0:11:39 of um the gettier kind of stuff that0:11:41 really blew blue epistemology up and0:11:43 made a whole0:11:45 whole load of controversy where0:11:47 previously people hadn't really noticed0:11:48 there was anything to be controversial0:11:50 about um so0:11:52 uh yeah i mean look let's just grow back0:11:54 from all these big ideas i mean0:11:56 um the question is just like if there's0:11:58 lots of disagreement in a subject like0:12:00 metaphysics or philosophy of religion or0:12:01 something is it is it is the right thing0:12:04 to do to say0:12:05 just shrug your shoulders and go like0:12:07 gee i guess i should you know not take a0:12:09 view on anything and i just think that0:12:11 like0:12:12 the answer to that is0:12:14 no but what you have to do is make like0:12:16 um it's not just black and white views0:12:18 like uh0:12:19 i just think i just believe that p and0:12:22 nothing else about that no nuance or0:12:23 anything you believe it like to with0:12:26 some waiting or whatever something like0:12:28 to some degree believe in p not just0:12:30 black and white but like0:12:32 um0:12:33 so give it you know even in a context0:12:35 where there's uncertainty you can still0:12:36 have like a moderate belief because you0:12:38 think that like you know some evidence0:12:40 persuades you or like the on the balance0:12:42 of weighing up a bunch of considerations0:12:44 including things like0:12:46 theoretical virtues and like the0:12:48 coherence with other things that you0:12:49 take yourself to believe or whatever0:12:51 that that can provide0:12:52 um some kind of ground that allows you0:12:55 to say yeah with you know with local0:12:57 caveats this is my view um0:13:00 and0:13:00 just because someone can say0:13:02 you might be in the matrix dreaming or0:13:04 something that doesn't necessarily0:13:05 undermine0:13:06 the0:13:07 modest sense of confidence that you gave0:13:09 in the first place i mean it does if you0:13:10 say i'm absolutely 100 certain about0:13:13 this like descartes was about0:13:15 whatever right if you're expressing0:13:17 something as strongly as that then it0:13:20 can be undermined by something as weak0:13:21 as0:13:22 the outside chance that you might be in0:13:24 the matrix but like0:13:25 no i0:13:26 typically if i'm expressing a view0:13:29 in something like metaphysics it's going0:13:31 to be0:13:32 balanced out very very nuanced kind of0:13:34 evaluation of lots of different0:13:35 competing considerations and it's kind0:13:37 of like on on balance this seems to be0:13:39 where the chips lie rather than i'm 1000:13:42 convinced of this and nothing you say0:13:43 will change my mind right0:13:46 right uh abdul your your mic is muted0:13:50 brother you gotta yeah sorry sorry so0:13:52 the reason i think this is an0:13:53 interesting question and i guess this0:13:54 could be a good segue into like um0:13:56 uh many of the points we we want to0:13:58 discuss today0:14:00 is that like so so what i what i've seen0:14:02 you do in in a lot of discussions is0:14:05 that0:14:06 it it seems like disagreement is a big0:14:08 thing like in the sense that0:14:11 well there are different views on like0:14:14 you know how we're going to deal with0:14:16 let's say0:14:17 benedetti problems like in paradoxes and0:14:18 stuff like that it's not just like0:14:20 causal feminism isn't the only view look0:14:21 at those philosophers saying that0:14:24 so0:14:24 i mean i guess in that sense right well0:14:28 so at the end of the day like0:14:30 for you i i don't know0:14:32 if you commit to um0:14:34 causal fentanyl like on this question0:14:36 specifically but would it just be that0:14:39 intuition that like you know i'm gonna0:14:40 favor this view over that and i've i0:14:42 think like um so i don't know if0:14:44 intuition is the right word but like0:14:46 someone like graham opie right with his0:14:48 um0:14:49 with his whole psr about the initial0:14:51 state0:14:52 and and and uh i've seen you ask him0:14:55 right the why not just accept the0:14:58 infinite regress right i mean because he0:14:59 doesn't see anything problematic with it0:15:01 and he just thinks it's more0:15:02 parsimonious right he he just thinks0:15:04 it's a better theory it's a better and0:15:07 and he commits to it so0:15:09 i guess that's the tricky part for me0:15:11 like um0:15:12 because sometimes to me and just just0:15:15 this is my perspective on some of these0:15:16 discussions0:15:18 it feels like the theist needs to do0:15:20 much more than that0:15:22 like it feels like it's never going to0:15:24 be enough for me to say hey0:15:26 this seems like a more parsimonious0:15:28 theory it seems like overall i've got a0:15:30 better picture and i'm committed to this0:15:33 view0:15:34 obviously you won't do this i'm just0:15:36 saying generally out there it seems like0:15:38 the the the common approach to that is0:15:40 well wait that's not necessarily the0:15:43 case so back to the whole like you know0:15:45 idea of like whether we need to be0:15:47 deductively sound and certain about0:15:50 things before holding to them0:15:52 it seems like the common impression out0:15:53 there is that it's the theist that needs0:15:55 to do that and the atheist the agnostic0:15:59 they can just get away with whatever0:16:00 world views they have so i i don't know0:16:03 what you have to say about that well0:16:05 um there's something unusual in0:16:06 philosophy of religion it's not the case0:16:08 in other areas of philosophy which is0:16:10 just um0:16:11 notion that i'm actually0:16:14 and this might be something you can0:16:15 explain to me a bit better but um it0:16:17 seems to me that in christianity there's0:16:19 a kind of uh evangelical aspect to it0:16:22 which is like you really are trying to0:16:24 convince people to to win their souls0:16:26 for jesus or whatever it is right and so0:16:30 that0:16:30 project sets an a high bar because0:16:35 if you're trying to change somebody's0:16:36 mind you do have to overcome their0:16:39 skepticism if you're just trying to0:16:41 explain why you are convinced of0:16:43 something you don't there's a real0:16:45 requirement to change somebody else's0:16:46 mind so it depends what you're trying to0:16:48 do right um and it just seems to me that0:16:50 a lot of the time0:16:52 there's this background assumption that0:16:53 what the christian is up to is trying to0:16:55 convert people that's just not0:16:57 necessarily gonna well might be the0:16:58 motivation you might be in evangelical0:17:01 atheists i suppose but yeah yeah i guess0:17:03 i guess that's true i get i guess that's0:17:05 true in the sense that well like like0:17:07 the whole like apologetics project like0:17:09 right so i mean generally speaking so i0:17:11 i guess you're right like on a societal0:17:13 level it seems like it's the theist0:17:15 who's trying to pull people on his side0:17:17 right but then when we come more like0:17:19 towards the intellectual sphere i mean0:17:21 it seems like that's just like0:17:23 transferred0:17:25 you know with no reservations in the0:17:26 sense that0:17:28 well i mean0:17:30 i just think this is right0:17:32 and i'm telling people that i think this0:17:34 is right that's really what0:17:36 what converting people is i mean and for0:17:39 the atheist0:17:40 it would really be that well i think0:17:42 this is right0:17:43 and maybe you're not interested in0:17:45 converting people but maybe you are in0:17:47 the sense that well maybe religion is0:17:48 harmful i don't know sure yeah but maybe0:17:51 your worldview doesn't entail that you0:17:52 know it's really important for a person0:17:54 to hold a certain view and i guess it's0:17:57 quite obvious in the case of0:17:59 theism and non-theism where there's this0:18:02 you know picture of an ultimate judgment0:18:04 and accountability that well okay in0:18:06 that sense it would be more important0:18:07 and i guess0:18:09 for the atheist to um0:18:13 i mean if that were true then then well0:18:16 uh the atheist uh0:18:19 expressing his views and trying to0:18:20 counter the theistic arguments well0:18:23 that's going to be a big deal as well0:18:24 because well0:18:26 if if my side of of of the you know if0:18:29 my world view is true then there's0:18:31 serious implications for like leaving0:18:34 religion so i i guess i guess on both0:18:36 ends there's an0:18:37 there's a significant weight to the0:18:40 claims we're making0:18:41 but i do get what you're saying in the0:18:42 sense that well what it does seem like0:18:44 it's the religious people running out0:18:46 there trying to convert people0:18:48 even though these days there does seem0:18:49 to be a bit of a balance with like uh0:18:51 you know what they call new atheism0:18:53 militant atheism i mean dying out a bit0:18:55 but but there does seem to be a balance0:18:58 and uh0:18:59 and i guess it depends on what like0:19:01 what region or country or point of0:19:03 history you're talking about because if0:19:04 we talk about china i think it0:19:06 some somebody's a place like china maybe0:19:08 it would be like reverse infer0:19:11 in favor of like um0:19:13 non-theism that that uh0:19:15 that you know theisms looked down upon0:19:17 and and and the favored view is is0:19:19 non-theism or atheism and uh the reverse0:19:22 would be true so i don't know i mean i0:19:24 get i get you i get i get the0:19:26 i get the sentiment but uh0:19:29 i guess more in the realm of philosophy0:19:31 of religion it seems like there's still0:19:33 i i do still get that vibe right in0:19:35 these discussions that you know so0:19:38 here's my worldview here's my like0:19:40 theory of reality0:19:42 uh0:19:43 then0:19:45 you know we could just end it right0:19:46 there shake hands and go home0:19:48 but but no no0:19:50 you have to prove something to me0:19:51 because you're trying to convert me but0:19:53 i don't think in these in these0:19:55 discussions it's really about trying to0:19:56 convert each other yeah0:19:58 so0:20:00 the burden of proof is not something0:20:02 that's fixed i mean it can exchange0:20:04 sides in a conversation i mean i would0:20:07 start off with you making a claim0:20:08 and then um0:20:10 a few minutes later i'm making claim now0:20:12 burden of proof isn't on me right0:20:14 it's not really got anything to do with0:20:15 who i am what i believe it's all to do0:20:17 with like what is going on in the0:20:19 dialectic that point so an atheist can0:20:21 have the burden of proof that fears can0:20:23 have the burden of proof there's really0:20:24 nothing about0:20:26 theism and atheism that hasn't dictates0:20:28 that who has the burden of proof as such0:20:31 so0:20:31 um0:20:32 if i meant for instance i i might uh0:20:36 put forward an argument from evil or0:20:37 something0:20:39 but you know0:20:40 that is on his face trying to establish0:20:43 a conclusion it might be that god0:20:44 doesn't exist like it's probable that0:20:46 god doesn't exist something like that0:20:48 but you know to the extent that i'm0:20:49 making that claim and i'm trying to0:20:50 defend it i do have to um0:20:53 meet that burden of proof that comes0:20:55 with it um0:20:56 and it just seems that like0:20:59 by0:21:00 whatever historical contingency or0:21:02 something0:21:03 theists are out there pushing arguments0:21:06 for their conclusions0:21:07 and atheists typically play the role of0:21:10 the objective there's nothing about0:21:12 atheism that means it's an objective0:21:13 rather than someone has a case that they0:21:15 can be held to account for0:21:18 um0:21:18 and you know0:21:19 so yeah that's that's i think that's the0:21:21 right thing yeah i i totally agree i0:21:23 totally so yeah it is context dependent0:21:25 obviously if i'm making an argument for0:21:26 the existence of god yeah so yeah i0:21:28 agree with that and i guess we could0:21:30 just jump straight into it from here uh0:21:32 and and uh i mean maybe we can because i0:21:34 i think the the0:21:36 i think there's gonna be more points of0:21:37 agreement on uh the clown cosmological0:21:39 argument if we because if we start off0:21:41 with the whole0:21:42 um uh infinite regress question i don't0:21:46 know if you want to start with0:21:46 everything that begins to exist has a0:21:48 cause that's like if you want to start0:21:50 with a causal principle i think that's0:21:51 going to be like a sort of like common0:21:52 discussion between both like the0:21:54 contingency argument and and the column0:21:56 cosmological argument but uh generally0:21:58 infinite regress and and what i what i0:22:00 told you in our uh you know in our0:22:02 exchanges is that i do agree with you at0:22:04 some points with with regard to the uh0:22:06 the critique you make against uh0:22:09 craig's uh you know0:22:11 impossibility of an actual infinite by0:22:13 successive edition argument right0:22:15 okay um0:22:17 and and uh0:22:19 i mean i guess0:22:22 it is it is a very like smart0:22:25 i think response the whole beginningless0:22:26 counting thing it just sort of shifts0:22:28 the whole0:22:29 um0:22:30 it's almost like you can't get around it0:22:31 in the same like strictly logical sense0:22:33 that you do with her when you begin0:22:35 counting right0:22:37 and and it to me it seems like um so i0:22:40 obviously i i i do believe that the past0:22:42 is not infinite uh right but i i guess0:22:45 the point is that uh the structure of0:22:48 the argument the way the argument is put0:22:50 forward maybe i mean i'm not i i don't0:22:52 know if uh there are probably0:22:54 good responses out there that i i0:22:56 haven't read but uh the structure of the0:22:59 argument that you know that the0:23:00 successive edition argument i don't0:23:02 think it shows that0:23:05 impossibility as far as i understand it0:23:07 given0:23:08 that uh critique uh because it it it is0:23:12 a bit misleading to0:23:13 begin counting when you're talking about0:23:16 a a beginningless past so i guess that's0:23:19 that's that's the point of that would be0:23:20 the point of agreement there i think the0:23:22 only um objection that i find um0:23:27 like worth considering is the is the0:23:29 whole um0:23:30 i don't know what it's called i i looked0:23:32 at it like uh quite a while ago but0:23:34 where like it's just arbitrary where you0:23:38 are going to end0:23:40 counting0:23:41 um what was that objection again uh i0:23:44 don't i don't remember who raised it but0:23:46 it's just something like it violates the0:23:48 psr something like that like there's0:23:51 yeah right there's no real reason why0:23:53 you're going to end counting let's say0:23:55 if you're counting down0:23:56 there's no real reason why you're0:23:58 going to you know reach0:24:00 109 876 now rather than you know any0:24:03 time in the infinite past so uh yeah i0:24:06 guess that's the only one that like i0:24:07 mean there's something there in the0:24:08 sense that it is weird right0:24:11 oh yeah definitely it's weird yeah uh0:24:13 and uh0:24:14 i don't know uh so so but that alone i0:24:17 think all in all it's it's it's it's a0:24:20 good counter argument but um0:24:24 do you want me to say a little bit about0:24:25 that then yeah yeah yeah if you can0:24:27 so0:24:28 the0:24:30 um the argument is put by0:24:32 people like craig right is that um0:24:36 uh i think the syllogism so this is like0:24:40 premise two of the column is the one0:24:42 that says the universe began to exist0:24:43 right and0:24:44 um create typically gifts like0:24:47 scientific supports for that and0:24:49 philosophical supports and if we just0:24:51 ignore the scientific ones and think0:24:52 about the philosophical ones then0:24:54 generally here's two of those and one is0:24:56 the hilbert's hotel argument the other0:24:58 one is the successive edition argument0:25:00 right so we've classified it down to0:25:01 exactly what we're talking about and0:25:03 then this successive edition argument0:25:04 says something like a collection formed0:25:06 by successive edition cannot be actually0:25:08 infinite um0:25:10 but and then he's saying the0:25:12 temporal regress of events like all of0:25:14 the events in the past is formed by0:25:17 successive addition like one thing0:25:18 happening after another therefore it0:25:20 cannot be actually infinite it's just a0:25:22 modus opponents effectively very simple0:25:24 little argument so the question is just0:25:27 can a you know question0:25:28 i mean0:25:29 you might question premise two and that0:25:31 is is the success is the series of past0:25:34 events formed by successive editions0:25:35 just parked out for the time being0:25:37 think about premise one0:25:39 is it true that um that uh no series of0:25:43 events or no series formed by successive0:25:45 edition can be actually is that true um0:25:50 it seems to me there's reasons to0:25:52 to to doubt that i mean the paper that i0:25:55 published last year0:25:57 um0:25:58 about this i was arguing that0:26:01 you know if you so you can form a little0:26:03 argument which is like you know it's0:26:05 possible that somebody starts counting0:26:07 now0:26:08 and just doesn't ever stop counting in0:26:10 the broadest sense of being possible0:26:12 right it's you know just assume that0:26:14 they don't die or go mad or anything0:26:16 like that so logically possible at least0:26:18 right that somebody starts counting and0:26:19 just doesn't stop you want to think0:26:21 about an angel counting or something0:26:22 like that then fair enough um0:26:25 but as long as that's possible then0:26:27 you know for each number they're going0:26:29 to count that number like a million are0:26:30 they going to count that yes they are0:26:31 obviously right so for every number it's0:26:34 true at some point that they're going to0:26:35 count that number so there's no there's0:26:37 no stopping point and it would be weird0:26:38 to think that there was a stopping point0:26:40 you know why think that some number n is0:26:43 the last number that you can count to so0:26:45 it just seems like for any number n you0:26:47 can count n plus one um0:26:50 but then so so now it just seems like0:26:52 we've established that every single0:26:53 number is one that will be counted by0:26:56 this person and and then you just ask0:26:58 well how many numbers are there then0:26:59 such that each one will be counted and0:27:01 it's just all of them0:27:03 how and so how many numbers are there0:27:04 well there's infinitely many i mean0:27:06 we're talking about natural numbers0:27:07 there's a specific sense of infinity0:27:09 that we mean that's because alif alif0:27:11 know right0:27:12 sort of bottom level infinite um0:27:16 and that's exactly how many numbers that0:27:18 this person will count it doesn't mean0:27:19 that there's some point at which they0:27:21 have counted all those numbers it's just0:27:22 saying now at this point when they start0:27:24 counting assuming that they never stop0:27:26 then you know it's just true that they0:27:28 will come each and every one of them and0:27:30 there's infinitely many of them so there0:27:32 you go and that's my kind of counter0:27:34 exam it just sort of seems like0:27:36 um0:27:37 it is possible to form uh an actual0:27:40 influence by successive edition we have0:27:41 to be very careful because0:27:43 i think craig's trying to say is it0:27:44 possible that you0:27:46 will have formed0:27:48 an actual infinite by successive edition0:27:50 and my counter example doesn't really0:27:52 speak to that um because i'm explicitly0:27:54 saying0:27:55 it's not true that he will have counted0:27:57 all of them0:27:58 right if he starts at t zero there's no0:28:01 point t0:28:03 in the future but he's finished that0:28:04 task it doesn't have an end0:28:06 so it's an endless task but now think0:28:08 about well what about all the moments0:28:10 leading up to this this point um0:28:14 well0:28:14 one reason for thinking that he couldn't0:28:16 you know have completed the count up is0:28:19 just that there isn't a final number0:28:21 right there's just no end it's an0:28:23 endless series so it's just like saying0:28:25 can you get to the end of something that0:28:27 doesn't have an end and that's why the0:28:29 answer is no0:28:30 because0:28:31 you know0:28:32 can you get to the end of the earth well0:28:34 no because you just keep going round and0:28:36 round and round there is no end to the0:28:37 earth right it's so for the same reason0:28:39 you can't you can't do that either if0:28:41 it's got no end you can't get to the end0:28:42 of it but thinking about a sequence0:28:44 which doesn't have a beginning0:28:46 but you know ends today like somebody0:28:49 who's been counting down forever0:28:51 um you know in the natural numbers in0:28:54 reverse order or something0:28:56 well0:28:57 what you can't say about that is it that0:28:59 it's impossible because it doesn't have0:29:00 an end0:29:01 right that's because it does have an end0:29:03 at the end it's when he says zero which0:29:05 maybe for instance today or something so0:29:07 he certainly can't just appeal to0:29:09 exactly the same thing0:29:11 that made us think that you can't finish0:29:13 it can count up0:29:15 um because0:29:16 that was just that there's no end to it0:29:17 but a countdown does have an end to it0:29:19 so obviously that doesn't0:29:20 follow but if i can just on that on that0:29:22 point i mean0:29:24 i mean i guess on the first point0:29:26 because i mean so so the whole um0:29:28 there's the whole quantifier shift uh uh0:29:31 objection so i don't know because0:29:33 because for me the the second part of0:29:36 the argument is seems much more0:29:37 compelling but0:29:39 but yeah i guess it is true that so that0:29:41 every number each number will be counted0:29:43 yeah that's true but i just don't think0:29:45 it's relevant to what craig is saying in0:29:46 the sense that well he's saying just0:29:48 he's saying it can't be traversed i0:29:50 guess that's more of like a0:29:52 temporal consideration that's not0:29:54 included in the maybe or0:29:57 i mean0:29:58 it's not quite clear what traversing0:30:01 really means and interesting you know0:30:03 taken literally means like moving from0:30:05 one point space to the other right and0:30:07 that takes you some time to do it0:30:09 assuming you don't move infinitely0:30:11 quickly0:30:12 um0:30:13 i'm0:30:14 other than as an an analogy or kind of0:30:16 like a metaphor or something i'm not0:30:17 really sure what it means to traverse0:30:19 assuming assuming presentism right so0:30:21 assuming craig's presentism and like you0:30:23 know one more moment succeeds another0:30:26 um i mean i i guess you do concede in0:30:28 your paper um0:30:30 i don't know whether it was you or or0:30:33 morrison but then the the the idea that0:30:36 well it is true that it won't be0:30:38 traversed in the sense that you know0:30:40 elif now is never going to be reached it0:30:42 doesn't have an immediate predecessor so0:30:44 that's right and i guess my my issue0:30:46 here is that like0:30:49 so the fact that each number will be0:30:51 counted isn't really craig's problem his0:30:52 problem is about the uh traversal0:30:55 considering like the temporal factor is0:30:57 is important considering present0:30:59 distance well think about it like0:31:01 so familiar with hilbert's hotel as a0:31:04 thought experiment right how many rooms0:31:06 are there in hilbert's hotel0:31:09 yeah an infinite an infinite number of0:31:11 new rooms yeah all right but0:31:13 which room has uh0:31:15 uh aleph null written on the outside of0:31:17 it0:31:18 yeah0:31:19 none of them do right so it0:31:22 that the sense in which i'm saying you0:31:24 can count to infinity is the same sense0:31:25 in which there's infinitely many rooms0:31:27 in hilbert's hotel and it's no0:31:28 objections it just seems like a strange0:31:30 objection to say ah but you never say0:31:32 alif no in that sequence that's just0:31:35 like saying i have but there isn't a0:31:36 room number alif now in hilbert's hotel0:31:38 what's that going to do right it doesn't0:31:39 seem yeah like i really yeah i see what0:31:41 you're saying but i guess so the0:31:43 difference here i think would be that0:31:44 like so so so i i don't see a problem0:31:48 with an infinite number of rooms0:31:50 like if they're just instantly0:31:52 instantiated right there it's like0:31:54 there's no temporal factor where there's0:31:55 going to be a sequence0:31:56 for that that's required for them to0:31:59 actually actualize from a finite number0:32:02 to an infinite number i guess in that0:32:04 case the same would apply but if you0:32:05 tell me there's an infinite set0:32:07 right0:32:08 well i believe there is an infinite set0:32:10 i guess the point is well can i count0:32:12 through it given certain considerations0:32:15 like metaphysic like like you know0:32:17 if i if i if we0:32:19 assume presentism for example right0:32:22 uh and and assuming that i'm not0:32:24 counting infinitely fast or something i0:32:26 don't know so so so i i guess given0:32:29 those considerations i guess that's the0:32:30 more relevant picture to what craig was0:32:33 describing so i i i guess my question is0:32:35 why didn't you go straight to the second0:32:37 part like why even0:32:40 yeah well because0:32:43 um0:32:44 i'm defending a philosopher that i love0:32:46 called frederetsky who made this same0:32:48 argument in 19650:32:50 and craig dismisses it with a kind of0:32:51 like uh0:32:53 like a0:32:54 footnote0:32:55 in his book um barely barely a couple of0:32:58 lines to dismiss and he calls it0:32:59 hopelessly confused or something and um0:33:03 it isn't hopelessly confused actually0:33:05 there's a there's what it seems to me a0:33:06 perfectly watertight argument underneath0:33:08 that so part of my reason for0:33:10 not moving straight to the counting down0:33:12 stuff is because there's0:33:14 interesting philosophical work here um0:33:17 just on the counting up bit now look i0:33:19 agree with you that for instance you0:33:21 can't sort of0:33:23 change a finite count somehow like0:33:26 traverse uh if you like0:33:28 or transition or transcend or something0:33:31 from the finite to the infinite by just0:33:33 counting like as if you would0:33:35 you know one day some some0:33:37 time in the future be counting anything0:33:39 other than a finite number i don't think0:33:41 that's right i don't think you can do0:33:43 that but0:33:44 all i'm saying is that all of those0:33:46 things which you've said which i think0:33:47 is perfectly sensible are completely0:33:48 compatible with the point i'm making0:33:50 point i'm making is sort of quite subtle0:33:52 and easy easy to miss it seems to me so0:33:55 i mean i would recommend so my paper is0:33:57 called all the time in the world which0:34:00 is me trying to make a funny paper name0:34:01 but um0:34:02 it's0:34:03 um0:34:05 actually can't even remember if i've0:34:07 posted it the full text i guess i will0:34:09 anyway maybe maybe at some point i can0:34:12 send you the link and we can put it i0:34:13 read it yeah0:34:15 so i i0:34:16 yeah i read the paper um yeah so i guess0:34:19 i guess um0:34:20 yeah because i i i would just agree that0:34:23 of course it's true that each number0:34:25 will be counted but maybe there's0:34:26 something i'm not seeing it's just i0:34:27 just don't see the relevance of it0:34:28 considering the other factors that are0:34:31 brought into craig's you know0:34:33 formulation of the column because it0:34:35 does take other things and0:34:38 keep other things in mind you know that0:34:39 you know in order for a moment to0:34:41 actualize the previous moment must only0:34:43 the present exists and i guess0:34:46 much more than just the abstract notion0:34:49 that each number will be counted is0:34:52 uh required i0:34:54 i won't say it's required i is required0:34:56 to be satisfactory for me but maybe0:34:58 there's something i'm missing so i think0:35:00 that you're caught in the0:35:02 in the gestalt of thinking that0:35:06 for something to0:35:08 um0:35:09 well here's one explanation anyway right0:35:11 which is that0:35:13 if you're thinking0:35:14 for it to be true so i'm making a claim0:35:17 which sounds wrong i'm making a claim it0:35:18 sounds like you can count to infinity0:35:20 and you're saying hold on a minute that0:35:22 that can't be right because for that to0:35:24 be the case you know on the a theory0:35:26 with you know it's kind of actualizing0:35:28 one moment after the other or something0:35:30 there'd have to be this point at which i0:35:32 have actualized0:35:34 infinitely many counts or something0:35:36 starting at one now some point in the0:35:38 future i have done it it's finished0:35:40 i'm looking back at the action and0:35:42 seeing it as a completed totality or0:35:44 something and unless that was true the0:35:47 claim that you can count to infinity0:35:49 must be false and because it's false0:35:51 that you can look back on the completed0:35:53 count that just that's why it's0:35:55 something about like0:35:57 but again i i agree you can't get to the0:36:00 end and i still say that doesn't matter0:36:01 for my point that i'm making because um0:36:04 just think about it like0:36:05 imagine that the future is like a line0:36:07 that's extending in front of you like in0:36:09 donny darko or something like this is0:36:11 kind of like space that's that's0:36:13 infinitely long lines just going away0:36:15 away to the distance and what i'm saying0:36:17 is not that0:36:19 there's a point0:36:20 somewhere down that line far away where0:36:22 i could look back towards where i0:36:24 currently am and there'd be an infinite0:36:25 distance between those two points i'm0:36:27 not saying that all i'm saying is that0:36:29 start like think about it now just0:36:31 imagine every single point on that line0:36:34 is like a light that's lit up or0:36:36 something right and just0:36:38 how many lights are there that are lit0:36:39 up in front of me well there's0:36:41 infinitely many and that's true even if0:36:43 i never get them to the end of them0:36:45 because there is no end like that that's0:36:47 all i'm saying that there's infinitely0:36:49 many and if we think about each of those0:36:51 lights as being an event that will0:36:53 happen then there's infinitely many0:36:55 events that will happen and if we assign0:36:57 each one an actual number and you know0:36:59 then there's infinitely many natural0:37:00 numbers i'll count that's all i'm saying0:37:02 yeah and the point the point of0:37:04 agreement the point of agreement is that0:37:06 they will never have all been counted in0:37:08 the sense that there isn't a time in the0:37:10 future where yeah okay so that's fine0:37:12 and uh0:37:14 and i guess jake uh if you want if you0:37:15 want to come in and say something about0:37:16 this before uh yeah i have a question0:37:20 about this always counting thing0:37:22 so maybe you can0:37:24 try to explain to me0:37:26 how you understand the difference0:37:28 between0:37:29 always counting and never beginning0:37:34 because0:37:35 to me uh0:37:38 is very difficult for me to imagine when0:37:40 you say well the person was always0:37:42 counting but he never began0:37:44 um okay so we're talking about an0:37:46 infinite countdown throughout the past0:37:48 well i'm saying starting from the0:37:49 beginning0:37:50 but there is no start right so he he's0:37:53 always counting0:37:55 um but there's two things to keep0:37:56 distinct right there's one where i start0:37:58 counting today i'm gonna go like one two0:38:01 three four blah blah blah there's no end0:38:03 to that sequence but there is a0:38:04 beginning then the other the other cases0:38:07 me i'm going like three two one finished0:38:10 and you know on you know let's suppose0:38:12 that there's no beginning to that so0:38:14 this exact mirror image of the count up0:38:17 so which one are you talking about at0:38:18 the moment to count down0:38:20 up0:38:20 well because i the way i and maybe i0:38:22 totally missed it the way i understood0:38:24 you guys talking about you're talking0:38:26 about somebody who's always been0:38:27 counting0:38:28 right because that's a countdown then in0:38:30 that case because if somebody starts0:38:31 counting now they haven't necessarily0:38:33 always been counting i mean0:38:36 you haven't always been counting0:38:38 yeah but if he's always been counting0:38:40 yeah then0:38:42 and he didn't start0:38:44 yeah0:38:44 then it's it's a bit difficult for me to0:38:47 understand0:38:48 how he's always been counting if he0:38:50 never started0:38:52 you see because he net0:38:54 he never began to count correct0:38:57 well there's some counting down remember0:38:59 so so0:39:00 you know yeah but it's counting down0:39:02 from what that's the question well0:39:06 he's not counting there's no point where0:39:07 he starts counting so so you know it's0:39:10 like if i'm counting up you can say well0:39:11 you're counting up to what i'm not0:39:13 always counting up okay let me let me0:39:15 try to0:39:16 say it a different way to explain what0:39:19 the difficulty to me is0:39:21 he never began counting so he's always0:39:23 been counting and he's counting down but0:39:25 he's not counting down from a particular0:39:28 number0:39:28 so0:39:31 how is he ever at any particular number0:39:35 okay0:39:36 this is the question i didn't i guess0:39:38 you're not going to like the explanation0:39:39 right but it's going to be something0:39:40 like i mean depends what you what sort0:39:42 of thing you're asking for but i mean0:39:44 you know yeah i'm just trying i don't0:39:46 know if what i'm saying makes sense but0:39:49 well i think um um0:39:52 so i think there's something natural0:39:54 about about this that you're trying to0:39:56 express it seems to me let me see if0:39:58 this is right if this catches your worry0:40:00 right which is that like you can imagine0:40:02 someone who's counting down0:40:04 all the natural numbers in reverse order0:40:07 and he's0:40:08 just by pure luck it seems like we0:40:10 stumble across him as he's going three0:40:12 two one few finished well0:40:14 infinite task off my back now i can go0:40:17 with my life and do something else0:40:19 and you say what have you been up to and0:40:20 he says well i just spent0:40:22 an infinite amount of time counting0:40:24 backwards through the natural numbers um0:40:27 and then we go around the corner and we0:40:29 find someone else and he's going three0:40:31 two one few unfinished and then you0:40:34 might say hold on how what explains me0:40:36 you finished five minutes later than the0:40:39 the first guy right you've both had0:40:41 infinite amount of time to finish how0:40:43 come you finished now and he finished uh0:40:46 a few minutes ago and now the mind0:40:49 starts to boggle because you think you0:40:50 can kind of sense a vertigo like there0:40:52 can't really be any kind of reason0:40:54 why one finishes now and the other one0:40:56 finishes0:40:57 um at some other time i mean is that the0:40:59 type of worry that you're trying it's0:41:01 similar but0:41:03 a step back before that so i'm not0:41:04 asking why did they finish at a0:41:07 particular time let's change to just0:41:10 modify the thought experiment slightly0:41:13 if prior to him getting or sort of0:41:16 reaching or counting down to0:41:19 zero or up to infinity what you're0:41:21 saying here i'm talking about0:41:24 if we stopped that person or walked by0:41:26 and heard him counting0:41:28 at any particular moment0:41:30 what would the reason be for saying oh0:41:32 he's at 500 or he's at0:41:35 237 or whatever0:41:38 it just seems that because there was no0:41:40 starting point and he's never began to0:41:43 count it's hard to imagine0:41:45 why he's at 10 or why he's at 37 or any0:41:48 no any number0:41:50 well so0:41:51 type of thing well some things i mean0:41:53 what sort of thing would be satisfying i0:41:55 mean presumably what would be satisfying0:41:57 would be some prior condition that0:41:59 entailed him0:42:00 saying the number that he's saying now0:42:02 and presumably that would be0:42:03 satisfactory0:42:04 but you know here's an example of0:42:06 something like that say he's saying0:42:08 say he's currently on his way0:42:11 uh counting down towards zero and he's0:42:13 at the number 500 right as we stumble0:42:15 across it you see how come he's a 5000:42:18 and not some other number um well i0:42:20 might tell you well i mean he always0:42:22 counts one number per0:42:24 let's say minute0:42:26 and uh two minutes ago he was on 502.0:42:30 right now those things i just told you0:42:32 then kind of entails that he's on 5000:42:34 right now because0:42:36 it follows logically from the fact that0:42:37 he always counts one number per minute0:42:39 two minutes ago he's on 502 therefore0:42:41 right now he's on 500 so0:42:44 that that's about as much as i can offer0:42:46 you in terms of like it's like you don't0:42:48 mind me elaborating0:42:50 yeah if you don't mind me yeah go ahead0:42:52 is because there's no immediate0:42:54 predecessor to infinity and he's also0:42:58 he's counting down and he's never0:42:59 started0:43:01 you can't even you can't get to the0:43:03 supposed first number it's oh so now it0:43:06 sounds like what you're saying is that0:43:07 he has to start at infinity and what's0:43:09 the next number to count to or something0:43:11 no but because0:43:13 yeah but because he's not starting0:43:15 there is no first number so0:43:18 it just seems0:43:19 completely arbitrary to say0:43:22 what number he's ever at0:43:24 i just don't see how i mean0:43:26 at some given i guess alex if you don't0:43:29 if you don't mind me let me just if i0:43:30 can just0:43:31 clarify so0:43:33 so i guess0:43:34 i mean this whole series would just be0:43:36 non-metric in the sense that0:43:40 i mean why why could wouldn't it be0:43:42 easier if if the if the thought0:43:43 experiment was more like so the guy was0:43:45 like always eating cookies or something0:43:47 right because0:43:48 because then0:43:49 you're not going to have like an ordered0:43:51 sequence where it's like0:43:53 oh it's 10 9 8 now but it's like i see a0:43:55 guy he's eating cookies well hey when0:43:57 did you start eating cookies well i've0:43:58 always been eating cookies well how many0:44:01 cookies have you eaten well there's an0:44:02 infinite number of cookies so but then0:44:05 because so that in that sense i don't0:44:06 think the0:44:07 part is very helpful because it seems0:44:09 like the whole thing is gonna be0:44:10 non-metric so really how is he at ten0:44:12 and the way you i think the analogy you0:44:14 gave with like the other counter would0:44:17 would assume like a relational view of0:44:19 time right0:44:20 um it doesn't assume a relational view0:44:23 of time it could be on a substantive0:44:25 view of time too0:44:26 um0:44:27 because if if it is then how are we0:44:29 measuring0:44:31 because then the distinction is still0:44:33 arbitrary right it's like0:44:35 um0:44:37 would they be like on different0:44:39 in different time frames or0:44:41 um or maybe they're in similar time0:44:43 frames but they're counting at different0:44:45 speeds and well the time0:44:48 you know the the time coincides the two0:44:50 different time frames0:44:52 match one to one can we just take a step0:44:54 back a minute i think we agree0:44:56 presumably that uh we we could now0:44:59 engage in a countdown from the numbers0:45:01 ten to one and we could orchestrate it0:45:03 such that i'll say ten then after all0:45:05 you say nine and then jake you say uh0:45:07 sorry i say ten then after all you say0:45:09 ten and then jake you say ten and then0:45:11 i'll say nine and blah blah and we just0:45:13 do this kind of countdown in a second0:45:14 like that okay there's nothing wrong0:45:16 with us not arbitrary in any sense it0:45:18 doesn't presuppose non-metric time or0:45:20 anything about philosophy of time does0:45:21 it that's perfectly mundane and humdrum0:45:24 now just extend that forever right0:45:26 that's all i'm saying so i don't really0:45:28 see that it has any doesn't bear on0:45:29 anything yeah yeah but then so i guess0:45:32 jake's worry here is that well the 100:45:33 isn't really a 10 is it it's like0:45:37 the problem is because you're working0:45:39 your you the example you're giving is0:45:42 from0:45:42 a known number which you're starting at0:45:44 and then you're extrapolating it the0:45:46 other way but you can't do that in the0:45:49 reverse that's the issue0:45:51 well i see i just don't i don't see i0:45:54 don't see a contradiction in supposing0:45:56 that um because i mean like think about0:45:58 it like this for any number n it's0:46:01 possible that i do a countdown from that0:46:03 number to zero in principle0:46:05 right0:46:06 yeah but i guess that that the problem0:46:08 is you're starting at a number yeah i0:46:11 agree but let's just see where we where0:46:13 this agreement kicks in i mean it just0:46:14 seems we all agree for any number n you0:46:17 could count down from that number0:46:19 right0:46:20 yes0:46:21 okay so there's no0:46:23 but but before before maybe maybe let me0:46:25 answer that because because uh jake jake0:46:27 says yes i agree too but then i guess0:46:29 the main worry here is that there is no0:46:31 number n yeah the the problem is there's0:46:33 no amber and and the pro second problem0:46:36 is there's no starting0:46:38 both of those are not analogous to the0:46:41 example yeah i mean there is no number m0:46:43 because there is no starting in a sense0:46:44 that okay so the way the way i see it so0:46:46 with the whole the guy's just always0:46:47 been eating cookies and there's no order0:46:49 to it right so it's just a non-metric0:46:51 sequence0:46:53 yeah0:46:54 so so the way the way i see it is well i0:46:57 can just arbitrarily pick a point in the0:47:00 infinite series0:47:01 and start counting as i i metricate time0:47:04 from from that point onwards and say0:47:05 okay this is 1bc 2bc3bc0:47:09 but that's just going to be completely0:47:10 arbitrary it's just going to depend on0:47:12 the point i choose it's not going to0:47:14 really be 1 bc or 2 bc or 3 bc really0:47:17 there is no 1bc or 2bc or 3bc0:47:20 well0:47:21 the symbols we use are arbitrary but i0:47:23 mean there's some facts about what0:47:25 somebody is saying uh at a given time0:47:27 that's not arbitrary0:47:29 right0:47:31 sorry if i don't really quite i mean i0:47:33 can i can call0:47:35 1bc7bc right and just like shunt the0:47:38 whole timeline down when i write down my0:47:40 dates or something if i want to i could0:47:42 be0:47:42 yeah and you can't really tell me that0:47:44 there's anything0:47:45 significant0:47:46 yeah but i guess so objectively yeah0:47:49 yeah yeah you're right so but i guess0:47:50 objectively in the sense that well0:47:51 objectively there really is no0:47:54 uh uh you know0:47:55 but it's very different there is no fact0:47:58 about what a guy is saying at a given0:47:59 point in time and that doesn't seem0:48:01 arbitrary at all like he is saying 100:48:03 right now0:48:04 right so so how is that arbitrary it's0:48:06 not like choosing to use a different0:48:08 symbol to denote some point in time it's0:48:11 an event and it either happens or it0:48:13 doesn't and and it just doesn't seem0:48:15 there's anything wrong with supposing at0:48:16 any given time in the past that anyone0:48:19 is saying any given number and0:48:21 right0:48:23 i guess i'd understand it better i guess0:48:24 i'd understand it better if you said0:48:26 that he was counting0:48:29 i mean i understand the the i'm on this0:48:31 objective specifically0:48:33 if you said he's counting up from just0:48:35 an0:48:36 arbitrary point like anywhere in the0:48:38 sequence but then if you say he's0:48:40 counting down and he reached 10 and and0:48:43 he0:48:46 and what we mean by that is genuinely he0:48:48 is0:48:49 at that number because of the sequence0:48:51 that he's been through then then i mean0:48:54 i i guess i shared jake's concern in the0:48:55 sense that well0:48:56 it doesn't seem like the sequence is0:48:58 metricated at all it doesn't seem like0:49:00 it means something to say that it's 100:49:01 because at every point in the finite0:49:04 past0:49:05 an infinite series has already been0:49:08 traversed so it's it's like0:49:12 i i don't think it can be metricated i0:49:14 think i think0:49:16 i think i see what you're saying so like0:49:17 if you take0:49:19 let's just consider all0:49:22 if you think of the sequence of numbers0:49:24 right having no0:49:25 let's say beginning so it's the natural0:49:28 the negative numbers let's say and it0:49:30 ends with one or zero however you choose0:49:33 to carve it up and that's arbitrary it0:49:34 seems to me where you end the series but0:49:37 let's pretend we agree that it's i don't0:49:39 know one or something at the hard end0:49:41 and then it's open in the other0:49:42 direction and then you ask well how many0:49:44 numbers are there in this set that's0:49:46 closed at one end and open in the other0:49:48 and there's infinitely many and now0:49:50 let's take away 17 numbers or something0:49:53 why i'm just assuming that the guy0:49:54 stopped when he got to 17 instead of0:49:56 stopped when he got to one right how0:49:58 many numbers has he counted oh the same0:50:00 amount of numbers0:50:02 he's already counted in the same amount0:50:04 right so0:50:05 um there's something kind of weird about0:50:07 that right there's0:50:08 some proper subset of an infinite series0:50:11 can have the same cardinality as the0:50:14 entire series and that sort of baffles0:50:16 the intuition um0:50:18 but that's just what it is yeah that is0:50:20 isn't it yeah that's right property that0:50:23 characterizes this type of sense and0:50:26 while i understand that that sort of0:50:27 thing is very strange i'm not seeing um0:50:30 the basis to say that the whole thing0:50:32 must be somehow arbitrary or non-metric0:50:35 just based on that type of feature i0:50:37 think it's not going to do enough work0:50:39 for you to get to that0:50:41 i mean so i guess for the like for the0:50:44 finitis i mean he's not going to so the0:50:46 the analogy just gave it's it's the the0:50:48 issue is going to be more like um0:50:50 i mean it's the same problem i mean so0:50:53 so we do believe a number line exists0:50:55 but uh i guess0:50:58 i guess the issue really is with the0:51:00 sequence as in is with like a0:51:03 is is really what craig calls a0:51:04 successive edition right uh0:51:07 that's the problem the problem isn't0:51:09 that there is an infinite set so there0:51:11 can be and it's just like like in0:51:12 hilbert's hotel there are infinite0:51:14 number of rooms it doesn't have to be a0:51:15 sequence where one pops into existence0:51:17 after the other so there is an infinite0:51:19 set whatever that means it's limitless0:51:22 and and uh and that's okay uh i guess0:51:24 the arbitrariness isn't in the fact that0:51:27 an infinite set exists it's in the it's0:51:29 it's more in the fact that there is0:51:31 uh0:51:32 a sequence0:51:34 that has any kind of meaningful metric0:51:38 to it0:51:39 where uh you know there is no beginning0:51:42 so i don't know if i expressed that well0:51:44 but like so so there's if if there is no0:51:47 beginning it just seems like that's the0:51:48 point that's arbitrary not the fact of0:51:50 infinity itself0:51:52 just really the state the temporal state0:51:56 a person is in if he's been0:51:58 beginninglessly doing something i guess0:52:00 that's yeah let me just say one thing0:52:02 guys just in the interest of time i0:52:05 think um alex you will give you the last0:52:08 word on that and then we might want to0:52:10 move on to uh0:52:12 causal financing because i know that0:52:14 okay i think i think you have a slightly0:52:16 different take on that and0:52:18 so maybe you can say your last piece on0:52:20 that and then comment on your thoughts0:52:23 on causal feminism0:52:25 okay um so0:52:27 well i think it was0:52:30 i guess i'm still not really seeing what0:52:32 the worry is so0:52:34 there's this idea that it wouldn't be0:52:35 like0:52:37 metric or something it seems to me what0:52:38 it means to be metric is just that it0:52:40 can be0:52:41 um0:52:42 uh0:52:43 partitioned in in a way that makes it0:52:46 um0:52:48 coincide with the number series that's0:52:51 basically all that it means right so you0:52:52 can imagine imposing a grid on it or0:52:54 something that's numerical and0:52:57 i'm not really seeing why having no0:53:00 beginning0:53:01 means that you can't do that because0:53:02 it's so if you just cast your mind back0:53:04 to kind of uh0:53:06 um0:53:08 high school0:53:09 geometry or whatever you have a kind of0:53:11 cartesian axis it's got a zero you know0:53:13 it's x and y axis the zero point is in0:53:15 the middle um but it goes negatively0:53:18 back0:53:19 uh in a minus x goes off towards the the0:53:23 left hand side plus x goes off towards0:53:26 the right hand side so what it doesn't0:53:28 mean both of them are as equally as0:53:30 metric as the other0:53:32 it just seems like i'm not really seeing0:53:34 why oh well it's not really metric if it0:53:36 doesn't have a beginning0:53:37 maybe i'm not understanding the0:53:39 objection still but if there's something0:53:41 more to it i guess i'll have to wait0:53:43 um for another day to hear0:53:46 and maybe you can explain it to me um0:53:49 i don't know another time uh but i i0:53:52 don't see the worry that you've got at0:53:53 this point so it's difficult to sort of0:53:54 yeah sure no problem so0:53:57 more about it another day0:53:59 yeah yeah sure sure so i i guess maybe i0:54:01 can i can uh message you about that when0:54:03 when0:54:03 yeah yeah maybe i can order my thoughts0:54:05 better so0:54:06 causal fenetism i guess if jake you want0:54:09 to go there uh yeah i guess yeah yeah go0:54:11 ahead just because i i understand he0:54:14 he's not going to say the exact same0:54:16 thing that won't as when we were talking0:54:18 about the infinite there0:54:20 so um0:54:21 yeah what are your thoughts on on causal0:54:23 financing0:54:25 um0:54:26 okay so cause of finitism is a view that0:54:28 every causal chain has a first chorus0:54:31 like uh original0:54:33 first point so it's you know obviously0:54:35 quite relevantly similar uh doctrine to0:54:38 what we were just considering a moment0:54:39 ago which is that time has a beginning0:54:41 now we're just talking0:54:42 you know0:54:44 it depends whether you think this is0:54:45 more specific or more general but we're0:54:47 saying cause affinity is a thesis every0:54:49 causal sequence has a first cause to it0:54:52 um0:54:54 and0:54:54 i mean generally speaking i i just don't0:54:56 really0:54:57 know whether causal finitism is true or0:54:59 not maybe it's true0:55:00 um0:55:02 it doesn't necessarily entail the time0:55:05 that's the beginning either even if0:55:06 causal finitism is true0:55:09 um0:55:10 the various different counter examples0:55:12 to this but i mean you can imagine0:55:14 overlapping by independent causal0:55:17 sequences0:55:18 right like let's say we're both flipping0:55:20 coins or something but you only start0:55:22 when i flipped five coins i stopped0:55:25 flipping after ten0:55:26 you know our sequences overlap with each0:55:28 other um but let's just suppose we've0:55:30 been doing that forever well cause of0:55:32 finance isn't still true even though0:55:34 um0:55:35 there's no beginning to that whole story0:55:37 just because each sequence has0:55:39 has a like a beginning to it so0:55:43 in some respects it's kind of modest0:55:44 claim0:55:45 um0:55:47 so i mean0:55:48 do you lean one way or another on the0:55:51 question of causal phenotype yeah okay0:55:53 so i guess if i leave in terms of like a0:55:55 broad sense of where i lean0:55:57 i0:55:58 don't really have any problem at all0:56:00 with uh0:56:01 well i think my dog is0:56:03 wilma come on get out0:56:06 sorry give me one second it's okay it's0:56:08 okay no problem take your time okay0:56:12 she has now uh left the room so that's0:56:14 more helpful now um0:56:16 i guess my view really is that um you0:56:19 know it's a very soft view0:56:22 is that it does seem to me like less0:56:24 problematic to suppose that0:56:26 like with aristotle the time just0:56:28 doesn't have a beginning to it it's0:56:30 internal in both the past and the future0:56:33 cosmos is just always there and if0:56:35 that's right0:56:37 then0:56:38 though cause affinities might be true0:56:39 it'd only be true in a kind in that sort0:56:41 of way i was talking about a moment ago0:56:42 when we trained in the interesting way0:56:44 that it's all used by0:56:46 theists so it's primarily defended by0:56:48 people like alex prus rob coons0:56:51 um0:56:52 jacob rasmus and her0:56:55 and lorena luna and some other people0:56:57 right who argue for0:56:59 the finitude of the past based on causal0:57:01 finitism and they're normally doing so0:57:04 based on some version of this like grim0:57:06 reaper paradox or benedetti paradox0:57:10 and that's where i really have a sort of0:57:12 stronger disagreement i mean0:57:14 the idea is0:57:16 but like0:57:18 you can sort of learn uh from0:57:20 reflections on the grim reaper paradox0:57:22 the causal financing must be true but0:57:24 like the best explanation0:57:26 of the impossibility0:57:28 that's going on in the grim reaper0:57:30 paradox is to suppose that0:57:32 cause of fighters is true and that just0:57:35 seems wrong to me i think that0:57:37 there's0:57:38 uh a better candidate explanation0:57:41 of what's going on in those0:57:43 grim reaper paradoxes it doesn't involve0:57:46 the supposition cause of fighters is0:57:48 true but that's not to say the cause of0:57:50 financing isn't true it might be true0:57:51 but it's just a kind of like what should0:57:54 what's like the best way of evaluating0:57:57 the situation you have to kind of do0:57:59 this0:57:59 um0:58:01 you have to make your own mind up right0:58:02 balancing out what what the0:58:04 considerations are and it seems to me0:58:06 that0:58:07 um there are various arguments you can0:58:09 make about like0:58:10 the so it's kind of general alchemist0:58:13 idea about0:58:14 you want to0:58:16 you know trade off the explanatory0:58:19 like power of a hypothesis against its0:58:23 ontological commitments right so if0:58:25 you're going to posit that something0:58:27 exists0:58:28 like0:58:29 universals or something like this then0:58:32 that's an acceptable addition to your0:58:34 ontology if it does enough work for you0:58:36 theoretically speaking to sort of earn0:58:38 its keep this kind of very0:58:41 widespread idea in metaphysics and i0:58:43 think that on that kind of evaluation0:58:46 that the cause of finances0:58:49 um0:58:50 idea is a is quite a strong metaphysical0:58:53 assumption0:58:54 and0:58:55 while it does kill off the kind of0:58:58 weird things that are going on in these0:58:59 paradoxes you can kill them off without0:59:02 making that ontological assumption and0:59:04 that means that like0:59:06 to do so is just to pay an ontological0:59:08 cost to get an explanatory payout that0:59:11 you can just get without making the0:59:12 ontological cost and as such so occam's0:59:15 razor would lean towards you taking the0:59:18 ontologically lighter0:59:20 solution everything else being equal and0:59:23 i think that0:59:24 is it0:59:26 which is the unsatisfiable parrot0:59:29 that's right yeah and0:59:31 and uh0:59:34 so again about costs right so so for the0:59:36 unsatisfiable pair0:59:38 so so you wouldn't like reject0:59:41 the patchwork principle right where um i0:59:43 mean because that's i think0:59:45 uh0:59:47 and maybe if you want to explain very0:59:48 briefly what that is for the audience0:59:50 and and and how that0:59:52 relates to this to this specific0:59:54 question0:59:55 i'm happy to explain absolutely any of0:59:57 any of this because it's not um none of0:59:59 this is easy or obvious but um would you1:00:02 like to explain the unsatisfiable pair1:00:04 diagnosis or the patchwork yeah yeah so1:00:06 so1:00:07 what i'm saying is like basically the1:00:10 patchwork principle consideration or1:00:12 objection the the objection that comes1:00:14 from there to your uh solution but i'm1:00:18 saying uh maybe you could start off by i1:00:20 mean i guess it's going to come in the1:00:21 middle of the explanation and and the1:00:23 people will understand what the1:00:25 principle is so1:00:26 yeah so the patchwork principle is um1:00:30 is kind of1:00:31 a very familiar sort of idea that could1:00:34 could occur to anybody really and1:00:35 probably has occurred1:00:37 in throughout the history of philosophy1:00:38 to different people in different ways1:00:39 but1:00:40 it's often often associated with someone1:00:42 like david hume or the kind of other1:00:44 favorite david of the atheism david1:00:47 lewis um1:00:48 as1:00:49 uh1:00:52 this idea that like1:00:54 anything can exist with anything else1:00:57 that's basically the kind of most simple1:00:59 way of saying it right like if you think1:01:00 it's possible that there could be like a1:01:02 frog and you think it's possible that1:01:04 there could be a cat then it'd be an1:01:06 unacceptable kind of1:01:08 thing to think that there couldn't be1:01:09 both a frog and a cat right now1:01:11 obviously there are exceptions to this1:01:12 type of thing um1:01:14 but you know you it seems like it's not1:01:16 that difficult to straighten those out1:01:18 like things that don't literally overlap1:01:20 in space and time right that1:01:23 a frog over here and a cat over there1:01:26 right1:01:27 they don't interfere with each other1:01:28 they have any effect on each other if1:01:29 one's possible and the other one's1:01:30 possible then presumably both of them1:01:32 together is also possible and there's1:01:34 something quite intuitive about the idea1:01:36 right just it just sort of seems right1:01:37 and lewis um describes this when he's1:01:39 talking about like the plentitude of1:01:41 possible worlds because david lewis is a1:01:43 kind of possible worlds metaphysician1:01:46 from1:01:47 um1:01:48 from the second half of the 20th century1:01:49 or the most1:01:51 influential analytic philosophers1:01:53 um1:01:54 and a great read as well i mean everyone1:01:56 should read a bit of baby lyrics at some1:01:58 point um1:02:00 and i yeah okay so that kind of sounds1:02:02 plausible because it sort of seems like1:02:03 tonight you have to1:02:05 postulate that there are some weird1:02:08 holes or like lacunae uh in in1:02:11 in modal space where you just can't have1:02:14 these things1:02:15 combined together for some reason um1:02:17 okay so1:02:18 it's interesting to realize though that1:02:20 like1:02:22 lewis and hume the reason that this is1:02:24 associated with them is also because it1:02:25 goes to their kind of um1:02:28 wider metaphysical1:02:31 view which is i mean broadly speaking1:02:35 it's like a kind of um1:02:38 they're saying like1:02:41 that1:02:42 what it means to be1:02:43 um what's the easiest way to explain1:02:45 this1:02:46 that1:02:50 um1:02:52 so it's been a while since i tried to1:02:54 explain this to anyone so um1:02:57 what they want to say is that like1:02:59 all that it is so uh1:03:06 yeah basically it's basically the way to1:03:08 put it is that the simplest way to put1:03:10 this is just that they're advocating1:03:12 this idea that basically to conceive of1:03:14 something is effectively all that it1:03:17 means for it to be metaphysically1:03:18 possible and1:03:20 it's certainly the case that you can1:03:22 conceive of both those things if you can1:03:24 conceive of each of them individually1:03:26 and that's it seems to be one extreme1:03:30 end of the options that you could take1:03:32 on what it means for something to be1:03:33 metaphysically possible which is just if1:03:35 you can conceive of it then it's1:03:36 metaphysically possible like that's it1:03:39 um1:03:40 so1:03:41 the rejection of that patchwork1:03:43 principle actually means the rejection1:03:45 of what's quite an extreme view on what1:03:47 it means to be metaphysically possible1:03:49 it is quite reasonable and perfectly i1:03:51 would argue perfectly reasonable to deny1:03:53 that and1:03:54 so the patrick principles appeal to1:03:56 explicitly by rob coons who's a1:03:58 christian theist who advances this grim1:04:01 reaper argument and endorses causal1:04:03 finitism and he doesn't believe in the1:04:05 patriarch principle right at least he1:04:07 restricts the patrick principle similar1:04:09 with um1:04:10 alex proves to he's he's not um one of1:04:13 these luisians about modality he he has1:04:16 a book on metaphysical modality and1:04:19 the largest section in there is him1:04:20 critiquing david lewis he's so he's not1:04:23 a patchwork principal guy either um the1:04:26 question is should i be a patriot1:04:27 principal guy and1:04:29 i actually just prefer a different1:04:31 metaphysical a different theory of1:04:33 metaphysical modality so i'm broadly1:04:35 speaking kind of aristotelian about1:04:37 metaphysical modality which means1:04:39 something like1:04:40 um1:04:42 that1:04:43 claims about possibility like things1:04:45 being possible are grounded in the1:04:47 powers of1:04:49 things that exist so like is it possible1:04:52 um for1:04:53 me to i don't know1:04:55 speak french1:04:57 to someone tomorrow i mean it kind of is1:04:59 but only because like i've got the1:05:02 ability to learn1:05:04 at least a sentence of french by1:05:05 tomorrow right now that capacity that1:05:08 i've got is what grounds that as being1:05:11 true so any story about what's possible1:05:13 like just is p possible or something1:05:15 it's kind of really abstract sense has1:05:17 to ground out in1:05:19 statements claims about like the powers1:05:22 that things that actually exist1:05:24 have so it's more of a like1:05:26 yeah sorry so so you it's like you1:05:28 restrict it to like a normal logical you1:05:31 wouldn't so you1:05:32 it's more of like a nomological modality1:05:34 that's the one you're concerned with1:05:36 like in the metaphysical discussion1:05:38 right uh apart from the logical one and1:05:41 uh sure1:05:42 and in that sense so1:05:44 yeah1:05:45 so so so like like coons with the1:05:47 patchwork principle i so i don't think1:05:49 he rejects it he does he does restrict1:05:51 it right i mean i guess1:05:52 um and and you'd be more familiar with1:05:54 this than i am but i think he restricts1:05:56 it in the sense that well he says1:05:58 he restricts it in a way that1:06:01 um you know the restrictions can't be1:06:03 just arbitrary i guess i i i i i guess1:06:06 that's the way he put it that there must1:06:07 be a principled way1:06:09 to rule out something yeah yeah1:06:11 that's right yeah it has to be a1:06:12 principled way of doing it and i mean1:06:14 it's there's not been anything but one1:06:15 of the ways he restricts it is by saying1:06:17 the course of feminism is true because1:06:18 that is a restriction on a patchwork1:06:20 principle i mean not everything can1:06:22 exist with everything else because um1:06:24 you know i can think of1:06:26 a cause i can think of another course1:06:28 thinking of another course but i can't1:06:29 just do that infinitely many times1:06:31 because otherwise they've got you know1:06:32 causal finitism is false so if causal1:06:34 finitism is true then there are things1:06:36 that i can conceive of that you know the1:06:38 patchwork principles should say that are1:06:40 possible but they're not possible right1:06:42 because cause affinity is true so he1:06:44 restricts it at least in that respect1:06:46 but he's also saying you know you can't1:06:47 just say oh i don't like this argument1:06:49 so i'm going to restrict the patchwork1:06:50 principle for no other reason than that1:06:52 would be completely unharmed but being1:06:54 an anesthetian about it isn't to1:06:55 introduce an ad hoc1:06:57 restriction because i'm independently1:06:59 forming a theory of metaphysical1:07:01 modality which actually isn't very far1:07:02 away from his real views when you look1:07:05 in detail i mean all these guys are1:07:07 quite sympathetic to1:07:09 it's kind of the vogue view on1:07:10 metaphysical modality these days yeah so1:07:12 i mean i guess this is where like1:07:14 because because1:07:15 because i i mentioned to you right that1:07:18 that um the whole that that uh the idea1:07:20 of you being very skeptical about1:07:21 metaphysical modality right and and1:07:24 and i think that is something that's1:07:25 common amongst philosophers in the sense1:07:27 that well it isn't as well defined as1:07:30 the other1:07:31 like uh uh modal classes right yeah but1:07:34 um1:07:35 uh1:07:36 so maybe this can clear up the confusion1:07:38 for me right so so1:07:40 so1:07:41 i think by metaphysical modality what1:07:43 what your1:07:45 your your aristotelian view would more1:07:47 or less be about like normal logical1:07:49 considerations right and that would be1:07:50 it the powers of things the laws of1:07:52 nature1:07:53 uh stuff like that right and and in that1:07:56 sense1:07:57 i i'd wonder why1:07:59 uh1:08:00 like the whole uh grim reaper scenario1:08:02 wouldn't be a concern because it does1:08:04 seem like well1:08:06 it is possible um1:08:08 and this is where we might be1:08:10 equivocating on the work possible but it1:08:12 does seem like it is possible for you1:08:14 know the grim reaper1:08:16 a grim reaper to exist and you know do1:08:18 whatever he needs to do in in in the1:08:20 proposed paradox1:08:22 and1:08:23 you these you do seem to have a1:08:24 framework for that in an infinite past1:08:29 i i guess so why it isn't possible i1:08:31 think would be um1:08:33 okay so here's one way of explaining1:08:35 this hopefully it's1:08:37 somewhat clear but1:08:38 a consequence of the australian view and1:08:40 when you're grounding1:08:42 like modal claims in the powers or1:08:44 dispositions of1:08:46 things that exist1:08:47 is that um1:08:49 you know at a given point in time like1:08:51 say today1:08:53 the um1:08:55 every1:08:56 thing that's possible is a continuation1:08:58 of1:08:59 what's actually true right now so it's1:09:02 like you can think of it as branches the1:09:04 future is like a load of branches that1:09:06 come away and the present is like the1:09:08 topmost part of the trunk of the tree1:09:10 underneath it before it starts branching1:09:12 right1:09:12 um1:09:14 so1:09:16 everything that's1:09:17 possible overlaps with what's actual now1:09:20 and of course if you rewind time you'll1:09:22 find that like yesterday there were a1:09:24 lot of branching points or something1:09:26 that that branched away from yesterday1:09:29 when that was present instead but in1:09:31 general kind of global thing you say is1:09:32 that um every possible world overlaps1:09:35 with every other possible world at some1:09:36 point in time so there's no like1:09:39 completely disconnected possible worlds1:09:41 that don't overlap like with the actual1:09:43 world at some point in time um so that's1:09:47 that's just consequence of this1:09:48 aristotelian view a welcome consequence1:09:50 in my view seems perfectly reasonable um1:09:54 but now imagine there's no beginning to1:09:56 time and imagine that uh1:09:59 the the1:10:00 in the actual world there aren't any1:10:02 grim reapers at all right because i mean1:10:04 the thing about the grim reaper scenario1:10:06 is there's a contradiction1:10:08 involved in it so1:10:10 obviously that's not the case assuming1:10:12 contradictions are impossible in the1:10:14 actual world even if it's beginningless1:10:16 um it doesn't doesn't have a1:10:18 contradictory state of affairs to it the1:10:20 claim is just if the past were1:10:22 beginningless then the grim reaper1:10:23 scenario where it is contradictory would1:10:25 be possible and that's the claim and1:10:28 then you say well grim reaper scenario1:10:29 is impossible so therefore anything that1:10:32 entails it it's possible must itself be1:10:34 impossible now it's basically the1:10:36 argument it's telling you time has a1:10:37 beginning but you know1:10:39 here's here's my1:10:40 my sort of response so imagine in the1:10:43 actual world there's no there's no1:10:44 beginning1:10:45 and1:10:46 i don't know every day in the past is1:10:48 just filled with somebody eating cookies1:10:50 or something instead of grim reapers1:10:52 doing waiting to kill fred or whatever1:10:54 um1:10:56 now ask yourself1:10:58 is1:10:59 the scenario where every day in the past1:11:02 there had been grim reapers instead of1:11:04 somebody just eating cookies is that1:11:06 possible in the aristotelian sense that1:11:08 i was talking about a moment ago and the1:11:10 answer is well no because on the1:11:12 anesthetian view that i was describing1:11:15 every possible world overlaps with the1:11:18 actual world at some point in time1:11:20 right but if we're trying to imagine the1:11:23 entire past having been different that's1:11:25 like saying a possible world that1:11:27 doesn't overlap any point in time with1:11:29 the actual world it's like entirely1:11:31 distinct from the actual world and it1:11:33 just sort of falls out of my theory then1:11:35 that assuming that the actual world1:11:37 isn't in fact full of grim reapers that1:11:39 is also not possible not metaphysically1:11:41 possible it's conceivable it's kind of1:11:44 well yeah it's conceivable in a very1:11:45 broad sense but it's not metaphysically1:11:47 possible1:11:48 and it's also not logically possible1:11:50 because it's contradictory so you know1:11:52 so so yeah so1:11:54 yeah so i guess the the the crucial1:11:56 point here is is that this this this1:11:58 solution1:11:59 heavily relies on on your1:12:02 rejection of of of uh you know the idea1:12:05 of conceivability in like you know in in1:12:08 informing these mortal uh well yeah i'm1:12:11 fudging two things together here because1:12:12 um none of what i just said has anything1:12:14 to do with the1:12:15 unsatisfiable pair diagnosis i'm just1:12:18 saying that actually independently1:12:19 speaking because i like aristotelian1:12:22 metaphysical modality it's not a problem1:12:24 for me anyway um let's pretend i did1:12:27 uh1:12:28 i wasn't just a you know an aristotelian1:12:32 then i would start explaining things in1:12:33 terms of1:12:34 well the unsatisfiable pair is just1:12:37 another hypothesis so so i didn't want1:12:39 to confuse those two things together1:12:41 they're just too different yeah yeah so1:12:43 so i guess if conceivability was1:12:45 significant for you or if it is1:12:47 significant for for someone then um1:12:52 then it's really about about which1:12:53 solution is better in the sense that1:12:56 well1:12:57 uh1:12:58 i mean i guess for me1:12:59 for me i i i just don't see why it1:13:02 wouldn't be1:13:03 possible in in in a broad sense uh1:13:06 so so i guess1:13:09 for not for an hour so so your1:13:10 aristotelian view i get that and and i i1:13:13 get that it you know it1:13:16 and i think this might be related again1:13:18 to to when we get into the discussion1:13:20 about more like the contingency uh1:13:22 argument and psrs because um1:13:25 i guess the aristotelian view is going1:13:27 to have a saying that in terms of1:13:29 beginnings i guess or in terms of like1:13:32 explanations but i mean okay we can we1:13:33 can get there later but then the1:13:35 aristotelian consideration aside uh i1:13:38 think if we include if we take seriously1:13:40 the idea of conceivability then then1:13:43 then for me i think the um the finis1:13:47 finitis finishes the solution1:13:49 is better because um well first of all1:13:53 it just1:13:54 solves it once and for all and the idea1:13:56 of commitments well i think the1:13:58 commitment i think there will be a1:14:00 commitment on both sides but it's1:14:02 difficult to say for me1:14:04 like so i think the the the1:14:06 what's less committing on on the1:14:09 on the other side of like the the1:14:11 unsatisfiable pair1:14:13 is that it's just like an agnostic1:14:15 stance in the sense that well1:14:17 it doesn't1:14:18 have to be the infinite could just could1:14:20 be that this1:14:21 uh you know1:14:23 this pair1:14:24 is it just causes this problem and this1:14:26 and and this just couldn't happen1:14:28 but but i think that that's1:14:31 also a commitment uh because i i don't1:14:33 think it's that straightforward for me1:14:35 as saying you know it's it's a square1:14:37 circle so it's there's not much of a1:14:38 commitment there and saying you know you1:14:40 can't instantiate a square circle in the1:14:41 world i think the the the uh the1:14:44 benedetti paradoxes are just i think1:14:46 they're they're saying a lot more than1:14:48 just a mere square circle being in1:14:49 reality it's just not as straightforward1:14:51 as me just rejecting a contradiction i1:14:53 guess1:14:54 okay so so1:14:57 the thing that kind of1:14:58 decisively1:15:00 convinced me that that it is basically1:15:02 just the same as1:15:03 or even more stark uh contradiction than1:15:05 a square circle1:15:07 um1:15:08 was1:15:09 a paid for by this philosopher called1:15:11 nicholas shackle um1:15:13 who who lays out1:15:15 the unsatisfiable pair diagnosis um1:15:18 where the term comes from actually1:15:20 by him1:15:21 in 2005 and it's called1:15:24 the i think it's called the logical form1:15:26 of the bernadetti paradox1:15:28 um and1:15:31 uh1:15:32 what you have to think about is that1:15:33 obviously there are1:15:36 expressions of the paradox that involve1:15:38 things like causation and time and blah1:15:40 blah and it's easy to think that what's1:15:42 going on there is something about1:15:43 causation and time like that's1:15:45 intrinsically related to the paradox but1:15:47 but now consider jablob's paradox right1:15:50 so stephen diablo has this paper in 19911:15:53 i can't remember exactly what it's1:15:55 called off the top of my head but um1:15:58 what he's interested in is sort of the1:16:00 liar paradox but trying to express it in1:16:02 a form that doesn't involve circularity1:16:04 so he's as far as i know doesn't know1:16:07 about the benedetti paradox when he1:16:09 writes this papers nothing to do with it1:16:10 he's just trying to investigate the liar1:16:13 paradox just as a logician just doing1:16:15 doing some work in philosophy right and1:16:17 he's thinking well maybe i can express1:16:19 the liar paradox it doesn't involve1:16:21 circularity because there's a whole1:16:23 bunch of the literature which is blaming1:16:24 circularity and maybe maybe i can just1:16:27 sort of get around that and progress the1:16:29 dialectic in this way she cooks up a1:16:31 version of this paradox and1:16:33 when it's i think the easiest way to say1:16:35 is you just imagine a sequence of1:16:37 numbers right the natural numbers and1:16:39 just suppose so that starts at one and1:16:42 it's open in the other direction right1:16:44 it's just infinitely many of them the1:16:45 highest natural number and you just1:16:47 suppose that um1:16:50 or a sequence of propositions which each1:16:52 one has a natural number assigned to it1:16:53 right so p1 p2 p3 whatever and then you1:16:57 say each proposition is such that it's1:16:59 true1:17:00 if and only if none of the1:17:03 uh higher numbered propositions are true1:17:06 right and and now you've got a paradox1:17:08 in place because it's well it's1:17:10 effectively it's just the grim reaper1:17:12 paradox because um1:17:14 i mean do i have to go through them1:17:17 right1:17:18 you can see right yeah yeah1:17:21 but now obviously there's nothing to do1:17:22 with causation you know something being1:17:24 true if and only if none of the other1:17:26 things are that's not causation1:17:28 and it's nothing to do with time always1:17:30 is completely independent from that and1:17:33 what shackles point was really is that1:17:35 you can abstract even further out from1:17:36 that so just this pair whereas it's a1:17:39 schematic pair you just suppose there's1:17:41 some structure that's open in one1:17:43 direction and closed in the other i1:17:45 could be set a set of1:17:47 elements or it could be grim reapers1:17:49 lined up in a line or anything it1:17:52 doesn't matter1:17:53 something instantiated some of this kind1:17:54 of structure that's part one and then1:17:57 the second part is just then you suppose1:17:59 that there's some proposition some1:18:00 property which holds on each element in1:18:04 the structure if and only if it doesn't1:18:05 hold on any of the ones you know further1:18:08 towards the open-ended part of that1:18:11 structure right and then all he's saying1:18:13 is nothing instantiates both of those1:18:16 because1:18:16 there's a logical contradiction that you1:18:18 can derive without ever having to1:18:20 interpret it as something causal or1:18:23 anything concrete or anything like that1:18:25 so the contradiction is entirely formal1:18:27 and that just means that1:18:29 it's a it's a logical contradiction it1:18:31 doesn't need to be interpreted as1:18:33 anything specifically realistic and then1:18:36 and then1:18:37 that already makes it seem suspicious1:18:39 that you have to you know solve this by1:18:41 positing something yeah1:18:43 because it's you know i don't have to1:18:45 wave away like why is it that you can't1:18:47 have a square circle it's just because1:18:49 you've contradicted yourself by saying1:18:51 square and circle it's not because the1:18:53 universe is such that you know whatever1:18:57 it would be you couldn't have a square1:18:58 circle whatever existed or whatever it1:19:01 doesn't yeah yeah independent of what1:19:03 exists1:19:04 yeah i mean obviously it's a1:19:05 contradiction i guess maybe maybe maybe1:19:07 misunderstood because yes of course it1:19:09 is a contradiction i guess what i was1:19:10 saying was that1:19:12 you know it so so in the case of the1:19:14 grim reaper paradox what i what i would1:19:15 expect and and like maybe kunsa's1:19:17 version of it the the temporal one1:19:20 what would i or the infinite past one1:19:22 what i would expect is for that to be1:19:24 possible and so i i guess obviously my1:19:27 expectations don't matter but the point1:19:29 is that1:19:31 given i do have the framework is it's1:19:33 just hard for me to say uh that you know1:19:37 well um1:19:38 that's just1:19:41 it's just not possible in it there1:19:44 doesn't seem to be anything1:19:45 straightforwardly clear about why1:19:48 you can't place an agent at every moment1:19:50 of time yeah yeah yeah1:19:52 okay so1:19:53 so now what we're doing is just saying i1:19:55 can imagine a possible world with a grim1:19:57 reaper in it like on his own i can1:19:58 imagine another possible world with a1:20:00 grim reaper in it on his own too and1:20:02 blah blah an infinite number of possible1:20:04 words each which has one grim reaper in1:20:06 it and then you just think well i'll1:20:07 appeal to some like patchwork principle1:20:09 and i'll just cut and paste each of1:20:11 those and paste them into a world1:20:12 together1:20:14 and that should be possible if each of1:20:15 them is independently possible then you1:20:17 know their conjunction together1:20:19 is possible the pathway principle tells1:20:21 me that that's the case and i'm pushing1:20:23 back saying well hold on a sec if they1:20:25 were all together and they all1:20:27 instantiated that structure and the1:20:29 property that i was talking about a1:20:31 moment ago then we've contradicted1:20:32 ourselves so now something must have1:20:33 gone wrong and1:20:36 what you're saying is yeah what's gone1:20:38 wrong is we imagine that there could be1:20:39 an endless or beginning a sequence right1:20:42 a causal chain with no first cause in it1:20:44 but all i'm i'm saying well1:20:47 uh1:20:48 you don't need to say anything like that1:20:50 because um1:20:52 it's just a logical contradiction now1:20:54 now1:20:55 i think you're1:20:56 you're saying well but i can imagine1:20:58 them like how have i gone wrong where1:21:00 did where did why did i go wrong in my1:21:02 chain of reasoning well precisely the1:21:04 point that goes wrong is you applied the1:21:06 patchwork principle1:21:07 the patrick principle is an okay guide1:21:09 to what's possible but this shows you1:21:12 that it's not a reliable guide i mean1:21:14 you're1:21:15 assuming that you can apply the1:21:17 patchwork principle1:21:19 um in this case but it's not an ad hoc1:21:22 restriction on the patchwork principle1:21:24 to say you can't combine two things1:21:26 together or say infinitely many things1:21:28 together1:21:30 when the outcome of that is a1:21:31 contradiction contradiction right yeah1:21:33 yeah i agree i mean i mean it needs to1:21:35 be restricted so i agree it's not and1:21:37 and i get what you're saying but1:21:40 what i'm saying is that it's more like1:21:41 an august to me that like so if i have a1:21:43 basket and it's like finitely large1:21:46 right you could just take like let's say1:21:48 you could take a hundred balls like i1:21:49 said throw 100 balls in it that's just1:21:51 normal obviously nothing surprising1:21:52 there i have an infinitely large basket1:21:55 you tell me with with with let's say1:21:57 infinitely many spaces you know enough1:22:00 for for for an infinite number of balls1:22:02 and then you tell me i can't1:22:04 put an infinite number of balls in there1:22:05 i guess that's where i know there's the1:22:07 other part of the paradox but i guess1:22:09 that's where it's just uh uh for me it's1:22:11 just it seems like a lot of problems1:22:14 come in when we uh bring infinities into1:22:17 the picture and you you might just want1:22:19 to say that of course like well hey1:22:20 that's the nature of infinity and you1:22:22 say that about um about hilbert's hotel1:22:24 like yeah okay there's something spooky1:22:25 about it but i mean it's not supposed to1:22:28 satisfy your intuitions but uh but um i1:22:31 guess1:22:32 i would just1:22:33 say that i i don't see why1:22:36 uh my my my my intuition about1:22:41 what should be expected in a certain1:22:43 scenario1:22:45 like should legitimately play a role in1:22:48 my determining which uh you know1:22:51 solution i take1:22:53 filibullistically of course right so it1:22:56 is the feasible but in the sense that1:22:58 yeah so it's so so i guess that's that's1:23:00 that's basically what what i'm trying to1:23:02 say you come to the situation thinking1:23:04 we're having an expectation right that1:23:06 it would be possible and you're finding1:23:08 that it's1:23:10 at least i'm suggesting that that1:23:11 intuition is being thwarted when you1:23:13 actually look at the details of it1:23:14 because you discover that there's a1:23:16 contradiction involved so something must1:23:18 have gone wrong there um so your1:23:19 intuition has definitely gone wrong now1:23:22 it's gone wrong1:23:23 because causal financing is true or it's1:23:25 gone wrong because of what i was1:23:27 suggesting it's just1:23:29 an unsatisfiable pair you contradicted1:23:31 yourself without realizing tied your1:23:33 shoelaces together and didn't notice1:23:34 tried to take a step forwards or1:23:36 something but one way or the other the1:23:38 intuition has gone wrong so i mean yeah1:23:40 that's that doesn't tell on a it's not1:23:42 like your intuition is preserved on1:23:44 course of financialism either because1:23:45 that's telling you you can't actually1:23:47 have1:23:48 all of those grim reapers together1:23:49 because causal fighters are mystery so1:23:52 you know your intuition was well i can1:23:54 just like you1:23:55 cut and paste them together and that1:23:57 goes regardless of whether i'm right or1:23:59 whether the cause of finances are right1:24:00 so it's just to be clear that you know1:24:02 you can't hang on to that intuition1:24:04 regardless of who's right here uh yeah1:24:06 okay yeah that's1:24:08 i see i see what you said there but then1:24:10 i guess1:24:10 i mean i don't have the intuition1:24:12 in the first place of like you know um1:24:15 let's say like an infinite past1:24:18 so i i guess just working in terms of1:24:20 like if there was i mean then it should1:24:22 be concealable then then1:24:24 and the patchwork principle is not1:24:26 really about1:24:27 uh how1:24:29 uh you know1:24:31 i guess1:24:32 it's not it's not it doesn't it's not1:24:34 necessarily about uh uh you know1:24:37 uh having1:24:38 to to to actually find it intuitive that1:24:41 there does exist an infinite framework1:24:43 for me to fill it's more about that well1:24:46 if there are two situations they're both1:24:48 possible there's no explicit1:24:50 contradiction1:24:51 then well they should be possible now1:24:53 you're saying that results in a1:24:55 contradiction but i'm saying that1:24:56 contradiction1:24:58 basically comes from the idea of the1:25:01 infinity because i like hey the basket1:25:03 analogy and it seems straightforwardly1:25:06 just intuitive to me that you know well1:25:08 there can't be an infinite basket so1:25:10 because of this uh problem yeah sure so1:25:13 i mean1:25:14 is it helpful to talk about the bridges1:25:16 for koenigsberg example because yeah1:25:19 maybe yeah1:25:20 and i guess with that okay yeah you can1:25:23 go ahead and explain it first well all1:25:26 so this well-known1:25:28 mathematical1:25:29 geometrical puzzle about like you know1:25:31 koenigsberg has seven bridges across the1:25:34 the1:25:35 one river snakes around it anyway1:25:37 whatever seven bridges of1:25:39 and the idea is as you know1:25:42 can you cross each bridge once without1:25:44 doubling back on yourself and and then1:25:46 have finished crossing all of them1:25:48 and um it was kind of a practical puzzle1:25:51 for a while where people were trying to1:25:52 do it and um1:25:55 you know1:25:55 euler who's a genius mathematician from1:25:58 the 18th century 18th century yeah1:26:00 um proved it and one of his earlier kind1:26:02 of significant results that you can't do1:26:05 it right and it's all leads to this idea1:26:07 of an eulerian circuit and blah blah1:26:09 blah but effectively if there were eight1:26:10 bridges there you could there were six1:26:12 bridges there you could but there being1:26:14 seven means it's a1:26:15 non-eulerian circuit and now1:26:18 you know you can go through the details1:26:20 of his proof to to figure that out but1:26:22 it wasn't intuitive and the first1:26:23 british people were actually doing it to1:26:25 see if they could you know succeed in1:26:27 this task and you might not know and and1:26:30 someone like dares you or something and1:26:31 you could waste a day trying to do it1:26:34 but i could sort of just prove to you1:26:35 that you couldn't do it and then you1:26:37 know to help with your intuitions uh now1:26:39 you just have to accept that as long as1:26:41 you understand the proof that it's not1:26:43 doable anymore and no one needs to posit1:26:45 any kind of metaphysical1:26:47 facts about the world or anything1:26:49 um it's not you know you have to be1:26:52 pretty bizarre to think that1:26:54 you know i'm saying that maths stops you1:26:56 from finishing a walk or something i'm1:26:59 not saying anything like that it's just1:27:00 you know you're not gonna you're not1:27:01 gonna be able to do a simple fact1:27:03 geometry effectively at the end of the1:27:04 day and what's going on with this is1:27:07 very similar you're just not going to be1:27:09 able to get1:27:10 consistency on the one hand and all of1:27:13 those grim reapers doing that exact1:27:15 thing because they are in fact logically1:27:17 inconsistent that there's a sort of1:27:19 conjunction of propositions that do1:27:21 um1:27:23 uh1:27:24 that are inconsistent with each other in1:27:25 exactly the same way as if you said uh1:27:28 that you know bridget has managed to1:27:30 complete her task of walking across all1:27:32 of the bridges like no she hasn't1:27:34 predicted yourself even if you don't1:27:35 realize it right so i guess so with the1:27:38 bridget example i mean obviously so so1:27:40 if i just have the intuition that i can1:27:41 do it it turns out just the fact that i1:27:44 can't then then you're right1:27:46 uh1:27:47 who cares about the intuition but1:27:49 but where how would it be analogous here1:27:51 like in the sense that so where are the1:27:53 two possible1:27:56 you know situations that we would think1:27:59 like according to the patchwork1:28:00 principle that we can1:28:02 they can be instantiated in in in in a1:28:04 possible world1:28:05 um1:28:06 well i mean i can i can imagine a1:28:09 scenario where there are six bridges1:28:11 across1:28:12 konigsberg's river whatever the river's1:28:14 going you should know this1:28:15 um yeah and now you know patchwork1:28:18 principle cut and paste1:28:20 i don't know 100 bricks out of each1:28:22 bridge1:28:23 right and paste them together into a new1:28:26 bridge so that now there are seven1:28:27 bridges1:28:28 um1:28:29 i can do that but it doesn't mean that1:28:31 you know everything else is preserved uh1:28:33 it it just stops being true that you can1:28:36 cross all of those bridges um without1:28:38 doubling back on yourself right just a1:28:40 simple application of the1:28:42 principles yeah but made something now1:28:43 logically impossible1:28:45 and it's the same thing here yeah yeah1:28:47 but but that's given certain conditions1:28:50 right certain like geometrical1:28:53 conditions and restraints it's not just1:28:55 the fact that i'm passing over bridges1:28:56 and i just added a bridge like i could1:28:58 pass over that one too but i i guess1:29:01 well in the case1:29:02 what isn't analogous here seems to me1:29:05 that well here i'm just saying that the1:29:07 grim reaper has a task and that there is1:29:09 an infinite you know1:29:11 platform1:29:12 and then i just combine the two with no1:29:14 further uh restrictions in the sense1:29:16 that uh uh1:29:18 it should be possible for each grammar1:29:20 to do this task and and and it's1:29:22 impossible yeah and it's just not1:29:24 possible for all of them to do it right1:29:26 and that sounds weird but it's not a law1:29:28 of any modal logic that1:29:30 uh possibly p1:29:32 uh possibly q1:29:34 therefore possibly p and possibly q1:29:36 that's not a theorem in any yeah yeah1:29:38 yeah of course1:29:40 you know very naive application of1:29:41 patrick principles is obviously wrong1:29:43 there and it's only these like really1:29:44 esoteric ones where you know i'm1:29:46 supposed to think that there's an1:29:48 infinity point a patchwork principle1:29:57 that's what's wrong right and now yeah1:29:59 i'm not paying any ontological cost i1:30:01 explain all of the paradoxes the same1:30:03 way uh occam's raises suggest this is a1:30:06 better better solution right i mean1:30:08 anyway like i said yeah i mean1:30:11 i mean yeah yeah so i think the1:30:12 intuition is different because i think1:30:13 the uh i mean i think the the1:30:16 well clearly even like for other1:30:18 considerations as well i think the1:30:19 definitive solution is is is uh even on1:30:23 as far as the ontological part is1:30:24 concerned is more1:30:25 than parsimonious so okay and i'm1:30:28 perfectly willing to to to allow that1:30:31 you may have come to causal feminism for1:30:33 a different reason and already paid that1:30:36 ontological cost and then what happens1:30:39 to you in particular having already paid1:30:41 that somewhere else is that you now1:30:43 encounter the benedetti paradoxes and1:30:44 you say i've already killed that off by1:30:47 my prior belief the cause of financing1:30:49 is true so there's no extra ontological1:30:50 cost for me so far yeah yeah right and1:30:53 there you go completely agree that's1:30:55 that's absolutely fine yeah all i'm1:30:56 saying is if we just come to this1:30:58 everything else being equal yeah yeah1:31:00 there's consideration that the paradox1:31:01 tell in favor of one hypothesis over the1:31:03 other it seems to me that it does it1:31:05 slightly favors mine over cause of1:31:07 financing if you've already paid that1:31:09 car somewhere else then you're well1:31:10 within your rights to just continue to1:31:12 believe of course finances yeah i mean i1:31:14 think it's your view that like this so1:31:16 these paradoxes the solutions like that1:31:18 causal financing is a respectable like1:31:21 well1:31:22 like you know it should be taken1:31:24 seriously1:31:25 so it's a respectable solution along1:31:27 with the unsatisfiable pair and uh yeah1:31:31 and i guess because because it's been an1:31:32 hour and a half we want to need to talk1:31:34 at least about the ps1:31:35 about the psr at least but uh but on the1:31:38 other thing you said about this that you1:31:40 know it doesn't necessitate that you1:31:43 know the past is finite causal finitism1:31:46 uh so those other like aristotelian1:31:49 considerations about the1:31:51 you know the the the infinity of like1:31:52 time space and whatever aside1:31:55 um1:31:56 wouldn't you say that it's simpler like1:31:57 i mean1:31:59 what's simpler cause of financing no no1:32:02 so so assuming causal financing which i1:32:04 think you said you would lean to for1:32:06 other considerations not the argument1:32:07 alone however that doesn't entail that1:32:10 there's just a single causal chain and1:32:12 the you know time isn't doesn't go1:32:14 insanely in the past i guess so so just1:32:17 putting the other aristotelian1:32:19 considerations aside about the nature of1:32:20 time and space and stuff like that1:32:23 wouldn't it be simpler to1:32:25 not posit extra chains i mean1:32:28 wouldn't it be simpler just to stop at1:32:29 one1:32:34 i mean1:32:35 one chain is simpler than many chains1:32:37 yeah that's that's right um so1:32:41 i wouldn't be postulating that there are1:32:43 in fact many chains unless i had a good1:32:45 reason to think that um1:32:47 that you know there's a certain cost of1:32:50 you know not not contrasting many1:32:52 independent causal chains to one but1:32:54 supposing that that all causal chains1:32:57 have a first point like they all start1:32:59 together at like a big bang or a first1:33:02 creation point in by a god or something1:33:05 like that1:33:06 that type of view also comes with kind1:33:07 of strangeness like why this point in1:33:09 time rather than some other point in1:33:11 time why exactly this thing happening1:33:13 rather than some other thing at that1:33:14 point so1:33:15 and now we are directly i guess talking1:33:17 about psi so maybe it's a useful segue1:33:19 yeah yeah so so maybe let's just jump1:33:21 straight in there give me your thoughts1:33:22 generally on the piece jake you've been1:33:24 quiet i don't know you need to like jump1:33:26 in whenever you feel like yes i'm going1:33:27 to say so do you want to say something1:33:29 about this before we move to like the1:33:30 psr1:33:32 no1:33:33 not good yeah okay so we can jump1:33:35 straight to the psr if alex i've seen1:33:38 you jake advance the1:33:40 contingency argument on a previous1:33:42 stream i think so1:33:43 it's that right thinking you're you're a1:33:45 fan of the contingency argument1:33:47 is that right1:33:49 yeah i like the contingency and the1:33:51 kalam both of them1:33:54 so okay so explain to me how you would1:33:56 put the contingency argument then1:34:00 um1:34:04 well it depends honestly if i'm going to1:34:06 be quite honest it depends who i'm1:34:07 talking to1:34:09 um1:34:11 yeah well the reason1:34:13 yeah but1:34:14 the reason why i actually prefer the1:34:16 kalam is because most people1:34:18 have difficulty with the contingency1:34:20 argument1:34:21 so1:34:22 um1:34:25 i mean1:34:26 i don't think me personally i don't1:34:28 think we're going to get to very very1:34:30 far because based on what you've already1:34:32 said1:34:33 about1:34:35 your theory of modality1:34:37 and1:34:38 your position on the psr1:34:42 so1:34:43 i take conceivability quite seriously1:34:46 into1:34:48 whether or not something is1:34:49 metaphysically possible1:34:51 and i think1:34:52 you strongly disagree with that1:34:55 so it's1:34:56 i don't really see how1:34:58 it's going to be any way to really1:35:00 adjudicate that1:35:02 um1:35:05 i don't know so what are your thoughts1:35:07 on that given that1:35:10 we fundamentally disagree on1:35:12 modality um1:35:16 yeah so i don't know1:35:18 well so then the argument1:35:20 has a controversial assumption in there1:35:22 which is1:35:23 um1:35:24 only some theories of1:35:26 modality uh1:35:28 can be true for the argument to work1:35:30 and that undermines the argument quite a1:35:33 lot doesn't it1:35:34 i mean if you think we have an impasse1:35:36 unless i mean if i'm an aristotelian you1:35:38 can't run the contingency argument then1:35:40 it's not a great argument unless you've1:35:41 got a good argument against1:35:42 aristotelianism1:35:44 right1:35:45 um1:35:46 no so i disagree so this is why kind of1:35:49 in the beginning i asked1:35:51 uh and i think that1:35:53 and this may be controversial but i1:35:55 think that1:35:56 largely that's what philosophical1:35:59 arguments come down to is well it just1:36:01 seems to be the case to me that this is1:36:04 and1:36:06 you1:36:06 it doesn't seem that way to you and we1:36:08 depart ways and i'm fine with that so it1:36:12 doesn't really bother me at all i think1:36:14 that's what's happened in the previous1:36:16 discussion as well1:36:18 um1:36:19 i can't understand for the life of me1:36:21 how someone can1:36:24 conceive of infinity and1:36:26 you know the objection or what i was1:36:29 raising earlier1:36:30 uh about you know not beginning counting1:36:33 and being at a particular number at a1:36:35 certain point1:36:36 all of that is totally inconceivable to1:36:39 me1:36:40 and1:36:41 um1:36:42 i don't see i don't really see any1:36:44 reason why it would be conceivable to1:36:45 somebody else1:36:47 and so therefore1:36:48 you know if the person says well1:36:51 it seems to be the case to me that it is1:36:53 possible1:36:55 i give my reasons why and then i just1:36:57 say all right have a nice day1:37:00 so1:37:02 yeah it doesn't really bother ending me1:37:03 i just think that's the nature of1:37:04 philosophy and i i think there's nothing1:37:07 unique1:37:08 to this particular argument uh1:37:11 philosophical argument that doesn't have1:37:14 underlying um1:37:17 metaphysical commitments to it and1:37:19 that's just the way it is1:37:21 okay it's interesting so it's almost1:37:23 like you're just okay with it uh having1:37:26 i mean1:37:29 somewhat like severely limited1:37:30 apologetical use then because like it's1:37:33 just you might just run into an1:37:34 aristotelian and then1:37:36 there's you know really no point running1:37:38 the contingency argument on them it's1:37:39 never going to change their mind and all1:37:41 you can do in that state circumstances1:37:43 kind of shake their hands and go your1:37:44 separate ways and you're just like yeah1:37:46 that's cool that just happens sometimes1:37:48 with1:37:48 philosophy1:37:50 uh these arguments can't get you1:37:51 everywhere is that that's so so let me1:37:53 let me play my cards1:37:55 i'm not personally1:37:57 i mean1:37:59 in a certain sense1:38:00 i'm not really interested in convincing1:38:02 anybody i'll just be quite frank with1:38:05 you1:38:06 my goal on i have a my own personal1:38:08 channel of mine1:38:10 i'm sharing my ideas i do the same thing1:38:13 here on thought adventure podcast and1:38:16 i'm more concerned with working in a1:38:18 particular tradition1:38:20 and giving people within that tradition1:38:23 um1:38:24 intellectual arguments and satisfaction1:38:27 for holding the views that they do1:38:30 um1:38:31 but as far as convincing other people if1:38:33 people like what i say1:38:35 and they're convinced by great if they1:38:37 don't1:38:38 i don't really care1:38:40 that's okay they'll be quite blunt about1:38:42 it yeah so is this a difference between1:38:44 islam and christianity than would you1:38:46 guys say that it's less1:38:48 evangelical no i would say that that's1:38:50 me personally um i think it is islam is1:38:54 about1:38:56 spreading the truth and1:38:58 uh1:38:59 obviously we don't use the word1:39:00 evangelism but we we call it dawah um1:39:04 okay i see myself within that sphere but1:39:07 at the same time if people are not1:39:10 convinced by what i say it doesn't1:39:12 really bother me any i mean uh1:39:15 i'm just one guy1:39:17 sharing my thoughts1:39:18 so1:39:19 i mean i guess on the on the question of1:39:21 the islam thing so i guess1:39:23 so the the islam the quranic position i1:39:25 think it's quite clear on the nature of1:39:27 dawa and like inviting people to islam1:39:29 that like you know you just as jake put1:39:32 it you put your cards on the table1:39:34 and well1:39:36 you know you try to convince if they1:39:38 agree they agree if they don't agree1:39:40 shake hands you know part ways and and1:39:43 god is the ultimate judge in that sense1:39:45 and we do1:39:46 realize through1:39:48 uh like like scripture that that uh1:39:50 people will differ people will1:39:53 uh fundamentally differ on intuitions1:39:56 and methodology and stuff like that so i1:39:58 guess that's what that goes back to what1:39:59 i was saying earlier with this agreement1:40:00 for me this a lot of people are very1:40:02 anxious about disagreement that right1:40:05 hey uh you know and i see this a lot of1:40:07 these as well and specifically muslims1:40:09 who come and say hey this philosopher1:40:10 said that oh my god my worldview is1:40:12 falling apart for example right but i'm1:40:14 like well why does what he said matter1:40:16 in the sense that like1:40:19 if really that's what matters then well1:40:20 there are other smart people who said1:40:23 other stuff so i mean why don't you take1:40:25 that view or this view so i for this i1:40:26 don't take this agreement way too1:40:28 seriously but i guess what can be done1:40:32 and and this is where i really like1:40:34 uh all p's uh like philosophy of1:40:37 argumentation right1:40:40 what can be done is is basically1:40:42 uh1:40:44 you could talk about the implications of1:40:46 a few right so if you show that okay1:40:49 okay so you have this certain view1:40:51 let me try and show you that it has its1:40:53 implications if you do agree and you1:40:55 don't like the implications then you1:40:56 have some work to do1:40:58 i guess that's that's that's uh1:41:00 one way to look at it1:41:02 and in that context maybe we can1:41:06 you can tell us about like what you1:41:08 think about the psr so1:41:09 uh well yeah i also think that sometimes1:41:13 the1:41:14 person holds1:41:15 contradictory uh views1:41:18 so part of discussing with somebody is1:41:20 to try to1:41:23 maybe you might not see it in the1:41:25 beginning maybe you do uh try to tease1:41:27 out what a inconsis internal1:41:30 inconsistency within their own1:41:32 views may be1:41:34 and um1:41:36 i think that happens quite frequently1:41:38 with1:41:40 laypeople i'm not to say that i'm not1:41:42 one of them1:41:43 but with people who have spent a lot of1:41:45 time thinking about it1:41:48 it's not a regular1:41:50 thing that most people1:41:52 who are professional philosophers no1:41:54 matter what they're involved in1:41:57 tend to spend a lot more time1:41:59 constructing their own ideas in such a1:42:02 way that at least their conception of1:42:05 reality is internally consistent and so1:42:09 i'm not going to some extent1:42:10 yeah so1:42:12 anyway that's the goal so if they don't1:42:15 okay then you would point out okay here1:42:17 uh mr craig this is where you got a1:42:19 problem more uh with this other person1:42:22 so i mean that's a sort of minimum1:42:24 standard1:42:25 that your views should be internally1:42:27 consistent and then from there we say1:42:30 okay you've passed that bar1:42:32 now the way that i look at it is1:42:35 what are the1:42:37 axioms that you're sort of starting off1:42:39 with or building your theory based on1:42:43 and1:42:44 a lot of people don't know what they are1:42:46 and so that gets teased out1:42:48 and then we analyze them with examples1:42:51 and uh thought experiments to see1:42:54 whether or not those are actually uh the1:42:56 best axioms to start off with1:42:59 or to in terms of it could be developing1:43:02 later on1:43:03 and uh we compare them and we say no i1:43:06 actually think this one is better than1:43:08 this one and the other person may1:43:11 disagree and at times i think there can1:43:13 be reasonable disagreement on those uh1:43:17 principles1:43:18 and at other times i say well1:43:21 it just seems obviously the case to me1:43:23 that1:43:24 my principle is correct and the other1:43:26 person's wrong and i i'm thinking in my1:43:28 head well1:43:30 nothing really more i can say other than1:43:33 uh1:43:34 it doesn't make any sense to me uh1:43:38 i'm very sympathetic to that and i think1:43:40 i'm probably sympathetic to1:43:42 you know let's1:43:43 we probably agree that certain christian1:43:46 doctrines don't seem to make any sense i1:43:48 mean1:43:49 i i could argue you know all day with1:43:51 someone about the trinity or the1:43:52 incarnation or whatever1:43:54 i'm just never going to really1:43:55 understand1:43:56 you know what they're talking about1:43:57 there um1:43:59 right and i think yeah i don't know i1:44:01 certainly don't think i'm going to be1:44:02 able to convince them or even show that1:44:04 i'm right rather than them i just i just1:44:06 don't know what they mean it doesn't1:44:07 make any sense to me um1:44:09 there's not much more i can say about1:44:10 that but okay so1:44:13 just focus on the psr and the1:44:15 contingency argument1:44:17 um1:44:19 i suppose1:44:20 look one one one thing to say about this1:44:22 is1:44:24 so the argument is something like look1:44:26 every uh contingent something like this1:44:29 every contingent1:44:31 contingently true proposition requires1:44:33 an explanation1:44:34 for why it's true rather than false1:44:37 and because it could have been false1:44:38 rather than true right so1:44:41 um1:44:43 that invites a kind of analysis which is1:44:47 familiar where you'd say something like1:44:49 well1:44:50 you know so p is contingently true what1:44:52 explains p well some other contingent1:44:54 true proposition explains p it's because1:44:56 q is true well what explains why q is1:44:59 true blah blah and you have this kind of1:45:00 like1:45:01 you know regress very similar to what we1:45:03 were talking about already different1:45:05 contexts1:45:06 um1:45:07 and you might think well look it can't1:45:09 go on forever because1:45:11 otherwise you know ultimately nothing1:45:13 would be explained and it can't like go1:45:15 in a circle at some point like1:45:17 p explains q and q explains p because1:45:19 then it seems like you know because1:45:21 there's something intolerable about1:45:23 circular explanation again nothing1:45:25 really seems to be explained if that's1:45:26 what's going on so the only uh1:45:29 geometrically speaking any other1:45:31 possible um structure we can think of is1:45:33 one where it terminates at certain point1:45:36 but1:45:36 then you think well i determine it's a1:45:38 point where the thing that's the first1:45:41 um1:45:42 explainer is contingent1:45:45 but it is not explained by anything1:45:47 um or it's1:45:49 you know the1:45:51 the last contingent thing is explained1:45:53 by something that's not contingent it's1:45:54 necessary um1:45:57 and you might say well look you can't1:45:58 have just like a1:46:00 first point which is contingent and not1:46:02 explained by anything because you know1:46:04 what then that just means there's no1:46:06 explanation and uh violates this idea1:46:08 that every continued thing has an1:46:10 explanation for it so you know by1:46:13 process of elimination or something we1:46:15 seem to have come to the conclusion that1:46:17 it must have been explained by something1:46:18 necessary and that's basically the1:46:20 contingency argument and then you start1:46:22 padding out by saying oh and unnecessary1:46:24 being you know that's god blah blah um1:46:28 and there's a number of things that1:46:30 strike me is not very good about that1:46:31 argument um1:46:33 so you know here's here's one sort of1:46:35 quite influential1:46:37 thing that people say about this which1:46:38 is that like what1:46:41 explanation means in this context yeah1:46:44 it's called the principle of sufficient1:46:46 reason so what we're talking about is1:46:48 a prior cause that is a sufficient1:46:51 condition of the1:46:53 contingent fact being true so1:46:56 a sufficient condition is like saying1:46:57 you've got everything you need1:46:59 for the condition to obtain so it just1:47:02 would obtain1:47:03 um1:47:05 and that basically just means you've got1:47:06 a condition that entails that1:47:09 the1:47:09 p is true say something that's1:47:11 sufficiently a sufficient reason for p1:47:14 is something that entails that p is true1:47:16 um but now the problem is if that's the1:47:18 notion of explanation that we're talking1:47:20 about then you can't ground everything1:47:22 in a necessary1:47:23 cause because if that thing is necessary1:47:27 um1:47:28 like a necessarily true proposition then1:47:31 it's a simple logical fact that1:47:35 um any logical consequence of a1:47:38 necessary truth is itself a necessary1:47:40 truth and not a contingent truth so what1:47:42 happens is it's called modal collapse1:47:45 you actually find that you just don't1:47:46 have any contingent truths at all1:47:48 everything is necessary nothing could1:47:49 have been in any way different and that1:47:51 just seems you know as intolerable as1:47:54 the idea that there's some contingent1:47:55 thing that doesn't have an explanation1:47:57 right like that this kind of dust moat1:47:59 that's floating past my head right now1:48:01 is necessarily there and look impossible1:48:04 for it to be in even a1:48:05 millimeter to the to the left or1:48:07 something that just seems you know as as1:48:10 crazy as the idea that there's some1:48:12 contingent truth that doesn't have an1:48:13 explanation so1:48:14 i mean it just feels like there aren't1:48:16 any good options here um1:48:19 yeah i'm struggling1:48:20 that's a good option1:48:22 so yeah so um1:48:25 so the whole modal collapse argument so1:48:27 you don't find the1:48:29 so partial explanation you don't you1:48:31 don't like that idea do you1:48:33 well i mean look at say we've got a1:48:35 partial explanation right um so so1:48:38 what's going on there is we've got the1:48:40 the explainer doesn't entail the thing1:48:42 that explains it just like1:48:45 has some other relationship to it1:48:49 there's loads of relationships you could1:48:50 have other than entailment like for1:48:52 instance you might say well it raises1:48:53 the probability we might say it makes it1:48:56 more probable than not or it makes it1:48:58 more probable than the other possible1:49:00 alternatives or something right1:49:02 you know1:49:03 i there's different things that are1:49:05 wrong with those but i mean1:49:06 um1:49:09 i lost you for a second i'm not sure if1:49:10 it was me yeah carry on i got you you're1:49:12 back okay so i was i was just saying1:49:14 that you know once we give up on1:49:17 the1:49:18 explainer entailing the thing it1:49:19 explains1:49:20 them this is one menu of things we could1:49:22 pick instead there's the relation but1:49:25 let's let's not go through all of them1:49:27 one by one just standing back from it1:49:29 what's going on there if it's not a full1:49:32 explanation is something about it's1:49:34 going to be unexplained right1:49:36 if you any any step away from a full1:49:38 explanation means you're not explaining1:49:40 it fully right obviously1:49:42 so if what you do is say raise the1:49:44 probability or something or make it more1:49:47 probable than not you're still not1:49:49 actually completely explaining why so1:49:51 for instance if i1:49:53 flip a coin and it lands heads i mean me1:49:56 flipping the coin obviously1:49:58 significantly increases the chance that1:49:59 it's going to land heads like if i never1:50:01 flip it it's not that my head's but it1:50:02 doesn't completely explain why man's1:50:04 heads i mean he could have landed tails1:50:06 right and if it yeah he could have done1:50:08 so yeah but but so what could we1:50:11 understand partial in in in in the1:50:14 in the sense of um sufficient but1:50:17 non-necessitating and i think coons does1:50:19 this where he says an explanation can be1:50:22 sufficient and non-necessitating1:50:25 and yeah i mean scientific explanations1:50:27 are almost always not the type of1:50:30 explanation that i was talking about1:50:31 beforehand like so let's say you smoke1:50:33 and then you get cancer i mean but it's1:50:35 not that smoking entails that you get1:50:36 cancer because someone else could smoke1:50:38 their whole life and not get cancer and1:50:40 it's you know has some kind of1:50:42 probabilistic relationship to you1:50:43 getting cancer but it's not very clear1:50:45 like exactly what it is it raises the1:50:47 probability of something but1:50:49 you know1:50:50 if i say why did this guy get cancer and1:50:53 you say because he was a smoker yeah1:50:55 sure i've got an explanation there1:50:56 that's true i'm not gonna deny that1:50:58 that's an explanation that here's an1:50:59 explanation it's just is there still1:51:01 stuff unexplained about why he got1:51:02 cancer yeah absolutely why did he get1:51:04 cancer and not the other guy who smoked1:51:06 just as much as him like there's still1:51:08 something contingent true that feels1:51:09 like it's not been explained1:51:11 and so if all we get is partial1:51:13 explanation and the driving intuition we1:51:15 had in the first place which was you1:51:17 can't leave contingent truths1:51:19 unexplained1:51:20 is just necessarily going to be a part1:51:22 of that like story yeah yeah i mean i1:51:25 agree i agree with that concern in the1:51:26 sense that1:51:27 i mean the way i look at it there are1:51:28 two sides to it so it's like the the the1:51:31 epistemic sense of like explanation as1:51:34 in what would satisfy you as an1:51:36 explanation versus what is like really1:51:38 the explanation1:51:40 um1:51:41 and and i think so in the case of like1:51:43 the smoking and the cancer well it's a1:51:45 satisfying explanation but really there1:51:47 are other things that1:51:49 that that happen1:51:50 and1:51:51 and i guess so1:51:53 so1:51:54 maybe there are better examples of1:51:55 something that can be sufficient1:51:56 non-necessitating and at the same time1:51:59 you kind of have all the information1:52:00 there like so like libertarian free will1:52:02 for example so i have let's say1:52:04 sufficient reason to uh to eat a1:52:07 chocolate cake over like drinking a coke1:52:11 and1:52:12 it's not necessitating so i go for the1:52:14 chocolate cake because of certain things1:52:16 in the chocolate cake that isn't in the1:52:18 coke but then there are other1:52:21 sufficient reasons that would allow me1:52:24 to go for the coke where like maybe1:52:25 there's something in the coke it's1:52:26 refreshing or something that i'd want1:52:28 over the chocolate cake both are1:52:30 sufficient non-necessitating and i can1:52:33 say i did one in a non-necessitating way1:52:36 and there isn't really any information1:52:39 missing here1:52:41 on a libertarian view1:52:44 you can say that there's no information1:52:46 missing but like um1:52:49 so1:52:50 there's a1:52:53 so it just feels like we're pushing back1:52:54 the question um1:52:57 two1:52:58 so so to begin with like i i'm eating1:53:01 chocolate cake and then i'm drinking a1:53:03 coke and then we say well you know1:53:06 i give a partial explanation for that in1:53:08 terms of my decision that i make as a1:53:10 free as a free agent and and that's the1:53:12 end of the story but you know1:53:14 why did you make that decision you know1:53:16 that whatever the term the origin point1:53:18 was1:53:19 in my head i you know i get this idea of1:53:22 having a chocolate cake instead of the1:53:25 whatever the first point was where the1:53:27 two parts diverge from each other1:53:29 because like presumably1:53:30 i don't know 10 minutes beforehand or1:53:32 something both possible worlds are1:53:33 exactly the same and then1:53:36 i think about chocolate cake and as well1:53:38 and then i think about cake coke in the1:53:40 other world whatever it is but at some1:53:42 point they diverge they branch away from1:53:43 each other and1:53:45 i find myself in the coke world or the1:53:47 cake world whatever1:53:48 two minutes later1:53:50 i i'm just questioning1:53:52 why this world rather than the other one1:53:54 and1:53:55 i don't understand how you1:53:58 i mean you can just say there's no1:53:59 there's no information left that you1:54:01 haven't described or something but that1:54:03 just feels to me like well there's a1:54:04 contingent1:54:06 fact that this doesn't have an1:54:07 explanation1:54:09 well i mean it would see it would seem1:54:10 to me like that would like beg the1:54:12 question against like libertarian free1:54:15 will because i mean what does it mean to1:54:17 ask a libertarian1:54:18 for like um1:54:22 an explanation1:54:23 other than the fact that1:54:26 you did what you did um why did you do1:54:29 that rather than the other thing1:54:31 uh well so so okay so1:54:36 so i mean though so the way coons would1:54:38 put it is that well well so i have1:54:40 reasons for the chocolate cake over the1:54:42 coke1:54:44 yeah right and and and the in the1:54:46 in the case that i did drink a coke i1:54:48 would have reasons for and i still do1:54:50 have reasons for the chop for the coke1:54:51 over the chocolate cake so there are1:54:53 reasons they're just non-necessitating1:54:56 well let's suppose those reasons are i i1:54:58 like chocolate and it's my reason for1:55:00 picking the chocolate cake and i'm1:55:01 thirsty so that's my reason for picking1:55:03 the coke right1:55:04 now1:55:05 both of those reasons are present before1:55:07 i make my decision1:55:08 so if i say why did you pick the1:55:11 chocolate cake and you say because i1:55:13 like chocolate cake and then in the1:55:14 other parallel world i'm saying why did1:55:16 you pick coke you say because i'm1:55:17 thirsty right i just still feels like1:55:21 well you haven't really explained1:55:23 anything because like1:55:24 the first and the desire for chocolate1:55:26 are present in both situations1:55:29 and yeah1:55:30 how does it play any explanatory role in1:55:34 because the two things are the same then1:55:36 there's a discrepancy and how can you1:55:38 appeal to some feature that's1:55:40 uh that overlaps both of those worlds in1:55:42 explaining the discrepancy between the1:55:44 two worlds like it's present in both1:55:46 yeah1:55:47 you know how come the first wasn't the1:55:49 thing that made you1:55:50 that overrode your decision and why was1:55:53 first motivating in the coke world1:55:55 rather than1:55:56 the desire for i suppose that's the way1:55:58 to put it why was one of those uh1:56:00 motivating rather than the other and i1:56:02 guess now what's the explanation for1:56:04 that does that have an explanation or is1:56:06 that the term this point where1:56:08 explanation stops1:56:10 yeah so yeah so i mean i guess that's1:56:11 that's that's really the whole thing1:56:13 about libertarian free will right and1:56:14 and uh1:56:15 whether it requires like contrastive1:56:18 explanation right so i mean so if i say1:56:21 i think i think the better way to put it1:56:22 would be like well i1:56:24 um1:56:26 so if i if i say i chose to eat the1:56:28 chocolate cake1:56:29 because i chose to eat the chocolate1:56:31 cake1:56:32 um1:56:33 then then it would seem here that well1:56:35 the reasons are not doing any1:56:37 uh explanatory work but i'm not sure1:56:40 about that it doesn't seem like they're1:56:42 doing like a causal work in like a like1:56:45 a deterministic sense1:56:47 but1:56:48 it1:56:49 it does seem like it still has to be1:56:51 part of the explanation i mean1:56:53 so1:56:54 so you said i chose to eat chocolate1:56:55 cake because i chose to eat the1:56:56 chocolate cake i mean so1:56:59 yeah did you see the the super chat i1:57:01 think it's irrelevant1:57:03 okay let me let me let me from cotton if1:57:05 you think it's relevant it's about1:57:07 cookies1:57:09 so okay let's let's okay let's go1:57:11 through it so1:57:12 uh you are unsatisfied with partial1:57:14 explanations isn't someone always eating1:57:17 cookies then at the present moment one1:57:19 or five or 100 cookies left partially1:57:21 explained by the infinite past not fully1:57:23 explained yeah that's a good that's1:57:24 that's that's a good objection and1:57:27 and uh1:57:30 yeah1:57:31 and you paid 20 bucks for that so if i1:57:33 play you should definitely1:57:44 um1:57:45 am i unsatisfied with partial1:57:47 explanation so first question in that1:57:49 and the answer is no i mean like uh most1:57:51 explanations are partial expression like1:57:53 i said the cancer and the smoking1:57:55 nothing wrong with that as an1:57:56 explanation perfectly reasonable um1:57:59 the the game here is we started off with1:58:01 this idea in the first place that1:58:02 everything contingent must be explained1:58:04 away and that's that's how you get to1:58:06 god existing um1:58:08 now1:58:10 uh so and and and let's just remember1:58:13 that like uh you know one of the horns1:58:16 of explanation that we've1:58:18 brushed past saying it was unacceptable1:58:20 at the beginning was well maybe there's1:58:22 just a root contingency and the reason1:58:24 that that was dismissed at the time is1:58:26 because you can't just have something1:58:27 that's unexplained that's contingent1:58:29 um now what i'm doing here is i'm saying1:58:31 when you have a partial explanation when1:58:34 we roll back a bit from1:58:36 you know1:58:37 sufficient reason like full entailing1:58:39 explanation1:58:41 what's going on is that now we're at a1:58:42 situation that's very similar to what we1:58:44 just dismissed a moment ago because1:58:46 something is not explained that's my1:58:48 claim anyway so i'm saying1:58:51 on the partial1:58:52 partial explanation solution that you1:58:55 seem to have been going for1:58:56 i think it basically just collapses it1:58:58 back in into nothing into something no1:59:01 better than just having a group1:59:03 contingency in the sense that something1:59:05 contingent is unexplained and if that's1:59:08 not okay for the brute contingency1:59:10 option and it shouldn't be okay in the1:59:12 partial explanation1:59:15 it's the root here too so i'm trying to1:59:18 what's going on is yeah you need to1:59:19 explain to me how we're not a complete1:59:22 symmetry here something better about1:59:24 your idea than the previous one so just1:59:26 to clear it up it's not like i'm it's1:59:27 not like i don't like partial1:59:29 explanations i'm just i'm just saying1:59:32 that there's a problem with advancing it1:59:34 in this context1:59:35 so just to clear that very first bit up1:59:37 um1:59:38 isn't someone always eating cookies1:59:40 isn't isn't someone always eating1:59:42 cookies then at the present moment1:59:44 having one or five or 100 cookies left1:59:46 partially explained by the infinite past1:59:48 i mean1:59:51 i i guess i do think that um1:59:55 if you say look why so this guy let's1:59:58 just forget the cookies for the time2:00:00 just think about the guy who's counting2:00:01 down and he finishes today and then um2:00:06 some and you might say well what2:00:07 explains um him finishing today2:00:11 and and this might be puzzling because2:00:13 you might think well nothing explains2:00:14 him finishing today could have finished2:00:15 any time in the past after all he's he's2:00:18 already gone through an infinite2:00:19 sequence2:00:21 every previous day he's gone through an2:00:22 infinite sequence it sort of seems like2:00:24 he could have finished any previous day2:00:26 so so why not rather than some other2:00:28 time so some some worry like that um2:00:30 if we just talk about partial2:00:31 explanation and we're really really2:00:33 open-minded about what partial2:00:34 explanation means2:00:36 and2:00:38 you know because you might say how come2:00:39 the roulette wheel landed on double2:00:42 zeros um and you know one very weak2:00:45 partial explanation for that is you know2:00:47 because it's one of the options that it2:00:48 could have landed on it's not to say2:00:50 that that raises the probability beyond2:00:52 50 50 or anything it's just in casinos2:00:55 that happens sometimes right2:00:57 um2:00:58 something sort of similar can can be2:01:00 said about the infinite past i mean if2:01:02 there's an infinite past then like in2:01:03 some sense somebody could be finishing2:01:05 an infinite countdown at any point you2:01:08 know at any point you could just come2:01:10 across that it could happen obviously if2:01:11 the past is finite you'll never come2:01:13 across that but if it's infinite then2:01:15 like in a very broad sense you could2:01:16 come across that at any point so it's a2:01:18 bit like just being in the casino some2:01:20 random roulette wheel or poker hand2:01:23 being dealt that happens in casinos in2:01:26 some way in an infinite past2:01:28 very broadly speaking somebody could2:01:30 finish an infinite countdown at any2:01:31 moment so i do think that if we're2:01:33 really open-minded about what counts as2:01:35 a partial explanation the infinite past2:01:37 is some kind of very weak partial2:01:39 explanation of why somebody's finishing2:01:41 their counter now so there's another way2:01:42 where yeah but but i guess i guess the2:01:44 issue here is that we need to separate2:01:46 between two things so when i when i so2:01:48 tim is raising a different point here i2:01:49 mean when i when i was when i was2:01:51 talking about partial explanation it2:01:53 really was about the modal collapse uh2:01:56 objection so not not specifically about2:01:59 contingent things requiring explanations2:02:02 so i i agree that on these two views2:02:04 there's going to be a stopping point2:02:06 right and either you're going to have2:02:09 modal collapse2:02:10 or either you're going to have some kind2:02:12 of contingency that um well then we need2:02:16 to address that right because the whole2:02:17 point is well contingent things need2:02:19 explanations but i guess it was it was2:02:21 on the2:02:22 modal collapse part that well if it's2:02:25 non-necessitating right so if i can say2:02:27 that that2:02:28 libertarian free will is that kind of2:02:30 thing and if there is anything that is2:02:32 like that it seems2:02:33 that libertarian free will is a very2:02:35 good candidate for that i mean from our2:02:37 own experience i guess i don't know your2:02:40 views about free will but i mean i just2:02:42 think it it seems like it is a2:02:45 plausibly a good candidate for that if2:02:46 th so if that is the case and and2:02:49 and we say that uh uh um2:02:52 that it is explained in that way that2:02:54 that's how libertarian free will is2:02:56 explained so assuming libertarian free2:02:58 will is true my causal history2:03:01 that that you know brings me to a2:03:03 certain point doesn't necessitate2:03:06 the choice i'm going to make i guess2:03:07 that's the gist of the idea and if so if2:03:10 it's non-necessitating2:03:11 then2:03:13 the fact that i choose a over b2:03:16 um it's not that it doesn't have an2:03:19 explanation it's that i am an agent who2:03:21 can freely choose a or b2:03:24 well it doesn't have an uh2:03:26 necessitating explanation2:03:28 yeah like it just isn't one uh2:03:31 necessitating explanation of any type2:03:33 it's not explained in that sense at all2:03:36 i mean there's there's there's a2:03:38 so you can say there's a non-contrastive2:03:40 explanation i'm just not sure what2:03:42 information is missing so on the on the2:03:44 libertarian view2:03:46 i mean the fact that you say2:03:49 uh2:03:50 i chose a because i chose a i mean2:03:52 obviously we don't speak in that2:03:53 language but just considering that point2:03:55 i chose a because i chose a seems to be2:03:57 like a2:03:58 perfectly legitimate explanation for a2:04:01 libertarian agent2:04:03 i mean i i don't see how else we can2:04:06 explain libertarian choices i chose a2:04:09 because i chose at least has the virtue2:04:11 of entailing that but i chose a right2:04:13 but the only because it's trivial i mean2:04:16 and and that's the problem with2:04:18 explanation is um2:04:19 generally2:04:21 it's2:04:22 you don't explain anything by just2:04:23 saying you know why is why is uh2:04:26 yeah because he's dead right i haven't2:04:27 explained anything by saying that so2:04:29 explanation can't be reflexive like that2:04:31 you can't have2:04:32 one and the same thing being both the2:04:35 explainer and the explained by that yeah2:04:37 yeah2:04:38 and i think yeah i think2:04:40 yeah i think you're right and i think2:04:42 like rp raises this concern but i think2:04:43 it's more of like a semantic thing like2:04:45 so so um so you could say that2:04:49 um2:04:50 so let's say2:04:53 uh um yeah so i chose a because i chose2:04:55 a right so you could say that an2:04:57 explanation2:04:58 or2:04:59 a a a equals a because a equals a so2:05:01 let's assume that2:05:03 well is that an explanation well some2:05:05 people might want to say it is2:05:08 self-explanatory and then well the2:05:11 objection you just gave i think it2:05:13 obviously applies in the sense that well2:05:14 what are you really explaining you're2:05:15 not explaining anything but2:05:17 others maybe so might say that it just2:05:19 doesn't require an explanation and i2:05:21 guess what what what we would mean in2:05:23 that case is that well2:05:26 once you understand what's being said2:05:28 you really don't need an explanation for2:05:29 it well so i don't need you to explain a2:05:31 equals a for me2:05:33 uh it just seems like that's the case oh2:05:35 i don't need to i don't need an2:05:37 explanation for a equals a because2:05:38 that's necessary right a equals a just2:05:41 seems like a2:05:42 tautology of logic so it's necessary but2:05:45 i have i choose cake over coke isn't2:05:48 necessary it's contingent so2:05:51 yeah2:05:52 if it doesn't have an explanation other2:05:53 than kind of trivial circular ones or2:05:56 if it just grounds out in me saying2:05:59 well2:06:00 if i choose cake it's because of the2:06:02 taste if i choose coke it's because i'm2:06:04 thirsty then that doesn't seem i mean it2:06:07 still leaves it hanging why2:06:09 the2:06:11 the first motivated you picking2:06:13 coke just saying2:06:15 that the conditions you know some2:06:16 non-necessitating conditions obtained2:06:19 still does leave it open why2:06:22 one of those was motivating you and not2:06:23 the other like there's there is still2:06:25 and it's you know2:06:27 it's all very well to say yeah but you2:06:28 know we don't ask that question or it2:06:30 doesn't seem like that but i'm forming a2:06:33 question that's just as valid as it2:06:34 seems to me i don't really see why it's2:06:36 any different from if i said you know2:06:38 some electron just pops into existence2:06:40 for no reason you say oh that can't2:06:41 happen i mean i could just say yeah well2:06:44 you know we think it does or something2:06:46 you know2:06:47 yeah yeah if we're playing the same game2:06:49 by the same rules you can't just appeal2:06:51 to some like2:06:52 special type of contingent event that2:06:54 doesn't have a causation it doesn't have2:06:56 an explanation but that's okay because2:06:59 yeah it's special or something like2:07:01 libertarian choices are still contingent2:07:03 and if they don't have explanations then2:07:05 there's just as bad as2:07:07 some other thing like uh electron2:07:08 popping into the universe yes but i2:07:10 guess we can make a difference between2:07:11 something that simply doesn't have an2:07:13 explanation and another that doesn't2:07:15 need an explanation and i get there's a2:07:16 difference between2:07:18 a equals a that's necessary and a2:07:21 contingent choice2:07:22 uh but okay so maybe there's a bit of2:07:24 nuance to it here so if i say so if i2:07:26 say i chose coke over pepsi or i chose2:07:28 you know chocolate cake over the coke2:07:31 then um well there's a lot of2:07:33 contingency going on there well because2:07:34 who's the i right i mean2:07:36 i'm a contingent being so i mean what2:07:38 explains me being here and making these2:07:40 choices2:07:41 i guess that that that's one question2:07:44 well then the other question is the2:07:46 choice itself2:07:47 the the real question i think is like on2:07:50 a libertarian view2:07:52 is that part of the explanation so i2:07:54 guess i get the the proposition as a2:07:56 whole is contingent right2:07:58 uh and and um2:08:01 i mean even in the case of god it would2:08:03 be a contingent proposition but then2:08:04 that part of the explanation2:08:07 wouldn't it wouldn't there be a2:08:09 significant difference between saying2:08:11 that something does not require2:08:15 an explanation because it's just2:08:17 so no i don't want to say2:08:18 self-explanatory but it just doesn't2:08:20 need an explanation because of the2:08:21 nature of what it what the thing is2:08:23 which is a libertarian choice and and we2:08:25 understand that we can relate to it2:08:27 versus2:08:28 versus2:08:29 an electron popped into existence and2:08:31 there's no explanation i mean i get that2:08:33 in modal terms2:08:35 there's no real difference but i guess2:08:37 when you bring the metaphysical2:08:39 considerations into the picture2:08:42 it seems like there's there's a serious2:08:43 difference2:08:44 well2:08:48 um2:08:51 it's not quite clear to me the2:08:52 foundation that this whole thing rests2:08:54 on i mean like2:08:56 so so it seems what you want to say is2:08:58 well we know libertarian choices kind of2:09:00 like by acquaintance with them because2:09:02 we do them all the time and that means2:09:04 that we easily understand what it means2:09:06 to2:09:07 freely choose2:09:08 cake over coke or whatever so we don't2:09:10 you know i don't need to worry about2:09:11 that anymore um2:09:13 but that doesn't seem right to me either2:09:15 i mean like okay i'm kind of acquainted2:09:17 with that that's true but at the same2:09:19 time it's quite puzzling when2:09:21 so for instance2:09:22 and2:09:23 i mean maybe this is what you what you2:09:25 think but i mean2:09:27 unless you think that your2:09:29 acts of will somehow2:09:32 uh can override the2:09:35 the laws of nature2:09:37 right that you can literally2:09:39 like intervene in what would otherwise2:09:42 have happened because of the physical2:09:44 necessities or something then you're2:09:46 stuck with either determinism or2:09:47 indeterminism and if determinism2:09:50 obviously there's you know you you are2:09:52 just making choices fully determined2:09:54 fully explained by prior choice and uh2:09:56 prior conditions and there's there2:09:58 really is no libertarian freedom at all2:10:00 um and it seems like your only option2:10:02 then is in determinism that's really2:10:04 going to know better because i mean that2:10:07 really just does mean things are2:10:08 happening2:10:09 um randomly and your2:10:12 free choices are just as you know part2:10:14 of that they're just you just pick coco2:10:16 for cake because you know some proton2:10:18 decayed or whatever and that's made you2:10:20 go down this path instead of the other2:10:22 one so2:10:23 i mean2:10:24 uh me can you explain that a bit i mean2:10:26 what's so what's um2:10:29 random what's random about it i get that2:10:31 it's indeterministic in that sense but2:10:33 uh2:10:34 but i think you're saying a bit more2:10:35 than that you're saying it's it's it's2:10:36 it's it's2:10:38 uh and deterministic in the sense that2:10:40 it's not you know doesn't rely on2:10:42 antecedent causes but you're also saying2:10:44 that it's um random in the sense that2:10:47 i'm not in control of it is that what2:10:49 well i'm saying that it um complicates2:10:52 that you were saying well we all2:10:54 understand this because we're making2:10:55 choices all the time but actually you2:10:56 can make this seem very problematic2:10:58 right this is what i'm trying to do is2:10:59 question whether it really is that2:11:01 simple and easy to appeal to i mean2:11:03 suppose the origin of your free choice2:11:05 to pick cake over coke is that some2:11:08 superposition in your brain collapsed to2:11:10 an eigenvalue of whatever as opposed to2:11:12 some other eigenvalue right2:11:14 suppose that's what2:11:16 that's the branching point that2:11:18 originates your choice going one way and2:11:20 not the other well2:11:22 um the difficulty there is that like2:11:25 there isn't any other story to tell you2:11:27 about like why2:11:28 super white collapsed in one direction2:11:30 rather than the other it's just it's2:11:31 effectively a brute contingency and now2:11:34 we've violated the psr so2:11:36 we're in no better situation than we2:11:38 were a moment ago when i said well maybe2:11:40 something just popped into existence out2:11:42 of nothing for no reason or something or2:11:44 just some group contingency at the base2:11:46 of of everything um yeah and so i i2:11:49 think when you bring your mind2:11:51 yeah so i think when you bring like the2:11:53 the2:11:54 maybe you were just you're just using it2:11:55 like as an analogy of the whole quantum2:11:57 stuff but then2:11:58 but when you bring that into the picture2:12:00 i mean it adds like uh i guess layers to2:12:03 into the analysis that i i don't i don't2:12:05 think is required so i mean i guess what2:12:07 what i don't see i i i don't see a2:12:09 reason for why2:12:11 uh2:12:12 a primitive2:12:13 you know faculty of2:12:15 uh um libertarian choice2:12:18 necessarily has to be associated with2:12:22 random fluctuating2:12:24 particles2:12:25 okay2:12:26 so let's let's posit one that overcomes2:12:29 that so it's neither restricted by2:12:32 causal uh determinism nor in2:12:35 uh causal indeterminism right it's2:12:39 some somehow a different to those2:12:41 but but then now what's going on is2:12:44 um2:12:45 you know2:12:47 give me some kind of uh i mean well2:12:49 let's just try in a very broad sense2:12:52 draw out what the picture you're2:12:53 describing looks like so on the one hand2:12:56 we've got like the laws of physics which2:12:58 explain um2:13:00 you know chemical reactions and the2:13:03 the collisions between objects and blah2:13:06 blah blah2:13:07 all this stuff and then2:13:08 we think you know something about2:13:09 chemistry relating to those physicals2:13:11 biology relating to those blah blah and2:13:13 then at some point2:13:15 where does human2:13:17 where does this uh mechanism you're2:13:19 positing2:13:21 uh kick in like how does it kick in2:13:23 what's going on like i just it's it's2:13:26 actually quite a mysterious2:13:28 addition to in certain to be otherwise2:13:31 relatively although you know those2:13:33 things unexplained but like relatively2:13:35 straightforward causal story that we2:13:38 will grow up knowing about what you're2:13:40 saying is there's this like2:13:42 i mean not literally but it sounds like2:13:44 a kind of magical2:13:45 interventionist ability that your2:13:48 what mind has to overcome the laws of2:13:51 physics and like choose options or2:13:53 whatever like it's really2:13:55 you know it's far away at least from you2:13:57 saying yeah yeah we don't have to worry2:13:59 about this this is a everyday thing that2:14:00 we all understand perfectly well2:14:03 no i don't think it's like that at all2:14:04 it's very difficult to explain what's2:14:06 going on there i guess that's my point2:14:09 yeah i mean i guess2:14:10 so i mean we're talking about like2:14:13 like the metaphysics of causation here2:14:14 right so i guess the idea is that that2:14:16 well i'm not going to um2:14:19 i don't think anything is2:14:20 straightforward about to be honest i2:14:21 don't think the chemistry is2:14:22 straightforward either so i i don't2:14:23 think2:14:25 if we're taught if we're looking at2:14:26 because it seems like you're looking at2:14:28 the everyday experience as well and2:14:29 saying well it's just normal that that2:14:31 thing bumps into that thing and then2:14:32 that stuff happens2:14:34 i think when we're when we're looking at2:14:35 a broader metaphysical picture i don't2:14:37 think any of it really is2:14:39 i don't think anything any of it should2:14:41 just be taken for granted and it's just2:14:42 common sense that that happens and this2:14:44 part isn't common sense i think uh the2:14:47 everyday picture is that both of them2:14:49 are common sense2:14:50 and the broader metaphysical picture is2:14:52 trying to account for what makes it the2:14:54 way it is so2:14:56 so i don't think there's anything2:14:58 strange in fact i think uh2:15:01 i think really we can't really relate to2:15:04 anything more than this2:15:06 this internal experience we have of2:15:09 a2:15:11 libertarian choice well maybe maybe you2:15:13 disagree but at least there is something2:15:15 internal to us that we can relate to2:15:17 more than anything2:15:18 uh in in the external world and the way2:15:21 the causal nexus around us makes things2:15:23 operate but2:15:25 um2:15:25 so i guess in that sense i just don't2:15:27 see the problem really with saying that2:15:29 well hey2:15:30 that ping-pong ball bumps into that one2:15:33 and then there's that reaction and well2:15:36 here there's within me this mechanism2:15:38 that i move myself2:15:40 yeah okay so i suppose that like i mean2:15:42 i think you understand at least the2:15:44 general picture i was painting which is2:15:46 like there's a causal story it's not2:15:48 quite clear how to fit this um2:15:51 self-moving will into that causal story2:15:53 it doesn't doesn't seem to fit in on2:15:55 determinism it doesn't seem to fit in on2:15:57 indeterminism but they seem to be the2:15:58 only two option immediately exclusive so2:16:00 like it doesn't seem to fit in so this2:16:02 is kind of at least a question mark2:16:03 about how that fits in together and then2:16:05 i suppose what's what's the other camp2:16:07 saying it's kind of determinists and2:16:09 compatibilists what are they saying2:16:12 because you're basically advocating an2:16:13 incompatibilist view here which is like2:16:16 hard hard free will kind of position but2:16:19 on the other side what they're saying is2:16:21 um2:16:23 human choices is just2:16:25 an event in the causal sequence just2:16:26 like anything else is right so they bite2:16:29 the bullet and say yes uh internal2:16:32 um2:16:33 seeming of free choice being different2:16:36 from the other sequences of events um is2:16:39 in some ways illusory so it's not2:16:41 actually veritical to what's going on or2:16:44 biting that bullet allows2:16:46 well it has as its consequence a clash2:16:49 with2:16:50 how it seems2:16:51 to us by our kind of intuitive internal2:16:54 picture and that's true so it's going to2:16:55 count against the theory to some extent2:16:57 that it does that but the2:16:59 explanatory payout2:17:01 is it now you have a unified2:17:03 um causal story at least in principle2:17:05 about what's going on in the world when2:17:06 you're making choices so2:17:09 um on the one hand you've got a theory2:17:11 and that would be sorry that would be2:17:12 the determinist positing this right2:17:14 determinist is kind of2:17:15 compatible so you know both those two2:17:17 super basically the same when it comes2:17:19 to this yeah because i guess my concern2:17:21 just very quickly so you can continue2:17:22 but just taking this into consideration2:17:24 my concern is like why is my uh um you2:17:27 know why is libertarian free will not2:17:29 indeterministic i think you're just2:17:30 thinking of a very specific picture of2:17:32 indeterminacy yeah it's it's not2:17:34 determinism on the one hand and2:17:36 libertarian freedom on the other it's2:17:38 libertarian freedom on the one hand and2:17:40 um the denial of libertarian freedom on2:17:43 the other so it doesn't take a stand on2:17:46 whether2:17:47 uh determinism or indeterminism is true2:17:49 but it's just saying2:17:51 which of whichever of those two is right2:17:54 um there's not a second type of cause2:17:57 which is called free choices by2:18:00 agents or something2:18:02 three choices by agents is actually just2:18:04 a cause in the causal order just like2:18:07 any other just like a rock falling down2:18:09 a2:18:10 mountain or a superposition decaying2:18:12 like that's all that there is it's just2:18:14 causes like that and we obviously think2:18:16 about them differently because you know2:18:19 we're we're apt to do that but we're2:18:21 just wrong if we think that it's2:18:24 metaphysically different from those but2:18:25 when you're talking about indeterminism2:18:27 are you talking about like obviously2:18:28 you're not talking about like the the2:18:30 epistemic sense where we where we think2:18:32 they're like there's like real and2:18:34 determinism2:18:35 like and stochastic like laws yeah yeah2:18:39 but but2:18:41 i mean what what does that look like in2:18:42 the sense that like um2:18:44 so it's probabilistic2:18:46 yeah right2:18:47 and and2:18:49 i don't know i guess i have questions2:18:50 about objective probability that that2:18:53 but like maybe like okay so so yeah2:18:56 if you want to say something well i mean2:18:57 there are versions of2:18:58 quantum accounts like copenhagen version2:19:00 where like the collapse of the2:19:01 superposition2:19:03 um is just probabilistic right just2:19:05 genuine2:19:06 like for uh probabilistic physics at2:19:09 that point as opposed to say something2:19:11 like the ever interpretation where like2:19:13 it's just the deterministic evolution of2:19:15 the wave function or something so i mean2:19:18 i don't know if that's helpful in any2:19:19 way but like yeah yeah i i i get it i2:19:21 just i guess this is just my my point of2:19:24 view is really what we do have access to2:19:27 causally if we're trying to be as simple2:19:29 as possible2:19:30 is and2:19:32 you know the macro scale which is2:19:35 seemingly deterministic2:19:37 and2:19:37 the2:19:39 agencies that we see in the world the2:19:41 agents that we see that don't seem to be2:19:43 just as a seeming2:19:45 don't seem to be strictly following that2:19:48 macro level2:19:50 determinism now when we look at the2:19:52 quantum scale2:19:53 i mean i'm not i don't i don't i don't2:19:55 want to that's the problem i said2:19:57 earlier with bringing the quantum2:19:59 mechanics into it because it just adds2:20:00 this layer into the analysis that about2:20:03 something that we know like2:20:05 very very little about like i i think2:20:07 like we're still like scratching the2:20:08 surface but just as a concept i think i2:20:11 can see here like2:20:13 that the obvious part like like it's not2:20:15 like one of them is obvious the other is2:20:16 not no it's obvious that there's this2:20:18 macro level determinism and it's obvious2:20:20 that there are agents in the world that2:20:22 seem to be2:20:24 in some kind of violation of it none of2:20:27 them none of these seem like2:20:29 like they both seem weird on a grander2:20:32 scale but like in the common sense uh of2:20:35 that when you bring it back to common2:20:36 sense i think they both just are obvious2:20:38 and2:20:39 i guess2:20:40 like so um2:20:43 i guess my so so when we talk about2:20:44 simplicity right so like like so so2:20:46 think of an idealist right so i mean and2:20:49 um and2:20:51 i mean are they positing the simpler2:20:54 explanation so like maybe maybe in in2:20:56 terms of like all aspects there's only2:20:58 like mental causation2:21:00 only the mental world exists well is2:21:01 that simpler2:21:03 i mean i guess it explains everything2:21:04 that we can explain there might be2:21:06 controversy there but generally speaking2:21:08 they can explain everything so it was2:21:10 that simpler2:21:11 and would i take that view2:21:13 i i don't know and uh2:21:15 in a sense because um2:21:18 i've uh i've read a few papers by2:21:21 i forgot his name2:21:23 uh2:21:24 anyway i read a few papers by a2:21:26 philosopher like uh who like in the past2:21:29 century or two who who um in response to2:21:32 hume read yeah he read so in response to2:21:35 hume he makes a very compelling case at2:21:37 least compelling like in the sense that2:21:39 well he's not talking a bunch of2:21:40 nonsense he's again assumed that well it2:21:43 seems like2:21:45 if anything you can't deny ancient2:21:47 causation you can deny whatever you want2:21:49 out there2:21:51 but you can't deny agent causation and2:21:53 maybe that takes us to to uh2:21:56 to a question about2:21:58 you know how coons improves florida2:22:00 paper about the psr and global2:22:02 skepticism right2:22:04 yeah and2:22:06 yeah and i'm wondering what you think of2:22:08 that approach that epistemic approach to2:22:10 the psr that2:22:11 a rejection of a certain type of psr2:22:15 can lead to a kind of skepticism about2:22:17 what i was just saying about you know2:22:19 external world like your empirical2:22:21 knowledge2:22:23 well you'll have to forgive me for not i2:22:25 mean2:22:26 for not remembering the fine details of2:22:28 that paper actually but2:22:30 um2:22:32 so the general idea is they propose that2:22:34 so their psr is about natural facts all2:22:36 contingent facts that you know2:22:38 all natural facts have an explanation2:22:41 and there's at least one supernatural2:22:42 fact that's the gist of it and the the2:22:44 general point is that well2:22:47 if you don't have any a priori method to2:22:51 2:22:52 to basically2:22:55 discern the2:22:57 explainable from the unexplainable or2:22:59 what requires an explanation from what2:23:01 doesn't2:23:02 then2:23:03 you2:23:04 basically2:23:05 can can fall into like it's a slippery2:23:08 slope to like a radical kind of2:23:09 skepticism because you can't really say2:23:11 anything about the external world and2:23:13 you can't really appear to your2:23:14 empirical knowledge to rectify that2:23:17 problem because that would be viciously2:23:19 circular because that's what we we want2:23:21 to justify2:23:24 um so and what's wrong with saying that2:23:26 the distinction between what needs an2:23:28 explanation what doesn't is what's2:23:29 contingent and what's necessary2:23:32 um2:23:33 i mean i guess the the the2:23:36 because i guess what we're concerned2:23:37 with here2:23:39 is2:23:40 maybe how you identify that in the sense2:23:42 that um2:23:43 because when you talk about concrete2:23:46 origins right you talk about causal2:23:47 explanations and2:23:49 talk about concrete uh necessity it's2:23:51 it's very different than this analytic2:23:53 analytic necessity so i guess i guess2:23:56 it's about what is the candidate for2:23:58 that and well i'm happy enough to say2:23:59 that everything that's concrete is2:24:00 contingent but2:24:02 you know theists not going to say that2:24:04 because they want to say that god is2:24:05 concrete but necessary2:24:07 so if anything the picture seems more2:24:10 complicated on your side and okay so so2:24:12 so that that's that's that's that's good2:24:14 so you want to say everything that is2:24:16 concrete2:24:17 is necessary and by sorry concrete is2:24:20 contingent2:24:22 everything that is concrete is2:24:23 contingent yeah did i say it the wrong2:24:25 way around the first time no yeah yeah2:24:26 no that's fine that's fine everything2:24:28 that is concrete is contingent and fine2:24:29 but where does that lead you that takes2:24:31 you like in in in the context of a2:24:33 discussion about2:24:34 a contingency argument it really takes2:24:36 you to abstract objects that2:24:38 are not2:24:38 causally they don't have causal ability2:24:40 they're causally effete so i mean so we2:24:43 don't really have an account causal2:24:44 account2:24:45 for for uh for the contingent stuff2:24:48 anyway i mean oh well i mean but then2:24:50 i'm coupling that with uh2:24:52 there being a beginningless past of2:24:54 contingent2:24:55 concrete events each one causes the next2:24:58 one2:25:00 um2:25:01 right so i mean i guess that's right but2:25:03 that's but i have to pick a view here2:25:04 that's probably but then there would be2:25:08 but there will be no explanation for2:25:10 that in the sense that well so i guess2:25:13 the concern is so if we're saying the2:25:14 contingent stuff need an explanation so2:25:16 for agreeing with that well then that2:25:18 series would be contingent so in the2:25:20 sense that well so you're not building2:25:21 something necessary but then in this2:25:23 case in the proposal you put forward the2:25:24 necessary thing is a abstract thing so2:25:27 that's not going to do any work no no2:25:28 abstract things don't explain concrete2:25:30 things yeah2:25:32 so2:25:33 what i'm going to say here is that2:25:34 there's so picture there being an2:25:36 infinite2:25:37 past of contingent events each one2:25:40 each one causing the subsequent one2:25:43 um2:25:45 then no contingent fact2:25:48 is unexplained2:25:50 because each as i just said each one is2:25:52 explained by the previous one2:25:55 um2:25:56 then it seems to me what you call you're2:25:57 left with is saying well what about the2:25:59 whole sequence right what explains that2:26:02 um2:26:03 and2:26:04 i'm just going to say that the2:26:06 explanation of2:26:07 the whole thing is just the junction of2:26:09 the explanations of each of the2:26:10 individual things2:26:12 so2:26:12 yeah but i mean that's um that's hume's2:26:15 uh objection right and uh yeah and i2:26:17 don't think anyone ever really gave for2:26:18 good robust i mean so i think2:26:21 like prus talks about that he talks2:26:23 about like uh2:26:24 what was the word uh2:26:26 a glop like an agglomerative explanation2:26:30 something like that2:26:31 yeah yeah where when like well that that2:26:34 assumes that it assumes that well2:26:36 uh2:26:37 if if if i explain2:26:39 uh uh2:26:42 x and i explain why then i've explained2:26:44 the existence of x and y2:26:46 but um2:26:47 it seems like2:26:48 if we're if we're taking the contingency2:26:50 argument seriously2:26:51 there is still going to be2:26:54 a contingent fact so you could have2:26:55 causally explained you know all that2:26:58 stuff but there's still going to be a2:26:59 contingent fact2:27:01 that's not explained so well i guess and2:27:03 that's i guess that's the whole series2:27:05 so i don't know if i agree though2:27:06 because like you know2:27:08 take two random contingent facts right2:27:11 like that i had coffee this morning2:27:14 and that like julius caesar2:27:17 had one slipper on when he was killed or2:27:19 something like i don't know that's true2:27:21 but let's just suppose that it's true um2:27:23 now2:27:24 each of those facts has an explanation2:27:26 presumably2:27:27 um and now consider the set that2:27:30 contains both of those facts in it2:27:33 is there a2:27:34 an explanation2:27:35 beyond the conjunction of both those2:27:38 individual facts for that set2:27:40 i think the answer is obviously no2:27:42 there's2:27:43 why not not for the yeah not for the2:27:46 particular set but there's obviously an2:27:47 external explanation for what's2:27:49 happening here in the sense that well2:27:51 i think we're thinking abstractly of the2:27:53 set no but then2:27:54 in terms of like the concrete world2:27:56 there will be a further explanation2:27:58 that's still going to keep asking why2:27:59 why and i guess the the reason i don't2:28:01 think this gets out of the2:28:02 skeptical problem is that because so2:28:04 they're still2:28:06 they're still it's still possible2:28:08 to have2:28:09 a contingent reality2:28:11 that2:28:12 has no explanation and what i mean2:28:15 has no explanation here is the fact that2:28:17 there exists2:28:19 a contingent series2:28:21 i don't know if you want to say that2:28:22 makes it necessary because what you said2:28:24 is necessary is the abstract object so2:28:25 that means that this contingent reality2:28:28 can exist2:28:30 and it doesn't call for an external2:28:32 explanation and the concern as as as2:28:34 coons puts it is that well2:28:38 i mean it really could be the case that2:28:40 your2:28:42 first person experience your you know2:28:45 first-person experience in a particular2:28:46 frame of time2:28:48 can be that i mean it could be the2:28:51 results of an infinite series or it2:28:52 could be2:28:54 you know that explanation and as silly2:28:56 as that sounds2:28:58 it seems like um2:29:00 the only way you can rule that out is2:29:01 really your experience but the problem2:29:03 is that begs the question because what2:29:04 we're trying to2:29:05 validate is your knowledge2:29:07 your empirical knowledge so i guess you2:29:09 can't appeal to it2:29:10 and2:29:11 i i don't know so it just seems to me2:29:14 that it doesn't uh2:29:16 get out of get out of the problem it2:29:17 seems much much more for me it just2:29:19 seems much more obvious2:29:21 especially considering this is already a2:29:23 very intuitive principle that people2:29:25 throughout history have had in one way2:29:27 or another and people who generally hold2:29:29 to that you know2:29:32 natural things2:29:33 and if we're going to divide that2:29:34 however you want like as2:29:36 limited finite things have explanations2:29:40 and that's just a broad metaphysical2:29:43 principle2:29:44 and you can come to a conclusion through2:29:46 that2:29:47 well2:29:48 hold on a minute so2:29:51 i thought the starting point was that2:29:52 each contingently true proposition has2:29:55 to have an explanation for why it's true2:29:56 rather than false2:29:58 and um yeah i'm not sure i agree if the2:30:03 starting point has to be2:30:05 well2:30:06 the point of my example with the me2:30:08 having coffee for breakfast and caesar's2:30:10 slippers right is to suppose is to cast2:30:13 down on the idea that you can generalize2:30:15 from that original starting point to say2:30:18 not just each continually true2:30:20 proposition has an explanation2:30:22 but that each set of contingently true2:30:25 propositions has an explanation2:30:28 you know over and above the conjunction2:30:31 of the explanation of the individual2:30:33 elements of the set right i mean i2:30:35 disagree with that principle i think you2:30:36 probably also disagree with that2:30:38 principle by the sounds of it you don't2:30:39 think there's a special2:30:42 explanation over and above2:30:44 so so2:30:45 why did i have coffee there's some2:30:47 explanation for that it's called p2:30:49 have me having coffee and it's just2:30:51 that's explained by cue some previous2:30:53 thing that happened earlier on in the2:30:55 day that explains oh yeah yeah yeah but2:30:57 i just explained but now just consider2:31:00 the set p and i don't know r which is2:31:03 caesar's slippers proposition now both2:31:05 of those have explanations right so2:31:07 something explained why his slipper fell2:31:09 off a few minutes before he would stand2:31:10 to death something explains why i made2:31:12 coffee instead of say tea or something2:31:14 right so both of those are explained but2:31:16 it's not like that set has2:31:19 if you want to explain the elements of2:31:20 the set you just have to say well2:31:23 but first there's the explanation why2:31:24 alex pick coffee and second there's2:31:26 explanation of why caesar's slipper fell2:31:28 off or something right yeah just the2:31:29 conjunction of those two explains2:31:32 yeah2:31:33 so what is your picture then you're2:31:35 saying there's2:31:37 an infinite amount of contingent things2:31:39 that explain each other is that what2:31:42 you're trying i mean i mean let me jake2:31:44 jake jake so i'm gonna mute this one so2:31:47 i'm gonna mute let me just say this2:31:48 about that point because i mentioned it2:31:49 earlier and then jake you can take over2:31:51 so i guess on that point i mentioned it2:31:52 earlier so earlier i was saying that2:31:54 well the fact that well abdul drank a2:31:57 coke that uh2:31:59 the self-explaining part on the2:32:01 libertarian view is is is the2:32:03 fact that i chose to drink coke but2:32:05 however if you look at the proposition2:32:06 as a whole who the hell is abdul2:32:08 i mean that's that's that's the point so2:32:10 unless you say unless you say so if you2:32:12 say for example the necessary being2:32:15 freely2:32:16 chose to create the world and we we want2:32:18 those two to be equivalent well freely2:32:20 choosing to create the world that2:32:22 doesn't need an explanation and the2:32:23 necessary being is necessary it doesn't2:32:25 need an explanation so that doesn't2:32:26 require an external explanation so i2:32:28 guess that's the difference between2:32:29 these two but then i mean2:32:31 i don't think any of that deals with2:32:33 with the skeptical problem because again2:32:34 whatever you say about this possible2:32:37 scenario being being um you know2:32:40 completely explained by the the the2:32:42 constituent parts that that2:32:45 you don't know what's out there you2:32:47 don't know the parts in the sense that2:32:48 you don't have any a priori means to2:32:51 actually rule out the possibility that2:32:53 your experience is that contingent thing2:32:56 that forms the conglomeration of2:32:58 contingency and maybe that's necessary2:32:59 maybe that doesn't need an explanation2:33:01 but we're not talking about epistemic2:33:03 explanation i mean obviously i everybody2:33:06 is lacking some aspect of2:33:08 explanation for staff2:33:10 so i thought we already said that we're2:33:12 not talking about epistemic explanation2:33:14 we're talking about metaphysical2:33:15 explanation like what actually is the2:33:17 thing that happened that explains why2:33:19 the other thing happened2:33:21 the fact that i'm lacking the2:33:22 information doesn't mean there isn't an2:33:24 explanation right even if nobody knows2:33:26 what the explanation is there is one so2:33:29 it we're not talking about what we know2:33:31 we're talking about what actually does2:33:32 explain whatever it's not yeah but i2:33:35 guess so the but the a priori principle2:33:37 to remove the skeptical concern sorry2:33:39 jake i'm going to bring you in right now2:33:40 but to basically to to get over the the2:33:43 skeptical uh uh concern is that the2:33:46 point is that what you need to a prior i2:33:48 know2:33:49 and you can interpret no here however2:33:51 you want what you do a prior i know is2:33:53 that well2:33:54 there is this2:33:56 type x that requires2:34:00 explanations and my2:34:03 current like solipsistic experience2:34:05 is2:34:07 part of that type x i guess that's2:34:09 that's that's that's the point so jake2:34:11 if you want to say something i'm gonna2:34:12 mute but uh alex you can reply first2:34:15 well i think i think the reply is i2:34:16 probably need to go and read the paper2:34:18 again to have a clear remember yeah yeah2:34:20 that's fine what you were saying then in2:34:22 that case yeah that's fine uh so jake2:34:24 you you wanted to say something sorry2:34:26 for2:34:27 yeah i'm just trying to understand the2:34:28 overall picture it seems like we have an2:34:31 infinite amount of things2:34:33 in alex's framework all of which are2:34:36 contingent2:34:37 and you know it's this kind of chain of2:34:40 one explaining the other2:34:42 um but2:34:45 i'm wondering if you if you2:34:47 it seems like you're not accepting the2:34:49 strong psr2:34:50 uh i don't know if you would endorse the2:34:53 weak psr2:34:54 or what sort of2:34:57 uh are you working with or you just2:34:59 don't have any principle at all2:35:01 well2:35:03 i mean let's just be so quite clear2:35:05 about it i i'm not really like saying i2:35:08 think this is true but i i guess i'm2:35:09 saying i don't see how you rolled this2:35:12 option out right like it so to prevent2:35:15 the argument going through you just need2:35:17 to have2:35:19 one of the various horns that were2:35:22 presented at the beginning2:35:24 still on the table and you haven't2:35:26 managed to argue by elimination to to2:35:29 the necessity2:35:30 of like2:35:31 the necessary cause2:35:33 version2:35:34 instead so i i'm not saying like i2:35:36 believe this is my view i'm just saying2:35:40 what's wrong with this view so it's a2:35:42 strong psr view every contingent event2:35:45 strongly explains2:35:47 the next one2:35:49 um2:35:50 and there's just infinitely many of them2:35:51 and there's no stopping point and then2:35:53 the classic objection to this is2:35:55 something like yeah but what explains2:35:57 the whole sequence why this whole2:35:59 sequence rather than some other whole2:36:01 sequence and i guess my reply was saying2:36:03 well the explanation of the whole2:36:05 sequence is just the conjunction of each2:36:07 of the elements2:36:08 themselves so2:36:09 what explains p it's q2:36:12 what explains q it's r blah blah blah so2:36:14 like the explanation of the whole2:36:16 sequence just basically is2:36:18 um2:36:19 the individual explanations for each2:36:21 element in the sequence now if that's2:36:24 right then there's nothing that's not2:36:25 explained each thing2:36:27 is explained each part of the whole is2:36:30 explained and if each part of the whole2:36:32 is explained then the whole is explained2:36:34 um and i i was arguing well i mean i2:36:39 guess i was saying look if you think2:36:41 that2:36:42 in general whenever you have2:36:45 like a set or something that's got like2:36:47 elements to it2:36:49 that you have to have more than just the2:36:51 explanation of each of the individual2:36:53 parts to have an explanation of that2:36:56 whole2:36:57 then i deny that principle and here's2:36:59 the cancer example2:37:01 me having coffee for breakfast and2:37:03 caesar wearing one slipper it's2:37:05 implausible to suppose there's some2:37:07 third thing which explains that2:37:09 apart over and above2:37:11 the individual explanation from my2:37:13 having coffee and the individual2:37:14 explanation for caesar wearing one2:37:16 slipper like once you've given those two2:37:18 explanations that's it you you're done2:37:21 explains nothing else to say about it2:37:23 like each2:37:24 ps strong psr is satisfied there's no2:37:27 contingent thing yeah that's what i2:37:28 wanted to be clear on so then you are2:37:30 you're you are accepting the strong psr2:37:33 uh in your explanation but because what2:37:36 i'm doing is2:37:37 um i'm agitating against the argument2:37:40 i'm saying let's suppose the ps strong2:37:42 psr is true2:37:44 um but how did you eliminate this2:37:47 idea that there's a never-ending2:37:49 sequence of explanations because in2:37:51 order for the argument to be successful2:37:52 you have to eliminate all of the other2:37:54 options2:37:55 it's an argument by elimination right2:37:59 i i get that but i'm i'm asking at this2:38:03 point because i've been listening for2:38:04 quite a while i'm asking at this point2:38:07 if that's the view you um2:38:11 obviously you're i'm not saying that you2:38:13 have to commit to it but i'm saying is2:38:15 is that the view that you lean towards2:38:17 or are you just responding this way and2:38:19 virtue of the argument and you you2:38:21 really have no confidence in strong psr2:38:24 whatsoever yeah that's what i'm asking2:38:26 yeah yeah that's right it's an2:38:28 instrumental um invocation of the2:38:31 principle for the purposes of2:38:34 arguing against the success2:38:36 of this contingency argument it's not2:38:39 like i believe in it myself oh yeah so2:38:41 so my question is then what's your2:38:43 actual position on the strong psr2:38:47 well2:38:48 i mean2:38:52 so this so as i said in the first place2:38:54 is kind of modal collapse argument makes2:38:56 you think that2:38:57 either2:38:58 the strong psr is false2:39:01 or2:39:02 everything is necessary2:39:04 or2:39:05 well yeah now actually that's it it's2:39:07 either the strong psr is false or2:39:09 everything is necessary2:39:10 so2:39:11 um2:39:14 if i have to pick out of those two2:39:17 i guess i don't think everything is2:39:18 necessary i mean i guess i reject strong2:39:21 psr just because otherwise i feel like i2:39:23 have to project2:39:24 i have to accept that everything is2:39:25 necessary and that seems wrong so2:39:29 why2:39:30 then i would pick the strong psr as well2:39:33 well why is that given what you've just2:39:36 said um2:39:37 the explanation you gave2:39:40 seemed to affirm the strong psr and yet2:39:42 everything is contingent not everything2:39:44 is necessary2:39:48 well2:39:50 i mean2:39:50 okay that's that's fair so so i suppose2:39:53 there's another kind of dimension to the2:39:55 strong psr the first one is that2:39:57 uh2:39:59 is that2:40:00 explanation is is necessitating2:40:03 um2:40:07 um2:40:09 okay what's the right way to put this2:40:10 thing so then2:40:14 yeah so i suppose what i'm saying is2:40:17 if you think that2:40:19 okay so here's another way to put this2:40:21 right okay let me let me let me try and2:40:23 be a bit more explicit about it i guess2:40:25 what i'm saying on this human view that2:40:28 there's a never ending or another2:40:29 beginning sequence of2:40:31 contingent events each one that explains2:40:33 the next is that you do just say2:40:36 there's no explanation of the totality2:40:39 of contingent reality that's just2:40:41 unexplained2:40:43 um2:40:44 you just but you deny2:40:46 that uh what i was trying to do is sort2:40:48 of deny that the original motivation uh2:40:52 pushes you to that second claim that you2:40:55 have to accept you have to explain2:40:57 the whole of contingent reality but2:40:59 let's suppose2:41:00 so i suppose what i'm saying is that the2:41:02 strongest version of the psr2:41:05 has both of the2:41:08 explanation is entailment and2:41:11 uh the whole of contingent reality has2:41:14 has that type of explanation now2:41:16 that2:41:17 if you you hold both of those things2:41:20 then2:41:20 you get this fanning morgan2:41:23 uh2:41:24 argument which is2:41:26 which is effectively that um2:41:28 suppose suppose within this like shape2:41:32 here the circle or something i'm drawing2:41:34 has their whole of contingent reality2:41:36 and absolutely every contingent fact2:41:38 right is contained within this area now2:41:41 if that has a necessitating explanation2:41:44 for it then it can't be from a2:41:47 contingent thing it has to be from a2:41:49 necessary thing because we just said2:41:51 every contingent thing is within this2:41:53 area and also self-explanation seems2:41:56 incoherent right so2:42:00 i guess that's another aspect of this2:42:01 i'm assuming self-explanation is2:42:03 incoherent but that seems pretty obvious2:42:05 um2:42:07 but then it follows that the explanation2:42:08 must be necessary if explanation is a2:42:11 necessitation relation then because2:42:15 every2:42:15 consequence of that sorry2:42:17 alex maybe you can clarify before you2:42:19 carry on maybe clarify that last point2:42:21 because it seems like the infinite2:42:23 series of contingent things that seems2:42:24 like that's uh that's it seems like2:42:26 that's a self-explanation at least when2:42:27 i'm asking why do contingencies exist2:42:29 well no but this here's here's the point2:42:31 that i'm confused about so2:42:35 it seems like you you said two different2:42:38 things right and that's why i introduced2:42:41 this third option2:42:43 on the one hand it seemed like you were2:42:45 trying to say well there isn't2:42:48 there is no such thing as2:42:51 the conjunction of everything of all the2:42:53 parts you know they they are explained2:42:56 by the individual uh members right2:43:00 but then on the other hand when you when2:43:03 i'm asking for your view and you bring2:43:05 this point up i said well it seems like2:43:08 you're affirming the strong psr2:43:11 and everything is explained but then he2:43:13 said well wait let me think about that2:43:15 more no actually2:43:17 the thing2:43:19 which is the totality is unexplained2:43:21 over and against others so it's yes it's2:43:24 it seemed like you slid back and forth2:43:26 kind of i think that's fair enough i2:43:27 think that um i may have been2:43:32 uh that's fine i guess i'm saying which2:43:35 one are you really2:43:36 going with at this point just so i can2:43:38 understand what the theory is because2:43:40 they're they're two different theories2:43:42 right i mean2:43:44 yeah okay so i think2:43:47 so what i was doing in the first place2:43:48 was like playing the game of like what2:43:50 do i think like what's going on what's2:43:52 the analysis of fruitful analysis of the2:43:54 argument and how secondly you're saying2:43:55 to me what do you actually think so i2:43:57 think it's slightly different questions2:43:58 and it's reasonable to ask that second2:44:00 question and2:44:02 i think now2:44:03 now i'm focusing on that second question2:44:04 rather than the first one it's2:44:06 reasonable because it's bringing out2:44:08 something that i hadn't really2:44:10 uh spent enough time explaining the2:44:12 first time around so fair enough um yeah2:44:15 so2:44:17 so the first time around i was saying2:44:18 well look i i dispute the requirement2:44:21 for this like additional explanation or2:44:24 something but i think it's fair enough2:44:25 if i'm if i'm picking a view to be2:44:27 honest about like yeah i guess what2:44:29 happens is um on that for you i was2:44:33 explaining you do just have to say that2:44:35 we're just not endorsing the requirement2:44:38 for an overall explanation but2:44:40 uh the strongest the reason why i2:44:43 reject the strongest possible psr2:44:46 is because if you include that2:44:49 requirement to explain all of causal or2:44:51 all of contingent reality2:44:54 absolutely everything2:44:56 with an entailment relation2:44:58 then2:44:59 the vanning worgen argument shows you2:45:01 that the thing doing the explaining has2:45:03 to be necessary because the thing being2:45:05 explained is all of contingent reality2:45:08 that the only thing left is necessary2:45:11 and if2:45:12 the2:45:13 necessity if the explanation relation is2:45:15 an assess necessitation relation then it2:45:19 follows logically2:45:20 that2:45:21 um2:45:23 that there is no contingent reality at2:45:25 all because2:45:26 the logical consequences of necessary2:45:28 truths are themselves necessary there's2:45:30 no contingent logical consequence of a2:45:33 necessary truth2:45:34 and so2:45:35 that is a2:45:37 most strong version of modal collapse2:45:40 that you get and now the way out of that2:45:42 is to suppose that there's some2:45:44 contingent2:45:45 uh thing that's not explained by the psr2:45:48 the very strongest vsr2:45:50 or that everything is necessary2:45:52 or that the strongest version of the psr2:45:54 is false um2:45:57 and i just don't see that you can2:46:00 chart a course2:46:01 between those so did you follow that2:46:04 change of reasoning yeah but yeah yeah i2:46:07 do but so now what i'm saying is now2:46:09 we're back to2:46:11 the2:46:11 two options instead of2:46:13 this other third option in which2:46:16 everything everything is contingent and2:46:18 everything is explained2:46:20 now we're back to well there's something2:46:23 that's fundamentally contingent2:46:25 that isn't explained or everything is2:46:28 necessary that's kind of where we're at2:46:30 now that's so2:46:32 um but then i go back to my original2:46:35 question2:46:36 what sort of explanatory principle are2:46:40 you dealing with because if you're at2:46:42 that point if you're not accepting2:46:44 because you're saying well if i have2:46:46 those two options2:46:48 the one of everything being necessary2:46:50 just seems more absurd than the other2:46:54 options yeah so it seems like you're2:46:55 leaning more towards that one which then2:46:58 would entail a rejection of the strong2:47:01 psr which then goes back to my original2:47:04 question what explanatory principle2:47:07 would you be operating with2:47:09 well i mean if you have to have2:47:11 something that's contingent2:47:12 that's not explained in that strong2:47:16 necessitation way2:47:18 um2:47:19 the view i was advocating a moment ago2:47:20 which is a beginningless chain2:47:23 at least has the virtue that every2:47:24 individual thing is explained2:47:26 um if we have to have something that's2:47:28 not explained2:47:29 it's really just2:47:31 i mean like i said i i can get off you2:47:33 something as a con you know it's a2:47:36 commiseration2:47:37 you can't have a proper explanation of2:47:39 the whole of contingent reality but what2:47:41 you can have is the conjunction of all2:47:43 of the contingent things so in a way you2:47:45 do explain everything it's not like2:47:47 something's popping into existence i2:47:49 have nothing right some fruit2:47:51 contingency that just starts a new chain2:47:53 or something which arguably is what2:47:54 happens on the libertarian view anyway2:47:57 um so2:47:58 at least i'm saying everything has a2:48:00 kind of proper strong2:48:01 explanation if you want that if you like2:48:03 that type of thing here's a review for2:48:05 you right it's just2:48:06 the way you escape the modal collapses2:48:09 the whole of contingent reality that2:48:11 whole sequence doesn't itself have a2:48:13 necessitating explanation if it did then2:48:16 actually you'd have mobile collapse2:48:18 again so you have to something has to2:48:20 give to avoid modal collapse2:48:23 you can embrace a weakened assassination2:48:25 relation2:48:26 so not the strong psr or you can say2:48:29 something contingent exists that's not2:48:31 explained by that you could pick a2:48:34 specific contingent proposition and just2:48:35 say that that's not explained but it2:48:37 explains everything else or you could do2:48:39 the thing that i was saying which is2:48:41 no individual continued proposition is2:48:43 unexplained but the entire chain is in a2:48:47 sense unexplained but i i give you i'll2:48:49 i give you an offering on that view2:48:51 which is a conjunction of all of the2:48:53 individual explanations it seems to me2:48:55 it's a pretty good deal gets you that2:48:57 best balance of2:48:58 all of those considerations2:49:00 yeah but then it seems that there are2:49:03 two things uh that i don't think the2:49:05 theory really deals with i mean the old2:49:08 famous question of why is there2:49:09 something rather than nothing2:49:11 it doesn't explain2:49:13 why things exist rather than nothing at2:49:15 all2:49:16 and it also doesn't explain why2:49:19 the actual world rather than another2:49:22 possible world2:49:23 so those two questions seem to me to be2:49:26 left unanswered2:49:29 uh okay but then i mean let's let's do a2:49:32 comparison then i mean because you know2:49:35 no view is completely invulnerable to2:49:37 any problem but the real thing is2:49:39 what do you do2:49:41 i'm just doing an analysis that's all2:49:43 i'm just trying to say what what are we2:49:44 left with on each uh theory and view2:49:47 that's all i i get it so so but what i'm2:49:51 saying is uh are those considerations2:49:53 are better explained on your theory than2:49:55 mine for instance and if they're equal2:49:58 on both theories and they don't help us2:50:00 tell between the theories right like you2:50:02 know arguably no no theory explains away2:50:06 solipsism completely but that doesn't2:50:09 you know solipsisms no doesn't help2:50:12 tell which theory is true right because2:50:14 it affects every theory the same way so2:50:16 it's just you know it's a problem for2:50:17 everybody so if this was a problem for2:50:19 both of us then you know so what right2:50:22 if it's a problem for me but not a2:50:23 problem for you then good it helps you2:50:26 and it hurts me so let's see if it's2:50:28 one of those right is there a problem2:50:30 for everyone or is it just a problem for2:50:31 me so i mean2:50:34 uh2:50:35 you're saying that on this view where2:50:39 there's an infinite sequence of2:50:40 contingent things it doesn't explain why2:50:42 there's something rather than nothing2:50:45 what's the explanation of why there's2:50:47 something rather nothing on your view2:50:49 because there's a necessary being that2:50:51 exists in all possible worlds2:50:53 could he have not made anything at all2:50:56 but he would always still be something2:50:58 so there would some be something that2:51:00 always exists2:51:06 because i think god is necessary so i'm2:51:08 saying assuming that we go with the2:51:10 option that there's something that's2:51:12 necessary2:51:14 um so god is necessary and he exists in2:51:16 all possible worlds that would explain2:51:19 why there's something rather than2:51:21 nothing at all2:51:22 and then also2:51:24 uh the second point of why there's the2:51:27 actual world over2:51:29 another possible world is explained by2:51:32 god's action2:51:34 which i know we went through the whole2:51:36 thing about libertarian free will and2:51:38 and all that those issues2:51:40 but i still think2:51:43 um that theory overall has more2:51:46 explanatory power and strength than the2:51:49 view that doesn't explain why there's2:51:51 something2:51:52 at all rather than nothing and also2:51:55 doesn't really do anything to help2:51:57 understand or explain why the actual2:52:00 world over another possible world2:52:03 okay so2:52:05 on your view2:52:06 the reason2:52:08 so i'm not sure if this helps you in any2:52:09 way right so unless you think that2:52:13 because2:52:15 i think necessary truths don't have any2:52:17 explanation2:52:18 right like2:52:19 why is one plus one equals two2:52:22 there's there's no explanation not in2:52:23 the terms we were talking about a moment2:52:25 ago where like2:52:26 you state the prior condition that2:52:28 necessitates that thing coming about2:52:30 like why did i have coffee rather than2:52:33 tea or why did this uh2:52:35 ball roll down the hill or something2:52:37 like like what we're doing when we give2:52:38 that type of explanation is we're2:52:40 stating prior conditions that2:52:42 necessitate2:52:44 the thing we're trying to explain2:52:46 right but if i talk about a necessary2:52:49 truth then because they're independent2:52:52 of any conditions obtaining that you2:52:54 can't give a condition that necessitates2:52:56 it but it's necessary even if that thing2:52:59 didn't happen for everything2:53:01 right now maybe there's a concrete thing2:53:03 that exists necessarily i don't think so2:53:06 but it's your hypothesis so let's let's2:53:08 run with it and see what happens um2:53:11 if necessary truths don't have any2:53:13 explanations then nothing explains why2:53:16 that thing exists2:53:18 and i you you were telling me that this2:53:20 is2:53:21 a part of your theory which is better2:53:23 than mine specifically on the question2:53:25 of why something exists rather than2:53:27 nothing but your answer was because a2:53:29 necessary being exists that doesn't have2:53:31 any explanation so how is that better2:53:34 than me saying well a lot of concrete2:53:37 contingent things happen2:53:38 and you know2:53:40 i offered you some kind of explanation2:53:41 for it but you didn't like it but i mean2:53:43 your your your alternative is just to2:53:45 postulate2:53:46 some necessary truth which kind of by2:53:48 definition doesn't have any explanation2:53:50 at all i mean don't see how that does2:53:52 better you know the question why is2:53:54 there something rather than nothing2:53:56 because a thing exists for which there's2:53:58 no explanation why it exists that's not2:54:00 a good explanation that's no explanation2:54:02 at all right2:54:04 so that's why i don't think that2:54:05 explanation works it's not an2:54:06 explanation just positing a necessary2:54:09 being2:54:10 even if it's true that it exists nothing2:54:12 explains why that exists so therefore2:54:15 nothing explains ultimately why there's2:54:17 something other than nothing does that2:54:19 make sense2:54:21 um2:54:22 yeah i understand what you're saying and2:54:24 i think uh i kind of want to2:54:28 go on to a different topic um2:54:31 too much2:54:32 and trying to run away through no no2:54:34 because i think it's related to what i2:54:35 want to say because i think you do2:54:38 believe in necessary things that exist2:54:41 in all possible worlds2:54:43 um2:54:44 based on your conversation with um james2:54:48 anderson and your understanding of2:54:50 platonism2:54:52 those are abstract things not concrete2:54:54 things yes right so those are abstract2:54:57 things so do you think it's it's2:54:59 possible for those abstract things to2:55:02 exist2:55:03 apart from2:55:06 the actual world or any other concrete2:55:08 existence2:55:10 i i think yeah the existence of abstract2:55:13 things is independent of the existence2:55:14 of any concrete things2:55:17 right so then in that case2:55:21 there's a possible world in which only2:55:23 abstract necessary things exist2:55:26 and no concrete2:55:29 nothing concrete exists2:55:32 uh yeah okay sure2:55:34 i mean2:55:34 i2:55:36 i'm playing the game a bit announced the2:55:38 team i'm just wondering is this a scene2:55:41 yeah i don't on an aristotelian2:55:44 view where there's no beginning to time2:55:48 every possible world overlaps with the2:55:50 actual world so2:55:52 i mean unless the actual world2:55:55 at no point contains any concrete things2:55:57 then2:55:58 um there isn't a possible world where2:56:01 at no point is there a concrete thing2:56:03 like if there's some concrete thing at2:56:04 some point in the actual world then it's2:56:06 not possible this is an entirely empty2:56:09 world no concrete things in it but ah so2:56:12 so that's so that yeah so then that's my2:56:15 point is then that means that something2:56:18 concrete is necessary2:56:22 um2:56:23 huh2:56:25 i mean it follows that if there's2:56:27 something concrete then it's necessary2:56:29 that there's something hungry that's2:56:30 true it doesn't follow it doesn't2:56:33 i don't have to hold that there is but2:56:34 um yeah i think that's right on the2:56:36 aristotelian view that's right that2:56:38 there's there couldn't be an empty world2:56:39 unless the actual world is an empty2:56:41 world2:56:42 uh2:56:43 right but then if that's the case then2:56:45 now you have something necessary that's2:56:47 concrete and now we go all the way back2:56:50 to step one in which your your theory is2:56:53 now radically different no no no no no2:56:56 i don't have that there's a necessary2:56:58 concrete thing but i think it's2:56:59 necessary that there's something2:57:01 concrete but each of those things could2:57:02 be contingent it's just that there2:57:04 couldn't be no2:57:07 concrete things2:57:08 but it doesn't mean there is one2:57:09 concrete thing that's necessary it's2:57:11 just not2:57:12 not individual but the2:57:14 thing exists yeah but the genus i'm2:57:16 saying2:57:18 so when we're talking or something what2:57:19 do you mean by the genus you mean the2:57:22 type2:57:23 yeah the category of concrete2:57:27 some of the category of something being2:57:29 concrete2:57:30 that's necessary2:57:32 yeah and so i'm not saying that2:57:33 therefore you're forced into2:57:35 oh a particular molecule or a pen yeah2:57:38 yeah2:57:39 i'm not saying that i'm not saying that2:57:41 but2:57:42 there2:57:43 the2:57:44 the category of concrete existence would2:57:47 then be necessary2:57:50 yeah okay well that's compatible with me2:57:51 saying every concrete thing contingently2:57:53 exists2:57:55 yeah2:57:56 right but now2:57:58 to me it seems like you're getting a bit2:58:01 closer to2:58:02 the view that we're trying to represent2:58:08 and maybe a little bit but i'm not sure2:58:09 that2:58:11 it's significantly closer because2:58:13 um2:58:16 so let me see if if we can retrace the2:58:18 steps where we just got got to make sure2:58:21 because maybe i'm missing this but2:58:22 um2:58:25 what i i was advancing that view that2:58:28 there's a beginning sequence of2:58:29 contingent propositions say contingent2:58:32 concretely existing things or something2:58:34 um2:58:36 and you said well2:58:39 that view suffers from this problem that2:58:41 i can't explain why there's something2:58:42 other than nothing2:58:44 um2:58:47 and then2:58:48 you said well on our view there's2:58:50 there's a necessary2:58:52 concrete thing2:58:54 um2:58:55 then i said well problem with that is it2:58:57 doesn't explain anything if it's2:58:58 unnecessarily existing concrete thing2:59:02 and now you're saying well on the2:59:03 aristotelian view it's necessary that2:59:06 some concrete thing2:59:07 exists2:59:09 brackets if it's actually true that some2:59:11 concrete thing exists whatever um2:59:14 what's the significance of that2:59:16 concession2:59:18 how does that2:59:20 i'm not sure how it deals with them2:59:21 because my rebuttal to your point was2:59:24 you're not explaining anything if you've2:59:26 got unnecessarily existent2:59:29 concrete thing because necessarily2:59:32 necessary truths don't have explanations2:59:36 yeah and i'm not sure that you're2:59:38 disagreeing with me about that or not2:59:42 yeah because i originally i originally2:59:44 was2:59:45 well i shouldn't say originally but the2:59:47 step in the discussion i wanted to go2:59:49 back to is when i was talking about2:59:52 uh a possible world in which abstract2:59:54 objects it exists but no concrete object2:59:57 exists originally you said yes but then2:59:59 you thought given your aristotelian view3:00:02 of what you were3:00:03 yeah i'm going to represent yeah if3:00:06 you're representing if you're sticking3:00:07 to that then you're saying no no that's3:00:10 not really going to work so then3:00:12 if you haven't changed but before we get3:00:14 to that bit just whilst we were still on3:00:16 the point that when i because you said3:00:18 on our viewing necessarily existing3:00:20 concrete thing exists and i said i don't3:00:22 understand how that provides any3:00:23 explanation3:00:24 i'm i before we start talking about3:00:26 whether i think3:00:28 there could be no concrete things i'm3:00:30 just not clear whether whether you3:00:31 agreed with that reply or whether you3:00:33 disagreed with it3:00:35 uh agreed with what that necessary3:00:38 necessary truths don't have explanations3:00:40 do you agree with that3:00:43 um3:00:43 3:00:45 in a sense that i don't really like the3:00:48 self-explanation idea3:00:50 so3:00:51 if there's an entity x3:00:54 that's concrete3:00:55 and3:00:56 exists3:00:57 and that that's a necessary truth3:01:00 nothing explains3:01:01 that x exists3:01:03 because necessary truth3:01:05 right3:01:07 no there's nothing we just3:01:09 yeah there's nothing there's nothing3:01:10 outside of the thing itself no that's3:01:12 explaining okay no3:01:14 so originally the criticism was i can't3:01:17 explain why something rather than3:01:19 nothing exists3:01:21 and you're3:01:22 and i said well what happens on your3:01:23 theory and you said well on our theory3:01:26 god exists necessarily but now i think i3:01:29 just can see that nothing explains that3:01:31 so how3:01:33 now i'm showing that you're winding up3:01:35 in the same place3:01:37 but before we talk about that how it3:01:39 still feels like you haven't3:01:41 are you agreeing then that your theory3:01:42 doesn't have an explanatory advantage3:01:44 because3:01:45 it doesn't explain away why it doesn't3:01:47 have anything to say about why there's3:01:49 something rather than nothing positing a3:01:52 being that exists necessarily with no3:01:53 explanation3:01:55 can't explain why something exists3:01:56 rather than nothing can it3:01:59 um3:02:01 well3:02:03 when you say why is there something3:02:05 rather than nothing right and we're3:02:07 including3:02:08 uh concrete existence in that3:02:11 i'm saying that if god is the necessary3:02:13 being3:02:14 and he exists in all possible worlds3:02:17 yeah that x in the sense explains the3:02:20 question of why there couldn't be3:02:22 non-existence3:02:24 but nothing explains why he exists so3:02:27 it's only to take one step back kind of3:02:29 kind of explanation and then you find3:02:31 that you're because if i say look it's3:02:33 just a brute contingency that something3:02:34 exists then you might rightly complain3:02:37 that well take one further step back why3:02:40 does that brute contingency exist i said3:02:41 well no reason at all and you say ah3:02:43 there's no reason then it's so good to3:02:45 just give me one step of explanation3:02:48 away from the kind of precipice of there3:02:50 being no explanation beyond that but it3:02:52 seems to me exactly what you've done by3:02:54 just giving me you know just some object3:02:56 exists necessarily but nothing explains3:02:59 that3:03:00 i mean if anything is unsatisfying3:03:02 explanation it must be that3:03:05 mind if i jump in here because this is3:03:06 this is great i mean i've been listening3:03:07 this is this is awesome but3:03:09 so i think at this point so i think the3:03:11 the most important3:03:13 point here is that well3:03:15 it seems like this is going to boil down3:03:18 to the fact that on both views i'm not3:03:20 saying you're necessarily committed to3:03:21 this alex i'm just saying as far as the3:03:23 discussion is concerned both views are3:03:24 going to commit to something necessary3:03:27 but right now there's the there's so3:03:28 there's the question of the overall3:03:30 theory3:03:31 and wait how is there a difference3:03:33 you're saying that there's something3:03:34 necessary3:03:35 has no explanation i'm saying there's3:03:37 something necessary it has no3:03:38 explanation but3:03:41 i'm not really sure that's the case so3:03:42 first of all there's there is the3:03:44 question of whether self explanation3:03:46 makes any sense and that's that's3:03:47 controversial so we can either accept3:03:49 that there is self explanation or say3:03:51 that something doesn't need an3:03:53 explanation3:03:54 now if we go for the latter something3:03:57 doesn't need an explanation3:03:59 we can either say it doesn't need an3:04:01 explanation3:04:03 by3:04:03 a virtue of it3:04:06 being necessary period3:04:08 and that can like literally be the tree3:04:10 right outside my door it just doesn't3:04:12 need an explanation just that's just it3:04:15 or we can say that there is something3:04:18 about the nature of3:04:20 this thing3:04:21 that doesn't call for an explanation in3:04:25 a similar way although the analogy isn't3:04:27 perfect so like an analytic truth like a3:04:29 equals a3:04:30 you're not going to ask for an3:04:31 explanation for that now3:04:33 it's obviously difficult to think of3:04:35 something like that in3:04:36 in the concrete world right because it's3:04:38 not an analytic truth but then3:04:41 at least what we're saying is3:04:43 that3:04:44 these are two views and we're thinking3:04:46 of the explanatory power3:04:49 on one view3:04:51 so3:04:52 so on one view there's there's just3:04:55 a rock that's self-explanatory on the3:04:57 other view we're saying no no it's3:05:00 it's something that self-explanatory or3:05:01 something that doesn't require3:05:02 explanation but in order for it to be3:05:04 that3:05:05 it's not that nature it's not it's not a3:05:07 rock it's something that is in a3:05:09 different category than these things3:05:12 around us that you know the natural3:05:14 world that does call for an explanation3:05:16 so i it might be a bit tricky like in3:05:18 the sense that when we look at a theory3:05:20 from the outside okay well it explains3:05:22 it that one explains it fine we're good3:05:24 we're it's a stalemate but then i mean3:05:27 in a sense you could say that about like3:05:28 a solipsist versus an external world3:05:30 realist well i mean he explains3:05:32 everything i mean3:05:34 yeah well look3:05:36 here's3:05:37 i mean if if what you're saying is3:05:40 on our3:05:41 theistic theory the difference is3:05:44 we've got a thing3:05:47 god whose nature3:05:49 gives it the3:05:50 i mean3:05:52 just to be quick about it to get out of3:05:54 jail free god i don't mean anything3:05:55 offensive it's not any accusation of3:05:57 deception or anything like that but like3:05:59 the reason why this is different from3:06:00 the other things3:06:01 is its nature if i press further on that3:06:04 isn't it really just that its nature is3:06:06 that it exists necessarily i mean and3:06:08 and then now what we're talking about is3:06:10 just actually it's just not a contingent3:06:13 proposition i mean i'm okay with3:06:15 necessary propositions not having3:06:17 explanations so like3:06:19 that's fine it's just that if if all you3:06:21 mean by its nature3:06:23 being special is that it's a necessarily3:06:25 existing thing then i just don't see how3:06:27 that progresses dialectic anywhere3:06:29 because3:06:30 if what we're saying is the reason why3:06:32 there's something rather than nothing is3:06:33 because something exists necessarily3:06:35 then you can't be an advantage in terms3:06:37 of explanation because3:06:39 aren't we just agreeing that necessary3:06:40 things don't have explanation so3:06:42 positing another necessary thing can't3:06:44 help you in terms of explanation because3:06:46 it's just yeah well3:06:48 i guess we are agreeing one second hold3:06:50 on a second3:06:51 man i think if we're agreeing on that3:06:54 we've made progress3:06:57 as far as i'm concerned in the3:06:59 conversation because i don't think we i3:07:01 don't think we necessarily and no pun3:07:04 intended started there we i don't think3:07:06 we started there so i think3:07:08 we've made progress in in the3:07:10 conversation that's just that's not how3:07:12 i look at it i like that idea3:07:14 yeah yeah yeah i mean i mean i think i3:07:16 think that is true and that's why it's a3:07:17 great discussion but then i i would3:07:18 disagree that so i would think by the3:07:20 way guys we've been going for like three3:07:22 hours we're gonna finish obviously i3:07:24 think i think we need to set like a a3:07:27 20-minute cap on it okay3:07:29 i really gotta go soon3:07:32 20 minutes is good so what i want to say3:07:34 is that i'm not sure we mean the same3:07:35 thing by no explanation that's that's3:07:37 first of all i mean so there might be a3:07:39 discussion that there but uh3:07:41 because again so you could say the same3:07:43 if i say that a equals a has no3:07:45 explanation3:07:46 and you know the grass is green has no3:07:48 explanation well we might mean the same3:07:49 thing by that but then if if i'm saying3:07:52 the grass is green has no explanation3:07:53 you're going to give me this look that3:07:54 it's not going to be like hey we're both3:07:55 saying the same thing period uh and3:07:58 green is contingent presumably yeah but3:08:00 that's kind of the point so that my my3:08:02 point is that well in in in the case of3:08:04 what you're positing as necessary i am3:08:07 saying that well3:08:09 again back to the skeptical problem3:08:10 because i think this is mostly an3:08:11 epistemic question it's it's well what3:08:14 is it about a natural thing that is3:08:17 necessary that differentiates it from3:08:20 other things that are contingent and can3:08:23 we say anything about a like you know3:08:25 hypothetical necessary concrete thing3:08:27 about its nature that qualifies it to be3:08:30 this thing that doesn't require an3:08:32 explanation it seems we can just from3:08:34 like even by just looking at like3:08:35 analytic truths it seems like we can3:08:38 look at something and not need an3:08:40 explanation versus not just needing an3:08:44 explanation for something that's3:08:45 screaming out for an explanation well3:08:47 but let's not mix up the nest the3:08:49 epidemic and the metaphysical again i3:08:51 mean yeah yeah i might look at a proof3:08:53 and understand it straight away but that3:08:55 doesn't mean that uh3:08:58 you know that my my ability to see it3:09:00 quickly or something doesn't mean that3:09:01 it doesn't have a further explanation or3:09:04 doesn't need a further explanation i3:09:06 mean3:09:07 i i don't know whether you're trying to3:09:09 disagree with this but3:09:11 contingent things need explanations3:09:13 necessary things don't i mean in that3:09:15 sense and what i mean by explanation is3:09:17 this strong psr sense of like an3:09:20 entailment and something that3:09:21 necessitates it3:09:23 you know i mean that's not that's not3:09:24 the view i hold to but i mean so i don't3:09:26 think it it needs to be an entailment3:09:28 relation but i guess on on certain3:09:31 accounts you can like so i guess it just3:09:33 depends on how you hash out the3:09:34 entailment the sufficient but not3:09:36 necessarily explanation but i guess so3:09:38 the point so you are right i might have3:09:40 been confusing the3:09:41 the epistemic and the metaphysical3:09:43 question but then the reason for that is3:09:45 because i think we can look at the3:09:46 nature of the necessary concrete thing3:09:49 in different ways so um there is the3:09:52 like in the sense of like its nature as3:09:55 in3:09:56 um3:09:57 so you have like what divine3:09:58 simplicities say which we wouldn't3:10:00 commit to right so the idea that the3:10:02 nature is identical to i i don't think3:10:04 that makes much sense i think there's3:10:05 some plausibility to some ideas3:10:08 within advanced simplicity conception3:10:10 but then uh then there's gonna be the3:10:12 other aspect that you described so3:10:14 there's just like the i mean i guess the3:10:16 logical truth of it in a sense like that3:10:18 that it part of its nature is to be a3:10:20 necessary existent and that's not gonna3:10:22 tell us anything about anything else3:10:25 but so i guess3:10:27 there there are two aspects to it so3:10:29 prus and in his new cosmological3:10:31 argument he says3:10:32 i mean in the very beginning he says3:10:33 that um3:10:35 he talks about uh3:10:37 there is something that3:10:38 that we want to prove that there is3:10:40 something that is like uh3:10:42 necessity3:10:43 and its necessity can be shown through3:10:46 an ontological argument even if we're3:10:49 not up for3:10:51 to you know proposing it in the sense3:10:52 that there is an ontological3:10:55 account for its necessity3:10:58 uh3:10:59 that explains its necessary nature3:11:02 uh but3:11:03 from my point of view at this point it3:11:06 makes sense to to to to bring the3:11:08 discussion to3:11:10 about that stage too of course we're not3:11:11 going to go there in 20 minutes but then3:11:13 and talk about stuff like what what uh3:11:16 you know uh rasmussen and coons talk3:11:18 about in terms of the no arbitrary3:11:20 limitation or bound unboundedness and3:11:24 i i don't think we can really separate3:11:25 so there might be an overlap between the3:11:27 epistemic and the metaphysical question3:11:28 but then3:11:29 i think it is relevant in the sense that3:11:31 if we are asking if there is a dispute3:11:33 and we're asking well what is it that3:11:35 qualifies something to have3:11:38 necessary i mean necessary existence3:11:40 seems to be a huge deal i mean it3:11:42 doesn't seem to be you know something3:11:43 that we're going to experience in our3:11:45 everyday life and it there3:11:47 i mean i guess there's a strong3:11:48 intuition about that so uh and that3:11:51 discussion can be had so we can have3:11:53 questions about you know3:11:55 what is it that makes this thing3:11:59 apart from the fact that's necessary3:12:00 what is it that makes this thing uh not3:12:03 require an explanation3:12:05 and it seems to me that a a3:12:10 if you're talking about brew contingency3:12:11 or a necessary natural thing it seems3:12:14 like there's not going to be an3:12:14 accountability it seems like it's like3:12:16 well there's3:12:17 there's a first thing that explains3:12:18 everything else fine i agree with that3:12:20 now how are we gonna say anything else3:12:22 uh i don't think so3:12:24 uh i don't think we can in in the3:12:26 natural um3:12:27 explain so i guess i guess that's that's3:12:29 where i'm seeing3:12:31 this you know where we've reached here3:12:33 well3:12:35 i think if3:12:38 so it sounds to me like what you're3:12:39 trying to say is there's3:12:41 you wanna3:12:42 so i was saying previously that the the3:12:44 relevant distinction between what has an3:12:46 explanation and what doesn't it's what's3:12:48 necessary and what's contingent it3:12:50 sounds to me that what you're saying is3:12:52 um3:12:54 that3:12:56 it's actually something like3:12:57 what's natural and what's supernatural3:12:59 or something because3:13:01 even if i said3:13:03 let's for arguments say composite some3:13:05 natural3:13:06 but necessarily existing3:13:09 say concrete object like a brock or3:13:11 whatever3:13:12 you're going gonna say even though it's3:13:15 true3:13:15 that it necessarily exists3:13:18 still3:13:18 um3:13:20 it's implausible to suppose that it3:13:21 doesn't have an explanation3:13:23 right3:13:24 ah is that right yeah but i think i3:13:26 think this is where the discussion goes3:13:27 to like so so you know the whole thing3:13:28 about like necessary in itself and3:13:30 necessary through another because yeah i3:13:31 mean you're right in the sense that well3:13:33 if if a concrete if a rock exists in3:13:35 every possible world well that just3:13:36 makes it necessary but i guess i i guess3:13:40 i mean i'm talking about necessary in3:13:43 terms of like fundamentality and i don't3:13:44 want to make it you know causal in the3:13:46 sense i don't want to3:13:48 uh i don't confuse arguments but then3:13:51 i guess3:13:52 well you could say so assume assume god3:13:54 exists in every possible world and in3:13:56 every possible world3:13:58 god3:13:58 you know creates something creates let's3:14:00 say the same thing3:14:01 necessarily he creates it well then yeah3:14:03 that thing is necessary3:14:05 um3:14:06 but i i think there3:14:09 is a distinction between uh uh being3:14:11 necessary yourself unnecessary to3:14:13 another um i wouldn't want the concrete3:14:16 world to be necessary so i would want to3:14:17 avoid that kind of modal collapse but3:14:19 then i think i think there is really a3:14:20 difference so like james anderson for3:14:23 example if he if he thinks that you know3:14:25 mathematical truths and logical truths3:14:26 are necessary3:14:28 um clearly he me he he grounds them in3:14:31 in a more fundamental uh thing3:14:33 uh but that doesn't mean they're not3:14:34 both necessary but so i guess it's just3:14:36 about like with the specific uh you know3:14:39 what the crucial aspect of necessity3:14:41 we're talking about here yeah i mean3:14:43 look this is why3:14:44 it's helpful to be clear about exactly3:14:46 all of the things that we mean i mean3:14:49 so3:14:50 when i'm saying that something is3:14:52 uh3:14:54 necessary3:14:55 um3:14:58 basically3:14:59 um3:15:02 i mean so so maybe you can respond to3:15:04 him because it seems like this is the3:15:06 confusion so he's saying abdul the3:15:07 existence of the rock depends on god3:15:09 which makes it contingent not necessary3:15:11 so this is where the i think part of3:15:14 like the confusion comes3:15:16 i agree it's dependent but like i guess3:15:18 in in modal terms it's just if it exists3:15:21 in every possible world in modal terms3:15:23 it's necessary but like am i going to3:15:25 commit to the idea that you know it's3:15:28 not dependent it could be necessary and3:15:30 dependent so i guess that's what we3:15:32 would mean by necessary through another3:15:35 maybe that's the that's actually what3:15:36 we're looking for in terms of a ultimate3:15:38 explanation we're not just looking for3:15:40 something that's merely necessary in the3:15:42 modal sense but a concrete foundation3:15:46 that basically3:15:48 uh um3:15:50 is independent because if it wasn't3:15:52 independent then i mean back to square3:15:54 one so i guess i guess that's that's the3:15:56 point independence3:15:57 sounds different than what3:16:00 i think we were talking about a moment3:16:01 ago because i think we're just talking3:16:02 about different subject now like3:16:05 that's true previously what we're3:16:06 talking about is3:16:08 some3:16:09 humdrum contingent fact like me having3:16:12 coffee or something right now3:16:16 that3:16:17 contingent fact about me having coffee3:16:20 well before it takes place it's3:16:22 contingent right it's both future and3:16:24 contingent and then3:16:26 some3:16:28 it might and at some point it becomes3:16:30 present right it's no longer future but3:16:32 it might be and and you know on this3:16:35 aristotelian view everything that's3:16:36 present is necessary as well because3:16:39 like it's too late to do anything about3:16:40 it i i am having coffee now it's too3:16:42 late to not have had coffee this morning3:16:44 or something five minutes before i drink3:16:46 the coffee i can still throw it and pour3:16:48 it down the drain or something like3:16:49 still contingent so3:16:51 things that are contingent of future but3:16:54 not everything in its future is3:16:55 contingent and even me having coffee3:16:58 might still be future3:17:00 and necessary before it becomes present3:17:02 i like some sequence of events you know3:17:04 it's falling out of the cup and into my3:17:06 mouth and there's some like you know a3:17:07 couple of seconds half a second fraction3:17:09 of a second3:17:10 nothing can stop me from drinking i'm3:17:12 going to drink it's too late for3:17:14 anything to intervene to stop it3:17:16 happening so3:17:17 i think that3:17:18 really really rigorously what we mean by3:17:21 sufficient reason is the point at which3:17:24 something3:17:25 transfers from being contingent being i3:17:27 mean future continues being future3:17:29 necessary like what happens that makes3:17:32 something inevitable right but because3:17:35 that's the necessitating condition3:17:38 that's the thing that takes place it3:17:40 changes its modal status from contingent3:17:42 to necessary now if that's and that3:17:46 seems very very intuitive to be3:17:48 what a sufficient condition is right in3:17:51 temporal modal terms but if that's what3:17:53 it is then all necessary truths like3:17:57 truths of mathematics or you know3:17:59 eternal truths about beings that exist3:18:01 and stuff there is no point in time3:18:03 where they ever become3:18:05 they ever get necessitated they don't3:18:07 and that never happens they never start3:18:09 off contingent and then become necessary3:18:12 so yeah there is no but it seems like3:18:14 you you reach with jake to the point3:18:15 that we're so i i guess it is we're3:18:17 talking about many different topics here3:18:18 because it seems like you reached jake3:18:20 to the point that well okay so let's3:18:21 talk about this like you know3:18:22 fundamental3:18:23 necessary thing and that like you know3:18:25 there is um3:18:26 let's say there must there is something3:18:28 that's necessary right and so assume3:18:30 that like you know everything3:18:33 like deterministically follows from that3:18:35 necessity3:18:36 um3:18:37 then then right everything would be3:18:40 necessary3:18:42 but um i guess when we're asking the you3:18:45 know grander question about like you3:18:46 know uh3:18:48 accounting for the necessity of that you3:18:51 you could take it as a whole and account3:18:53 for the necessity of everything but i3:18:55 guess the point is whatever3:18:57 does account for the existence of3:19:00 contingent things3:19:02 that is what we're focusing on and3:19:05 that's what we're3:19:06 that's what i think i mean you that we3:19:08 can sail i think we're just i think3:19:11 the the agnostic or the atheist position3:19:13 and sometimes3:19:14 i think it stops too early because i3:19:16 think there's some things that more3:19:17 things that we can say3:19:19 about what would make something3:19:21 necessary there's more things you can3:19:22 say the question is whether that makes3:19:24 any explanatory difference whether you3:19:25 say them or not like so let's suppose i3:19:28 say3:19:29 uh that it's necessary that there is3:19:31 something3:19:32 on my view right3:19:34 but that it's there's no explanation of3:19:36 anything else you can't say anything3:19:37 more about that you've got aha and after3:19:38 you we can say a bit more than that3:19:40 because3:19:41 not only is it necessary sorry that3:19:44 there is something let's say you agree3:19:45 with that um but there's a reason why3:19:48 and the reason is because god made all3:19:51 of the stuff right3:19:53 but so you can say more about it the3:19:55 question is does it actually do anything3:19:56 to say that3:19:58 um think it does though well advantage3:20:01 i think it does because i think i think3:20:03 you said in the past that i mean you see3:20:05 the intuition beyond positing something3:20:07 like let's say uh you know unboundedness3:20:10 or limitlessness for necessary things3:20:12 that there seems like there is an3:20:13 intuition there and that we we find that3:20:15 in science too among physicists when3:20:16 they talk about ultimate explanations3:20:18 and and stuff like that and you know3:20:20 unwanted like arbitrary variables in in3:20:23 in in some models and so i think3:20:27 so i think in that sense well if there3:20:28 is that intuition well then i guess3:20:30 there is something we can say that adds3:20:33 uh3:20:34 explanatory power not3:20:36 how is that explanatory just means that3:20:37 what you're saying is that like3:20:39 the extra thing that i add to the3:20:41 explanatory story3:20:43 also satisfies an intuition i've got3:20:45 that's not the same as explaining more3:20:47 things um so i guess it wouldn't explain3:20:50 more saying so if you look so again this3:20:52 so what i said earlier is if you look at3:20:53 the theories from the outside yeah so so3:20:56 this explains the data that explains it3:20:58 and i guess right now i'm talking about3:21:00 given other considerations which is more3:21:02 like of a like stage two consideration3:21:05 yeah okay so yeah other explanatory3:21:07 versions yeah yeah3:21:08 yeah that's what i said stage two yeah3:21:10 yeah well here's here's an ex3:21:13 here's a theoretical virtue uh3:21:15 ontological simplicity you're positing3:21:16 an additional entity so so you i mean3:21:20 okay you're saying it satisfies an3:21:22 intuition that you've got about like3:21:24 maximality and limits or something but3:21:26 it contravenes this like otherwise3:21:29 rational principle we shouldn't add3:21:31 entities if we can get away without them3:21:33 so you're paying a cost for that i mean3:21:36 yeah if if the cost was equal to the3:21:39 gain that it gave you then it would be3:21:41 no benefit to doing it and it seems to3:21:43 me that the cost massively outweighs the3:21:44 benefit that you get i mean the3:21:45 intuition is flaky as hell but the3:21:47 oncological cost is massive like you're3:21:49 positive um3:21:51 necessary concrete being whereas i'm not3:21:54 so obviously there's a big ontological3:21:56 cost there that's not disputable and but3:21:58 the value of satisfying some intuition3:22:01 you have in metaphysics is very very3:22:03 dubious it seems to me so i mean at best3:22:05 they match in which case it's not an3:22:06 advantage but actually they don't match3:22:08 it's just a cost that doesn't pay for3:22:10 itself so i think you're losing still on3:22:13 that yeah so i i don't i don't think3:22:14 there's no i don't think yeah yeah i3:22:16 don't think it's a flaky intuition to be3:22:18 honest because again so if you if3:22:20 so3:22:22 so so so what you're saying is that3:22:24 there is an ontological far cost but3:22:26 then i and before going to the3:22:27 ontological cost and talking about3:22:29 simplicity because what what the3:22:31 simplicity is going to assume simplicity3:22:33 only matters as like a tie breaker all3:22:35 other things equal so like let's assume3:22:38 for example that that um3:22:41 uh you know i have a theory that3:22:43 explains diversity in nature3:22:45 in terms of explanation it explains it3:22:47 just as well as like evolutionary theory3:22:49 does3:22:50 and it'll say pause it's less uh so3:22:53 obviously there's so there's there's3:22:54 more of like a3:22:55 quantitative simplicity here but then3:22:58 assuming it's simpler that doesn't that3:23:01 means nothing so far considering the3:23:03 evidence and i guess3:23:04 when you look at the broader picture i3:23:06 mean everything we said about the psr3:23:08 and explanation and the nature of the3:23:10 contingent world and natural world and3:23:12 what does call for an explanation3:23:14 does uh give serious merit to the idea3:23:18 that we need to uh um that we can3:23:21 utilize this these3:23:23 uh um you know a priori notions about3:23:26 the way the world works to say something3:23:28 about the ultimate nature of reality3:23:30 that would get us out of you know uh3:23:32 certain uh skeptical uh um uh you know3:23:36 arguments on the one hand and that would3:23:38 ontologically3:23:40 presuming we're right account for3:23:42 necessity on the other and so i don't3:23:44 think that's just a flaky intuition i3:23:47 think it's it's so i think it's so i3:23:50 could say it's a flaky intuition that we3:23:52 think that causality operates the way it3:23:55 does in the external world3:23:56 and while you can appeal to your3:23:58 intuition but then obviously3:24:01 i mean like the solo cyst or somebody3:24:02 who doesn't believe in external world3:24:04 realism is going to be like well that's3:24:05 a flaky intuition and i as less an3:24:08 idealist or a solipsist i'm explaining3:24:10 everything you explain and if we're if3:24:13 we take like you know3:24:15 the skepticism like about external world3:24:17 realism that's been dominating uh3:24:20 uh3:24:20 philosophy for for for a long time3:24:23 seriously then i think it's really worth3:24:26 taking seriously the possibility that3:24:28 our intuitions about the external world3:24:31 are are flaky but if that's the case3:24:35 then then i think we we fall into a3:24:37 problem with skepticism that we don't3:24:39 really want to fall into the sense that3:24:41 i want to say i have empirical knowledge3:24:43 of the world i want to say that things3:24:45 don't just happen3:24:47 you know3:24:48 for no reason that could be just this3:24:49 red ball that exists eternally for no3:24:51 reason i want to say that our intuitions3:24:54 although fallible3:24:56 given the reality that we kind of agree3:24:59 that we do have knowledge our intuition3:25:01 can play a good role in helping us3:25:04 distinguish between something that3:25:07 clearly screams out for an explanation3:25:09 and another that is more3:25:11 a more plausible candidate for3:25:13 fundamentality i guess that's3:25:16 that's the way that's the3:25:17 way guys guys it's like 20 minutes we i3:25:20 think alex if you guys are fine with it3:25:24 i think we'll give you the last word3:25:26 and um3:25:29 kind of wrap it up because you did say3:25:32 you didn't want to be until midnight and3:25:34 uh3:25:37 um if you want you can give your final3:25:40 reply to um3:25:41 abdul and then maybe just you know sort3:25:45 of closing remarks on3:25:47 the conversation and how you think it3:25:49 went um3:25:51 so i guess um3:25:58 yeah i guess3:25:59 i think with uh3:26:03 i'm still not really seeing3:26:05 so i guess my my3:26:07 my position is something like this that3:26:09 i still don't really see what3:26:12 the benefit is3:26:15 uh3:26:16 so3:26:17 picking the option i was playing around3:26:19 with was3:26:20 you have a beginning a sequence of3:26:22 events3:26:23 each of which is contingent and3:26:26 everything contingent needs an3:26:27 explanation3:26:29 at least every individual contingent3:26:31 thing needs an explanation3:26:33 we play around with strong psr but we3:26:36 avoid modal collapse because we suppose3:26:38 that the whole contingent series3:26:41 doesn't have any individual explanation3:26:43 it just has the conjunction of each3:26:44 individual part as its explanation and3:26:47 it seems to be a pretty good balance of3:26:49 things3:26:50 um i3:26:51 i mean3:26:54 if you want to preserve as many things3:26:55 as you can out of these3:26:57 you've got explanations for each3:26:59 individual contingent thing3:27:01 um3:27:03 i didn't really see the benefit that was3:27:06 to be got from positing unnecessary3:27:09 being in the first place i mean3:27:11 on its face it seems like it either does3:27:13 something contingent3:27:14 um3:27:17 or it does something necessary in either3:27:19 case we're back to square one really i3:27:21 mean i'm not sure what difference means3:27:23 but then we'll be talking a lot about3:27:24 this personal cause stuff3:27:27 but then again i3:27:28 i don't i don't think that that's3:27:30 very clear it's not clear to me but how3:27:32 that helps i still think that in those3:27:35 cases3:27:36 i can ask why the agent did a rather3:27:38 than b and things like because i did3:27:41 whatever just sound to me like uh no no3:27:44 explanation at all3:27:45 um3:27:47 so so i'm still puzzling right why that3:27:50 why i should3:27:51 buy that type of3:27:53 answer i'm just not seeing how it makes3:27:56 much difference3:27:57 so i think3:27:58 generously it's it's draw frankly3:28:01 between3:28:02 these two it's not like i think3:28:03 necessarily there is an infinite change3:28:06 you know contingent things i just i just3:28:08 don't see how there's a decisive3:28:11 consideration that tells in favor of of3:28:13 uh the alternative than that so i think3:28:16 it's just kind of a stalemate there3:28:18 um3:28:19 i think it's been really fun3:28:20 conversation i'm really glad that we had3:28:23 that we had this um3:28:25 it's been really fun you guys are both3:28:26 cool um3:28:28 i think your show is cool3:28:30 um you guys treat these things really3:28:32 well3:28:33 um3:28:34 you you normally have good insightful3:28:36 things to say and you're really like3:28:40 respectful and3:28:41 uh3:28:42 you know polite and intelligent so i3:28:45 think that you know it's been a pleasure3:28:47 to talk to you guys um3:28:50 so i guess my closing remark is like3:28:52 thank you very much you know3:28:54 thanks a lot i mean the pleasure is ours3:28:56 i um i mean i mean i i'm personally uh i3:28:59 personally have a lot of respect for you3:29:00 and i follow your work and i think the3:29:01 same about you you engage with the3:29:04 arguments respectfully you take them3:29:05 seriously unlike a lot of people we see3:29:07 out there um so so i i respect that and3:29:11 i think it always really is going going3:29:12 to be a still mate in the sense of like3:29:14 like convincing one another but i guess3:29:16 what3:29:17 some of the benefits of these3:29:19 discussions that well maybe a lot of3:29:20 what you said like you know i can take3:29:22 home and like reconsider some stuff and3:29:24 you could do the same and really for the3:29:26 a3:29:28 neutral observer if if that kind of3:29:30 person exists3:29:31 they can also get something out of this3:29:33 so i um3:29:34 i i really appreciate you coming on and3:29:37 maybe we can talk i mean i i guess i'll3:29:39 send you a message about the whole3:29:41 uh um3:29:42 you know uh sorry libertarian choice3:29:45 thing because i think there's a lot to3:29:46 say there as well and i forgot to say it3:29:48 about3:29:49 something that's clearly can account for3:29:51 this problem in the beginning but yeah3:29:53 we can we can uh3:29:54 we can definitely talk again really3:29:56 appreciate you coming on sorry for3:29:57 taking all that time3:29:59 and uh and yeah we'll talk through take3:30:01 your final words and then close3:30:04 yeah i'm actually on the admin account3:30:06 now so i can close it out but uh i just3:30:09 wanted to show a comment from roger who3:30:11 has been here3:30:13 three and a half hours and uh he's i've3:30:16 seen him commenting throughout and he3:30:18 said this was so good guys though we3:30:20 disagree about god's existence i thought3:30:22 adventure podcast uh this was a great3:30:25 show so i agree i think that it was uh3:30:29 great insightful3:30:31 i think3:30:31 i i learned a lot3:30:33 about alex's views on some of these3:30:36 things and3:30:37 i think that some genuine progress was3:30:40 made in the discussion and i really3:30:42 enjoyed it so i want to thank alex uh3:30:46 for coming and and joining us for this3:30:48 discussion and people in the chat are3:30:50 saying maybe we need a part two so3:30:53 that's definitely on the table from our3:30:55 side in the future um maybe we'll have3:30:58 another discussion3:31:00 and um yeah with that being said um i'm3:31:03 going to close it out guys i'll hit the3:31:05 outro i want to thank everybody3:31:08 for watching and until next time3:31:10 assalamu3:31:14 peace3:31:41 you

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